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The Citizens of each State shall. be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the congressional debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, the framers of the Amendment pointed to the terms "privileges"
and "immunities" used in Article IV, Section 2 as precursors of the
identical terms used in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided that "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ...." 3 The terms "privileges" and "immunities" were terms of
art that had acquired a specific legal meaning through a series of judicial
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
2. As Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stated in a Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1871:
The clause of the fourteenth amendment, "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States," does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and
immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article 4, section

2.
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 466 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 41-22, at 1 (1871)). Similarly, Senator Poland stated that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause "secures nothing beyond what was intended by the original
provision in the Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866); see
also infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text discussing Republicans' views concerning
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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decisions involving the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2. 4 Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1, and
other Republicans believed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 may have been designed to guarantee certain
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States that were
inherent in the concept of American citizenship uniformly throughout the
United States. For example, Senator Bingham stated on January" 25,
1866, prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, "I
believe that the free citizens of each State were guarantied [sic], and
intended to be guarantied [sic] by the terms of the Constitution, all-not
some, 'all '-the privileges of citizens of the United States in every
State."5 Similarly, Congressman Frederick Woodbridge, a Vermont
Radical, stated that the proposed Amendment would
give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain
to citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its enactments when
necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever State he may be,
those privileges and immunities which are guarantied [sic] to him under the
Constitution of the United States. 6

4. As Justice Story noted in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160
(1820), when such terms derived from the common law are interpreted, "definitions are
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text" of the Constitution.
Raoul Berger has also argued that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" were
"words of art" having a "circumscribed meaning." Raoul Berger, Constitutional
Interpretation and Activist Fantasies, 82 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (1993). However, Berger would
constrain the terms as used in Article IV, Section 2 to certain privileges of "trade and
commerce." This Article contends that although the terms "privileges" and "immunities"
did have a well-defined and circumscribed legal meaning, the meaning encompassed a
number of capacities of the citizen besides those dealing solely with trade and
commerce. See also infra note 17 (collecting cases interpreting the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2); ROGER HOWELL, THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSIDP 9-10 (1918) ("The words 'privileges' and
'immunities,' like the greater part of the legal phraseology of this country, have been
carried over from the law of Great Britain, and recur constantly either as such or in
equivalent expressions from the time of Magna Charta. For all practical purposes they
are synonymous in meaning, and originally signified a peculiar right or private law
conceded to particular persons or places whereby a certain individual or class of
individuals was exempted from the rigor of the common law."). See also Earl M. Maltz,
Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305,
305 (1988) ("An examination of antebellum thought reveals that equal protection, due
process, and privileges and immunities were terms symbolizing a core set Qf basic rights
in which there was substantial agreement in both free state and slave state society.").
5. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866).
6. Id. at 1088.
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However, most Republicans, like Senator Bingham, believed that the
Constitution provid~d no mechanism for congressional enforcement of
the Clause.7 For example, in discussing the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment, Congressman Thaddeus Stevens stated:
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every
one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some form or other, in
our DECLARATION or organic law. But the Constitution limits only the
action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment
supplies the defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the
States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally
upon all. 8

Thus, based on such statements, it is likely that Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was thought by members of Congress as well as
the populace at large to be analogous to provisions already present in the
Constitution. The important innovation contained.in the Amendment
was Section 5, which conferred upon Congress the power to enforce
these provisions. 9
Although a number of scholars have attempted to determine what was
originally meant by the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article rv, Section 2, 10 no

7. This was Charles Fairman's conclusion as well. Fairman stated that "these
great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the
Constitution, rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the
States." Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 25 (1949). Fairman believed that this "bill of rights" was
composed of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 33-34.
However, some Republicans thought that there was a congressional power to enforce
the guaranteed privileges and immunities of citizens either under the Necessary and
Proper Clause or under the Guaranty Clause. For example, Congressman William D.
Kelley stated, "I find in [the Constitution] now, powers by which the General
Government may defend the rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities of the humblest
citizen wherever he may be upon our country's soil." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1062 (1866). Similarly, Congressman William Higby, a Radical Republican from
California, stated that the proposed amendment would "only have the effect to give
vitality and life to portions of the Constitution that probably were intended from the
beginning to have life and vitality, but which have received such a construction that they
have been entirely ignored and have become as dead matter in that instrument." Id. at
1054; see also Ex parte Bushnell v. Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859) (discussing
the lack of congressional enforcement power under the Clause).
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
10. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986);
HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.

812

[VOL. 34: 809, 1997]

Privileges and Immunities Clause
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

consensus has been reached. The position adopted in this Article is that
during the nineteenth century it was the prevalent view that the
"privileges" and "immunities" of citizens were those powers or
capacities deemed to be inherent in the concept of citizenship, flowing
from the principles of natural law and embodied in the positive common
law and constitutions of the state govemments. 11 The conclusion
reached is substantially the same as that reached through an analysis of
Section 1 in terms of the social compact theories of natural law theorists

1193 (1992); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Fairman, supra note 7, at 5; John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992); Trisha
Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1995).
.
11. Natural rights theory had been influential in American legal thought since the
time of the Revolution. CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW
CONCEPTS (1965); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955); CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1933); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV.
843 (1978). Prominent jurists had also espoused natural law concepts. See, e.g.,
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.); Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.
.Cas. 832, 845-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, Cir. J.); Gardner v.
Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166-67 (N.Y. 1816) (Kent, C.). See generally BENJAMIN
FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 288-98 (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1931)
(citing early cases).
Several commentators have noted, in particular, the influence of natural law theories
on the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CURTIS supra note 10; DANIEL
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990);
HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL
UNDER LAW (Collier Books 1965) (1951); David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections From the Admission of Maryland's First Black
Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939 (1985); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The
Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMM. 235 (1984); Robert
J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without
Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24
Hous. L. REV. 221, 224 (1987) (stating that "Republicans were committed to the
concept of natural rights, which they saw as embodied in the statement of the
Declaration of Independence that all men were entitled to 'life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness"'); Olson, supra note 10, at 350 (concluding that "the [Privileges and
Immunities] Clause must be placed against the backdrop of the classical natural law
tradition embraced by the 39th Congress").
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influential in nineteenth century American legal thought. 12 However,
the road traversed in reaching this conclusion is quite different. The
analysis focuses on the jurisprudence developed under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The analysis presented in this Article
is a more direct route to an identical conclusion, since members of
Congress explicitly referred to Article IV, Section 2 when discussing
what they meant by the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13
The purpose of this Article is to gain insight into the original meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment by examining the understanding of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 in nineteenth century
America. Thus, a comprehensive inquiry into the original meaning of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 at the time
of ratification of the Constitution is not undertaken. 14 However, the
nineteenth century understanding of the Clause arguably comes relatively
close to its original meaning in 1787. Furthermore, many of the sources
utilized in this Article pre-date the ratification of the Constitution or
were produced during the founding era. Hence, this Article does provide
some insight into the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, and derivatively traces the contours of
the federal system as originally designed.
·
Part II of this Article describes the relevance of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to a determination of the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Several members of Congress involved in
the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment stated that the privileges

12. See Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 681 (1997) (applying social compact theories to interpretation of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
13. See infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
14. However, a number of other writers have touched upon the original meaning
of the Clause. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY,
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 30-40 ( 1981) (discussing interstate travel with slaves under
Article IV); HOWELL, supra note 4 (describing the relationship between Article IV and
the historical treatment of alien merchants in England); JAMES H. KETTNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 220-30 (1978); Chester James
Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause ofArticle Four, 9 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1 (1967); David S. Bogen,
The Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794, 796
(1987) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was "not a reference to natural
law, but was solely concerned with creating a national citizenship"); John M. Gonzales,
Comment, The Interstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental Rights or Federalism?, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 493 (1986).
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and immunities guaranteed under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment were identical to those guaranteed under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
Part III analyzes the way in which the Privileges and Immunities
Clause went beyond voluntary principles of international comity in order
to establish certain positive obligations among the states. These positive
obligations are textually embodied in the privileges and immunities
language of that Clause. This Part more generally examines the
structure of Article IV as reflecting principles of international comity and
discusses the antebellum controversy over the Fugitive Slave Clause.
The distinction between special and fundamental privileges recognized
in the jurisprudence under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 is examined, as well as the state governments'
power of regulation under the Clause. These concepts were fleshed out
in the case law applying the principles of international comity embodied
in the Clause.
Part IV discusses the nature of the protection afforded under the
Clause--whether it guarantees substantive protection of certain
fundamental rights, such as the right to hold property, to contract, to
testify in court, and to sue, or merely equal civil rights. Again, the
concepts addressed in Part III relating to principles of international
comity provide context for interpretation of the Clause.
Finally, Part V applies the distinction between fundamental and special
privileges in interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part discusses the tension
between the prohibitions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
power retained by the states to regulate the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizens under the Clause. It also explains the distinction
between political and civil rights made by participants during the
congressional debates over Section 1.
The analysis presented in this Article provides further support for an
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as guaranteeing a
closed set of fundamental powers or capacities inherent in the concept
of citizenship. This interpretation recognizes the. wide scope of the
states' power to regulate these fundamental powers of the citizenry while
guaranteeing that they will remain free from abridgment or complete
abolition. While the states might regulate the mode or manner in which
they could be exercised, they were powerless to prohibit the exercise of
these capacities. Although the importance of the Privileges and
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Immunities Clause as a precursor of Section 1 is widely recognized, it
may prove useful to demonstrate the relevance of this analysis to an
interpretation of the Amendment by canvassing the links drawn between
Article IV, Section 2 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
generation responsible for its ratification.
II.

THE COMITY CLAUSE AND SECTION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

1 OF THE

It is widely recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 served as a precursor of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 · Several
members of Congress expressed their belief during debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment that the privileges and immunities referred to in
Section 1 of the Amendment were the same as those guaranteed under

15. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller,
The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627,
630 (1994) (discussing the controversy over the proper interpretation of Article IV);
Lambert Gingras, Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers' Understanding:
The Case of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 47 (1996) (arguing
that "Bingham and other Republicans . . . read the comity clause as creating or
recognizing a national set of rights, protected from state interference and similar from
one state to another"); Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A
Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 539 (1985) (concluding that Senator
Bingham's intent in drafting Section 1 was to assure the enforcement of guarantees that
were already inherent in the Constitution, "particularly those inherent in the comity
clause"); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947, 999-1000 (1995) (noting that the Slaughter-House decision cannot be
correct because it would mean that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
set of rights different from that protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2). As Senator Bingham later wrote in 1871:
The clause of the fourteenth amendment [sic], "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those [guaranteed
by the comity clause]. The fourteenth amendment [sic], it is believed, did not
add to the privileges and immunities before mentioned, but was deemed
necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the power of the
States. It had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of
amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power of the States,
and it was apprehended that the same might be held as the provision of the
second section, fourth article.
THE RECONSTRUCTION .AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 466 (citing H. R. REP.
No. 41-22, at 1 (1871)). Therefore, the only innovation that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Section 1 wrought was to make applicable to the states the
guarantee against abridgment of the privileges and immunities referred to in Article IV,
Section 2.
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Article IV, Section 2. 16 There was already a well~developed body of
case law under the Privileges and Immunities Clause to which these
members of Congress could point in explicating the meaning of the
terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendmeht. 17 The Privileges and Immunities Clause was
discussed by members of Congress on several occasions prior to
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a potential guarantee for the
rights of free blacks. Chief among these episodes are: (1) the controversy over the proposed constitution of Oregon in 1859; (2) the debates
over the Civil Rights Bill, another precursor of Section 1; and (3) the
debates over the proposed amendment itself. Finally, the Clause was
also discussed by the Supreme Court dissenters in the infamous
Slaughter-House Cases 18 as being a precursor of the Amendment.
A.

Debate Over the Proposed Oregon Constitution·

During the congressional debates over the admission of Oregon as a
state in 1859, Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of

16. For example, Vermont Senator Luke Poland, in the debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment, argued:
The clause of the first proposed amendment, that "no State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States," secures nothing beyond what was intended by the
original provision in the Constitution, that "the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866); see also infra Parts II.A-D (discussing
congressional views of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. A number of cases had been decided under the Clause, including State v.
Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); Campbell v.
Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89 (Mass. 1827); Amy
v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822); Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 (1834);
Commonwealth v. Towles, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 743 (1835); Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194
(1856); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767 (1856); People v. Coleman,
4 Cal. 46 (1854); People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68 (S.C.N.Y. 1855); Fire Dep't v. Noble,
3 E.D. Smith 440 (N.Y.C.C.P. 1854); Fire Dep't v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 142 (1862);
People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554 (1852); Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172 (1868), affirmed in
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1871); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68
(1868); Downham v. Alexandria Council, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173 (1869); Liverpool Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See also RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) (discussing some of the more prominent
cases).
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, made the argument that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was intended to protect
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States while in the
several states, arguing that there was an ellipsis in the drafting of the
Clause. Senator Bingham reasoned:
The citizens of each State, all the citizens of each State, being citizens of the
United States, shall be entitled to "all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States." Not to the rights and immunities of the several States; not
to those constitutional rights and immunities which result exclusively from State
authority or State legislation; but to "all privileges and immunities" of citizens
of the United States in the several States. There is an ellipsis in the language
employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is "the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States"
that it guaranties [sic]. 19

Bingham addressed certain of these rights, which he thought fell under
the heading of "privileges and immunities of citizens" and which he
thought were violated by the proposed constitution of Oregon. 20
Bingham distinguished between the elective franchise, which he believed
states could restrict to "certain classes of citizens of the United States,"
and those privileges and immunities of ·citizens that were guaranteed
under Article IV, Section 2. He concluded: "I deny that any State may
exclude a law abiding citizen of the United States from coming within
its Territory, or abiding therein, or acquiring and enjoying property
therein, or from the enjoyment therein of the 'privileges and immunities'
of a citizen of the United States."21 Bingham enumerated other rights
that were unconstitutionally denied to "colored persons" under the
Oregon constitution including the "benefit of the writ of habeas corpus,"
"trial by jury," holding real estate, making contracts, and maintaining
suits. 22 These rights enumerated by Bingham were among the most
fundamental comm.on-law rights.23

19. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
20. Id. According to Bingham, among these unconstitutional provisions were those
declaring that
large numbers of the citizens of the United States shall not, after the admission
of the proposed State of Oregon, come or be within said State; that they shall
hold no property there; that they shall not prosecute any suits in any of the
courts of that State; and that the Legislature shall, by statute, make it a penal
offense for any person to harbor any of the excluded class of their fellowcitizens who may thereafter come or be within the State.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the fundamental privileges and
immunities inherent in citizenship in the United States).
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At this point in time, the same year as the Supreme Court's Dred
Scotf-4 decision, it seems that Senator Bingham adhered to Justice
Curtis' dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case that being born a
citizen of a state was sufficient to entitle one to citizenship of the United
States and the accompanying privileges and immunities of citizens
guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2.25 The Taney majority in Dred Scott had argued that it was
necessary that free blacks were considered citizens of the United States
at the time of ratification of the original Constitution in order for them
to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens under Article IV,
Section 2. The Court examined the historical evidence and determined
that free blacks were not considered citizens at the time of ratification.26 However, Bingham disagreed with this historical conclusion and
argued that free blacks were considered citizens at the time that the
original Constitution was ratified. 27 Echoing Justice Curtis's reasoning
in his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott, Bingham stated:
[P]ersons thus excluded from the State by this section of the Oregon constitution, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore are citizens of the
United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights of life and liberty
and property, and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law. 28

Thus, at this time, prior to drafting Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Bingham maintained that free black citizens of the states
were entitled to the privileges and immunities guaranteed under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IY, Section 2. Furthermore,
Bingham classified among the privileges and immunities of citizenship,

24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
25. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the dissenting and majority opinions in
the Dred Scott case).
26. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411-12. Several other courts came to the same
conclusion as the Taney majority in Dred Scott. See Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326
(1822); Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 (1834); State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331
(1838). In Pendleton v. State, the court stated:
Are free negroes or free colored persons citizens within the meaning of [the
Privileges and Immunities Clause]? We think not. In recurring to the past
history of the constitution, and prior to its_ formation, to that of the confederation, it will be found that nothing beyond a kind of quasi-citizenship has ever
been recognized in the case of colored persons.
6 Ark. 509, 511 (1846).
27. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
28. Id.
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the "rights of life and liberty and property" and "due protection" thereof,
indicating that perhaps the protections afforded under the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to "persons" were also understood by Bingham to be conveyed to
citizens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 29

B.

The Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment

Besides the debate over the proposed Oregon constitution, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was also mentioned in the context of
the debate over the Civil Rights Bill,30 a precursor of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was designed to prevent inequalities with respect to
certain fundamental rights of citizens occasioned by the Southern Black
Codes. 31 For example, it was the conclusion of James Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager of the Civil
Rights Bill, that "[i]f the States would all practice the constitutional
declaration [of the Privileges and Immunities Clause] . . . and enforce it
. . . we might very well refrain from the enactment of thi~ bill into a
law."32 Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was identified

29. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 68-69 (1993) ("It is logical to read the new amendment's
protection of life, liberty, and property as representing one privilege and immunity of
citizenship--and one worthy of extension equally, not only among citizens but to 'all
persons in the several States."').
30. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill which was passed over the veto of President
Johnson provided:
That all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude
... shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866). As is evident from the above excerpt,
many of the rights enumerated in the Bill were fundamental common-law rights. This
fact is consistent with an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing
a closed set of common-law rights to citizens of the United States. See Smith, supra
note 12 (presenting such an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
31. See FLACK, supra note 10, at 81 (concluding that "nearly all [members of
Congress] said that [the Fourteenth Amendment] was but an incorporation of the Civil
Rights Bill"); Fairman, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that "[o]ver and over in this debate
[over the Amendment], the correspondence between Section 1 of the Amendment and
the Civil Rights Act is noted ... [: t]he provisions of the one are treated as though they
were essentially identical with those of the other").
32. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 163-64
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866)).
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as addressing the same fundamental, common-law rights as those guaranteed under the Civil Rights Bill.
If free blacks were citizens of the United States, or could be given this
status through congressional legislation, and if the national government
had the power to address violations of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 by the state governments through
legislation, there would be no question of the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.33 However, the constitutionality of this Act
was called into question by Bingham himself, 34 prompting Congress to
draft the Fourteenth Amendment in order to ensure the constitutionality
of their actions in passing the Civil Rights Act. As Professor John
Harrison has stated, "[a]ny theory of the Fourteenth Amendment must
... explain how it validates the Civil Rights Act."35 By achieving an
understanding of the phrase, "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens," as

33. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The Civil Rights Bill declared that
"all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed" were "citizens of the United States." Id. § I.
The Civil Rights Bill was widely recognized by congressional Republicans as a
precursor to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, George Latham
stated that the "civil rights bill which is now law ... covers exactly the same ground
as the amendment." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866). Martin Thayer
stated that the Amendment was "but incorporating in the Constitution of the United
States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a law." THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 213 (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866)); see also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 566
(1991) (recognizing that "constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act was a major purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment").
34. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (1866) (remarks of John
Bingham). Some state appellate courts also declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869); State v. Rash, 6 Del. (1 Roust.)
271 (1867); Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867).
35. Harrison, supra note 10, at 1390. Harrison points out that Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act stated that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, were deemed citizens of the United States.
The Act provided that in every state and territory all citizens, without regard to race,
color, or previous condition of servitude, should have the same rights as white citizens:
[T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property ... and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties,
and to none other.
Id. at 1390 n.14 (quoting Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27).
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used in Article IV, Section 2, one can explain the enumeration of rights
to be protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
C.

The Slaughter-House Cases

Not only had the Privileges and Immunities Clause been cited during
the debates in Congress over the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth .
Amendment itself, but it was also cited by the Supreme Court dissenters
in the Slaughter-House Cases, who employed the terms "privileges" and
"immunities" in the same manner as they were used in Section 1. In the
Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court emasculated the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by a
narrow margin, holding that the privileges and immunities referred to in
the Amendment were only certain limited rights of national citizenship.36 However, several justices wrote vigorous dissenting opinions
in the case, arguing that the protections afforded under the Clause were
intended to be much broader. According to one dissenting member of
the Court, Justice Field, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
Iv, Section 2 provided that with respect to the privileges and immunities
"which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments ... [n]o
discrimination can be made by one State against citizens of other States
in their enjoyment, nor can any greater imposition be levied than such
as is laid upon its own citizens."37
Justice Field stated that the

36. A number of commentators have noted the decision's effect. See, e.g., JUDITH
A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 107 (1983); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 37, 166 (1990) (noting that the Court's decision
rendered the Clause "a dead letter"); 2 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
106, 107, 204 (1932) (noting that the Court emasculated the Clause); CHARLES
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1875, at 184-85 (1939)
[hereinafter JUSTICE MILLER]; Aynes, supra note 15, at 627-28; Michael Conant,
Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House
Cases Re-examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 789 (1982); Charles Fairman, -what Makes a
Great Justice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. REV.
49, 78 (1950) (noting that the Court's decision "virtually scratched" the Clause from the
Constitution) [hereinafter Great Justice]; Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the
Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989) (noting that the Court "ruthlessly eviscerated
the Clause of practically all operative meaning"); Dr. Patricia Allan Lucie, White Rights
as a Model for Black: Or--who's Afraid of the Privileges or Immunities Clause?, 38
SYRACUSE L. REV. 859 (1987); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and
Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 (1987) (concluding that the Court
"gutted the privileges or immunities clause"); John Anthony Scott, Justice Bradley's
Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the
Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552, 555 (1971); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 342 (1949).
37. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 98 (1873).
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relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was as follows:
What the clause in question [the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2] did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile
and discriminating legislation of other States, the 14th Amendment does for the
protection of every citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, whether they reside in the same
or in different States. If, under the 4th article of the Constitution, equality of
privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of different States, under
the 14th Amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the
United States. 38

From this passage, it is apparent that Justice Field did not believe that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 reached
state action against resident citizens. This appears to have been the
conclusion of Senator Trumbull also, who stated that cases involving the
Clause "relate entirely to the rights which a citizen in one State has on
going into another State, and not to the rights of the citizen belonging
to the State."39 This was one of the "imperfections" in the original
Constitution, which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
correct. 40

D.

"Imperfections" in the Original Constitution

Not only was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 silent with respect to the relation between a state government
38. Id. at 100-01.
39.
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES,supranote2, at 137 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866)). Senator Garrett Davis also noted that
the Civil Rights Bill would apply "where the citizen is domiciled in the State where he
was born," unlike the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 595-96 (1866).
40. Michael Kent Curtis has argued that Senator Bingham and other members of
Congress were of the opinion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 protected certain rights of national citizenship, including the Bill of Rights.
Bingham and others who framed the Fourteenth Amendment relied on a
reading of the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 by
which it protected a body of national privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, including those in the Bill of Rights. This reading may
have been incorrect.
CURTIS, supra note 10, at 114. Raoul Berger has argued, however, that the majority did
not share the "unorthodox" view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. BERGER,
supra note 17, at 96-97.
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and its own citizens, but, additionally, where it did apply, there were
problems with enforcement of the Clause against the states. Prior to
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states did not always
comply with the Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of Article IV, Section 2. As Paul Finkelman has noted:
States could and did deny privileges and immunities to citizens of other states.
Full faith and credit were not always given to out-of-state judicial decrees.
Such denials of comity, by both the North and the South, were partially
responsible for the dissolution of the Union. The memory of such problems
motivated the adoption of certain sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41

For example, whether or not the right to property in slaves was one
of the privileges and immunities protected under the Clause was a matter
of great dispute prior to the Civil War. 42 As Professor Finkelman has
noted, "[t]he United States Supreme Court was never asked to apply this
clause, or Washington's interpretation of it [in Car.field v. Coryell], to
transit with slaves. Had this happened in the late antebellum period,
Taney's court possibly would have sustained the right of transit with
slaves."43 The Taney Court did, however, address the issue of whether

41. FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 8; see also Aynes, supra note 29, at 75-76
(discussing the problem of enforcement under Article IV); id. at 78 ("Prominent judges,
lawyers, and members of Congress shared Bingham's conviction that the Constitution
prohibited the states from abridging the privileges and immunities protected by Article
IV, Section 2, but that Congress could not enforce the provision.").
42. See infra Section 111.C.1.
43. FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 10. Finkelman notes that there were a number
of cases concerning fugitive slaves in which the notion of comity and interstate transit
played a central role. Among them, he cites Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449
(1841), Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850), Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), and Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). FINKELMAN,
supra note 14, at 12. In Groves, the Court seems to have come close to affirming the
right of property in slaves as being one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship
guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2. The Court stated:
As each state has plenary power to legislate on this subject [what constitutes
property], its laws are the test of what is property; if they recognise slaves as
the property of those who hold them, they become the subjects of commerce
between the states which so recognise them, and the traffic in them may be
regulated by Congress, as the traffic in other articles; but no farther. Being
property, by the law of any state, the owners are protected from any violations
of the rights of property by Congress, under the fifth amendment of the
Constitution; these rights do not consist merely in ownership, the right of
disposing of property of all kinds, is incident to it, which Congress cannot
touch. The mode of disposition is regulated by the state or common law; and
but for the first clause in the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution of the United States, a state might authorize its own citizens to
deal in slaves, and prohibit it to all others.
But that clause secures to the citizens of all the states, "all privileges and
immunities of citizens" of any other state, whereby any traffic in slaves or
other property, which is lawful to the citizens or settlers of Mississippi, with
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free blacks were citizens of the United States and therefore entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states in Dred
Scott v. Sandford. 44 The Supreme Court concluded that free blacks

each other, is equally protected when carried on between them and the citizens
of Virginia. Hence, it is apparent, that no state can control this traffic, so long
as it may be carried on by its own citizens, within its own limits; as part of its
purely internal commerce, any state may regulate it according to its own
policy; but when such regulation purports to extend to other states or their
citizens, it is limited by the Constitution, putting the citizens of all on the same
footing as their own.
Groves, 40 U.S. at 515. Similarly, other courts also indicated that property in slaves
might be afforded protection under the Clause. For example, in Willard v. People, 5 Ill.
(4 Scam.) 461, 471-72 (1843), Justice Scates reasoned that since Illinois was bound to
grant a right of transit to non-Americans without disturbing their property under
principles of international comity, "[m]uch less could we disregard their [citizens of the
United States] constitutional right, as citizens of one of the states, to all the rights,
immunities, and privileges of the citizens of the several states." Id.
However, as might be expected, the results reached by Northern courts with respect
to the question of whether slavery need be recognized based upon the principles of
international comity underlying the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 were quite different. For example, in Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837),
Chief Justice Thomas Williams declared that an individual could no longer be a slave
within Connecticut since "slavery is contrary to the principles of natural right and to the
great law of love; that it is founded on injustice and fraud, and can be supported only
by the provisions of positive law .... " Id. at 39-40. Even the slaveholder's counsel
recognized that "slavery was a system of such a character, that it can claim nothing by
the law of comity ... that it was local, and must be governed entirely by the laws of
the state, in which it is attempted to be enforced." Id. at 40-41; see also FINKELMAN,
supra note 14, at 126-80 (discussing the Northern rejection of the application of
principles of international comity to the institution of slavery). Furthermore, during the
time that the Articles of Confederation were in effect, all of the Northern states banned
the importation and exportation of slaves. Pennsylvania also limited the right to sojourn
with a slave. FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 32 (citing ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIR.ST
EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 106-8, 120, 148-53, 156-69
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1967)).
Eventually, even the Southern states began to recognize limitations upon the right to
property in slaves outside slave states. Several of the Southern states adopted "The
Slave, Grace" doctrine under which slaves who had lived in a free state and returned to
a slave state were freed by the slave-state court. Id. at 187. The rationales for this
doctrine included the following: that residence or presence in a free jurisdiction could
free a slave; that once free, a person was always free; and that only positive law could
make someone a slave, and therefore absent legislation reenslaving former slaves, they
would remain free. Id. For example, in Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467-70
(1820), Judge Mills acknowledged that the right to property in human beings was "a
right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of
nature, or the unwritten and common law." See also infra Section III.C.1 (discussing
cases arising under the Fugitive Slave Clause as well as the Rankin case).
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-06 (1856).
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were not and could not become citizens of the United States absent
constitutional amendment. 45 Therefore, the Court assuaged Southern
fears that free blacks might claim the constitutional rights of the citizen
in Southern states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2. However, the fear on the part of the North was that
application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to transit with slaves
would lead to constitutionally-mandated recognition of slavery outside
the Southern States.46 In fact, in Article IV of the Confederate

45. Id.
46. For example, Francis Lieber, a Republican and professor at the University of
South Carolina stated that '" [e]ach institution of government was being strangled by an
outreaching slave power."' FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 12 (quoting PmLLIP S.
P ALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 79-80 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press 1975)). Furthermore, Finkelman
states that "Lincoln, and other northerners, saw the Dred Scott decision as a first step
toward a judicial nationalization of slavery." Id. at 283. Finkelman cites the LincolnDouglas debates wherein Lincoln stated:
[W]hat is necessary for the nationalization of slavery? It is simply the next
Dred Scott decision. It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no
State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided
that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the territorial legislature can
do it. . . . [S]lavery is to be made national.
Id. at 317 (quoting 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 27 (Roy P. Basler
ed., New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press 1953-55)). Finkelman claims that "[i]n
nationalizing slavery the Supreme Court could have relied on doctrine and dictum
developed in Groves v. Slaughter, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Strader v. Graham, and Dred
Scott." Id. at 325.
However, not every court recognized a constitutionally-protected right of property in
slaves in transit. For example, in Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the freedom of slaves brought through New York in transit.
It was argued before the court that "the municipal law which makes men the subject of
property, is limited with the power to enforce itself, that is by its territorial jurisdiction
... the strangers stand upon our soil [in New York] in their natural relations as men,
their artificial relation being absolutely terminated." Id. at 598. The court adopted this
argument that property in slaves was not protected under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause because slavery, being contrary to the law of nature, was merely a municipal
regulation having no extraterritorial force. However, Judge Clerke in his dissent argued
that New York was bound to recognize this form of property under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Clerke stated:
the relations of the different States of this Union towards each other are of a
much closer and more positive nature than those between foreign nations . .
. . [T]hey are one nation; war between them is legally impossible; and this
comity, impliedly recognized by the law of nations, ripens, in the compact
cementing these States, into an express conventional obligation, which is not
to be enforced by an appeal to arms, but to be recognized and enforced by the
judicial tribunals.
Id. at 642. Clerke asked:
[i]s it consistent with this purpose of perfect union, and perfect and unrestricted intercourse, that property which the citizen of one State brings into another
State, for the purpose of passing through it to a State where he intends to take
up his residence, shall be confiscated in the State through which he is passing,
or shall be declared to be no property, and liberated from his control?
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Constitution, the wording of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
changed so that it was explicitly recognized that property in slaves was
to be preserved as one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 47
Thus, Northern fears were probably well-founded. The foregoing
discussion reveals the confusion in antebellum America concerning the
meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as well as some of the

Id. at 636. Clerke argued that even though property in slaves was not recognized under
the law of nations, the positive provisions of the Constitution overrode the law of
nations. Clerke argued that the majority was wrong
in supposing, because the law of nations refused to recognize slaves as
property, the several States of this Union were at liberty to do the same;
forgetting that the compact, by which the latter are governed in their relation
towards each other, modifies the law of nations in this respect ... [therefore,
no state is] permitted in its dealings or intercourse with other States or their
inhabitants to ignore the right to property in the labor and service of persons
in transitu from those States.
Id. at 642-43. For a more thorough discussion of the Lemmon opinion, see infra notes
113-37 and accompanying text.
4 7. The following language was added to the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
"[T]he citizens of each State . . . shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State
of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in
said slaves shall not be thereby impaired." CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE
STATES art. IV, § 2; CHARLES ROBERT LEE, JR., THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTIONS 110
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press 1963).
The members of the constitutional convention of 1787 from the Southern states may
have presumed that because of the enumerated powers of the federal government as well
as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, the right to property
in slaves would be maintained under the Constitution. General Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney argued before the state's house of representatives during the debate over
ratification in South Carolina:
We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them,
for no such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands, that the
general government has no powers but what are expressly granted by the
Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several
states. . . . In short, considering all circumstances, we have made the best
terms for the security of this species of property it was in our power to make.
We would have made better if we could; but, on the whole, I do not think
them bad.
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254-55 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937). Furthermore, individuals such as Pinckney might have thought that property in
slaves was not merely conventional, but did have a firm foundation in natural law and,
therefore, property in slaves would be protected under Article IV, Section 2. During the
constitutional convention, Pinckney asserted that "[i]f slavery be wrong, it is justified by
the example of all the world. He cited the case of Greece[,] Rome[,] & other antient
[sic] States; the sanctiqn given by France[,] England, Holland[,] & other modem States.
In all ages one half of mankind have been slaves." 2 Id. at 371.
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dissatisfaction with its perceived defects48 in guaranteeing the rights of
citizens of the United States as originally drafted, such as the Clause's
inapplicability to controversies between a citizen and his own state
government and the lack of congressional power to enforce the Clause.
Having established the relevance of understanding the nineteenth
century meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 to understanding the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,49 three
interrelated issues arise to be resolved in interpreting the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: (1) did the Clause give
substantive protection to a set of well-defined privileges and immunities,
perhaps providing for differences in regulation of these rights in different
states, or merely provide "antidiscrimination" protection,50 ensuring that
foreign citizens would enjoy the same privileges and immunities as
resident citizens, but leaving it open to the states to choose which
privileges and immunities their citizens would enjoy; (2) even if the
protection was merely antidiscrimination protection, did the framers
assume that there would be a set of privileges and immunities conferred
to citizens in all of the states, but not constitutionally-mandated under
the Clause; and (3) did the Clause merely provide protection for foreign
citizens in the other states, or did it also afford protection for citizens
against their own state governments?
With respect to the last question, the evidence indicates that Justice
Field's interpretation of the Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases as
protecting only foreign citizens may have been the most historically
accurate. 51 This would not be a surprising result since there is a

48. As Congressman Thaddeus Stevens noted, prior to adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation
on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and allows Congress to correct
unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall
operate equally upon all." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
49. See supra Part II.
50. This has become the prevailing interpretation of the Clause by modem courts.
See Downham v. Alexandria, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173, 175 (1869) (Field, J.) ("It is only
equality of privileges and immunities between citizens of different States that the
Constitution guarantees."); HOWELL, supra note 4, at 20 ("The view that a citizen of one
State carries with him into any other State certain fundamental privileges and immunities
which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the first-mentioned
State, has been definitely abandoned.").
51. See supra notes 37-38 discussing Justice Field's Slaughter-House dissent.
However, prominent members of Congress may have disagreed with this position
including John Bingham, principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and James Wilson of Iowa, floor manager of the Civil Rights Bill and Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
Wilson may also have thought that Congress had the implied authority to enforce the
Privileges and Immunities Clause against the states, unlike Senator Bingham. See CONG.
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perception at least that the Framers of the Constitution were more
concerned with federal interference with individual rights and less
concerned with state interference with the rights of their own citizens.
Resident citizens could be protected from the actions of their own state
governments under the state constitutions. At a minimum, it may have
been an assumption of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that all
free governments would recognize a core set of fundamental privileges
and immunities of citizens.
The first two questions generated greater controversy. It seems that
the prevailing understanding of the Clause was that it only provided
antidiscrimination protection, but it may have been assumed that all of
the states would provide certain rights possessed by citizens in all free
governments. 52 Therefore, the practical effect of the Clause would be
to ensure that citizens, no matter where they went in the United States
would enjoy certain fundamental rights. For example, certain privileges
and immunities of citizenship--the privileges and immunities of
citizenship of the United States provided for in the Constitution,
applicable to all citizens in the several states---were undoubtedly
afforded substantive protection. One such privilege of citizens of the
United States, in dispute in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 was the privilege
of suing in the courts of the United States under Article III. However,
a wider notion of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, of general citizenship, encompassing certain privileges and
immunities of citizens in all free governments which were traditionally
under the regulatory control of the state governments, may have been
envisioned under the Clause. 54

GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-19 (1866) ..

52. This is the language that Justice Bushrod Washington used in his opinion in
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), in interpreting the
Privileges and Imm.unities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and the nature of the
privileges and immunities guaranteed therein. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying
text, discussing the court's opinion in Corfield.
53. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
54. For example, it was argued by counsel in the case of Lemmon v. People, 20
N.Y. 562 (1860), that there was a substantive right to property guaranteed under the
Clause as well as certain other "general privileges and immunities." According to
counsel, the Privileges and Imm.unities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was designed to
secure to the citizen, when within a State in which he is not domiciled, the
general privileges and immunities which, in the very nature of citizenship, as
recognized and established by the Federal Constitution, belonged to that status
[Citizen of the United States]; so that by no partial and adverse legislation of
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Furthermore, even if the weight of the historical evidence leads to the
conclusion that the antidiscrimination reading of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 is the most historically
accurate, it does not mean that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to afford only
antidiscrimination protection to citizens. 55 The Privileges or Immunities Clause may have been intended to afford substantive protection as
well. 56 It may have been the intent of the framers of the Amendment
to mandate that the states uniformly respect certain fundamental rights
of citizens such that the states could not withdraw these rights equally
from every citizen of a state without violating the Section 1 prohibitions.
Thus, the protection would be similar to that afforded under other
provisions of the Constitution which serve as substantive limitations on
all of the states, such as the Contracts Clause57 and the Bill of Attainder Clause. 58 This may have been the reason that the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" was used in Section
1-to indicate that there were certain fundamental rights inherent in
one's status as a citizen of the United States, which must be recognized
by all of the state governments. 59 The state governments would still be
free to regulate the form in which these capacities of citizenship existed
or the mode in which they could be exercised,60 but were obligated to
recognize these pre-political privileges and immunities of citizens.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 did not
arise from a blank slate, but rather was preceded by a well-developed
body of law concerning the natural relations of sovereign states. The

a State into which he might go as a stranger or sojourner can he be deprived
of them.
Id. at 580-81. See also infra Part IV.D, discussing potential interpretations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
55. See Harrison, supra note 10 (presenting the case for interpreting the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting against
discrimination, but not guaranteeing substantive protection of fundamental rights).
56. Other commentators have argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
designed to protect certain substantive rights. For example, Charles Fairman concluded
in his exhaustive study of the Amendment's history that it was "meant to establish some
substantial rights" under the heading "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States." Great Justice, supra note 36, at 77; see also Aynes, supra note 29, at 73
(arguing that the Amendment was designed to enforce existing substantive rights rather
than establish new ones); Maltz, supra note 4.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
58. Id.
59. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the relationship between citizenship and
the rights guaranteed under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
.
60. See infra Part V.B, discussing the states' retained power of regulation under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
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Clause was viewed not only as an "individual rights" provision, but also
as a "federalism" provision, maintaining the integrity of the federal
system as well as the equality of the states as political entities.
However, the Clause went beyond principles of comity in several
ways-constituting the citizens of the several states one people and
creating positive, conventional obligations in place of "unwritten"
principles of reason that served as legal default rules.
III.

STATES IN A STATE OF NATURE: THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND INTERNATIONAL COMITY

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was
founded upon principles of international comity among states.61 The
comity of nations was often described as based on principles derived
from an independent "unwritten" law termed the law of nations. 62 Such

61. This was a constitutionalization of notions of interstate comity, which was the
voluntary recognition of certain rights of foreign citizens. For example, Justice Story
in his work on the conflict of laws explained the principles of international comity as
expressed by Huber: ( 1) laws have no force beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a state;
(2) persons within a given jurisdiction, "whether their residence is permanent or temporary," are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction; and (3) nations and states "from comity
admit" that the laws of other nations and states ought to "have the same force every
where," as long as "they do not prejudice the power or rights of other governments, or
of their citizens." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 30
(Hilliard, Gray & Co. eds., 1st ed. 1834). This form of voluntary comity was not
derived from civil or natural law, but rather out of convenience. Id. The flaw with this
variety of comity was that it "is, and ever must be, uncertain. That it must necessarily
depend on a variety of circumstances, which cannot be reduced to any certain rule." Id.
at 29. However, it must be noted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause goes beyond
such voluntary recognition because it mandates recognition of certain rights and because
the rights that must be recognized were rights, such as the right to hold property, not
voluntarily recognized as rights of foreign citizens in the United States. See infra notes
69-72 and accompanying text. The Clause, in effect, mandated that the states recognize
citizens of other states as citizens of their own states and not deny them the rights of
citizenship that belong to their own citizens. See also ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 127-28 (1935); Peters. Onuf, The
First Federal Constitution: The Articles of Confederation, reprinted in THE FRAMING
AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 82 (Leonard w. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney
eds., 1987) (noting that Jonathan Witherspoon conceived of the confederation as a more
perfect form of the international system).
62. The idea that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
was an attempt to make binding through compact the principles of comity among states
derived from natural law was expressed by the Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). In that case, Mr. Webster, arguing before the
Court, enumerated several distinct rights that were to be afforded to foreign citizens
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principles might be employed by judges as background rules of
"general" or "universal" law or reason. 63 Positive municipal laws could
override these principles as could positive constitutional provisions.64
As Justice Story stated in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, it
was the comity of nations and not of courts that could be enforced, and
the intent of the legislature expressed in positive law could override
these principles of reason. 65

through principles of comity and identified the law of nations as the source of principles
of international comity. According to Webster:
The term "comity" is taken from the civil law. Vattel has no distinct chapter
upon that head. But the doctrine is laid down by other authorities with
sufficient distinctness, and in effect by him. It is, in general terms, that there
are, between nations at peace with one another, rights, both natural and
individual, resulting from the comity or courtesy due from one friendly nation
to another. Among these, is the right to sue in their Courts respectively; the
right to travel in each other's dominions; the right to pursue one's vocation in
trade; the right to do all things~ generally, which belong to the citizens proper
of each country, and which they are not precluded from doing by some
positive law of the state. Among these rights, one of the clearest is the right
of a citizen of one nation to take away his property from the territory of any
other friendly nation, without molestation or objection. This is what we call
the comity of nations. It is the usage of nations, and has become a positive
obligation on all nations.
Id. at 556-57. Thus, the principles of international comity were argued to be binding
upon the states as positive law since they were embodied in the ''usage of nations." This
comity was voluntary where there was no common superior establishing it as law.
According to the reporter, Mr. Webster stated that comity "is but a customary or
voluntary law; that it is a law existing by the common understanding and consent of
nations, and not established for the government of nations by any common superior."
Id. at 557. However, in the United States similar principles were made binding with
respect to citizens of the several states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article N, Section 2.
63. An illustration of the belief on the part of the legal community that the law of
nations served as a set of legal default rules is to be found in the remarks of Senator
Seward concerning rights of slaveowners. According to Seward, "the Constitution does
not recognize property in man, but leaves that question, as between the States, to the law
of nature and of nations. That law, as expounded by Vattel, is founded in the reason of
things." CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 264 (1850).
64. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing Pufendorfs views concerning the role of
natural law in judicial interpretation).
65. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 594-95 (1856)
(corroborating Justice Story's views). According to Justice Curtis:
[A]s has justly been said ... it is the comity of the State, not of the court.
The judges have nothing to do with the motive of the State. Their duty is
simply to ascertain and give effect to its will. And when it is found by them
that its will to depart from a rule of international law has not been manifested
by the State, they are bound to assume that its will is to give effect to it.
Id. at 594 (citation omitted). See also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5
Bush) 68, 77 (1868) (stating that "[i]t is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of
nations, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same
reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided.").
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The origins of a concept of "the law of nations" may be traced to the
Roman law. As was stated in Justinian's Institutes, the law of nations,
or jus gentium, comprised that part of the civil law shared in common
with most other nations. The concept of comity among the states in the
federal system is analogous to the relation of Rome to its client states.66
The union among the states, however, would appear to be stronger than
that between Rome and its client states. The jus gentium represented a
separate body of law that was not coextensive with the civil law
applicable to citizens of Rome. 67
Under the federal system in the United States and, more specifically,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article :rv, Section 2, citizens
of foreign states were to be deemed citizens in all of the states and were
therefore to be governed under the civil law of the several states.
Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause went beyond traditional

66. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, ch. 15, § 7 (Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, &
Alan Watson eds., 1985). Justinian's Institutes states:
[A]lthough free peoples and those bound to us by treaty are foreigners to us
... they retain their freedom and rights over their own property in our country
just as in their own, and the same applies to us in their country . . . . A free
people is one which is not subject to the control. of any other people; a civitas
foederata, one which has neither entered into friendship under an equal treaty
or under a treaty [which] includes the provision that this people should with
good will preserve the majestas of another people.
Id.
67. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the Roman distinction between the law
of nations and the civil law).
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principles of international comity.68
According to Chancellor Kent:

First, comity was voluntary. 69

68. This term "comity" was defined by Mr. Ingersoll in argument before the
Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle and connected to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2:
Comity . . . is international courtesy; never allowed between provinces,
districts, counties, cities, or other parts of the same empire. The connexion
between these United States is closer and more intimate than that of comity.
Their union by federal compact expressly settles the relation of the states to
each other, and leaves no room for tacit or constructive comity to operate ..
. . An article of the Constitution provides for the force and proof of public
acts of state, for the privileges and immunities of the citizens of each state in
all the rest, for fugitives from justice and fugitives from labour; leaving little
or nothing on this important subject to judicial construction.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 569-70 (1839).
69. In his dissent in Bank of Augusta, Justice McKinley referred to the work of
Emmerich Vattel, an influential natural law theorist, as authority for his discussion of
international comity. According to Justice McKinley, the voluntary nature of international comity was said by Vattel to flow from the sovereignty of the individual states and
the liberty that each has "derived from nature." Id. at 606. Justice McKinley quoted the
following passage from Vattel's Law of Nations:
"Nations being free and independent of each other in the same manner as men
are naturally free and independent, the second general law of their society is
that each nation ought to be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty it
has derived from nature. The natural society of nations cannot subsist, if the
rights which each has received from nature are not respected. None would
willingly renounce its liberty: it would rather break off all commerce with
those that should attempt to violate it. From this liberty and independence it
follows that every nation is to judge of what its conscience demands, of what
it can or cannot do, of what is proper or improper to be done; and consequently to examine and determine whether it can perform any office for another
without being wanting in what it owes to itself. In all cases, then, where a
nation has the liberty of judging·what its duty requires, another cannot oblige
it to act in such or such a manner. For the attempting this would be doing an
injury to the liberty of nations."
Id. (quoting EMMERICH VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 53, 54). Thus, without some sort of
binding agreement, or supreme sovereignty, the principles of comity would remain
voluntary.
Similar statements were made in Miller v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788). In that case,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the role of the civil law and the law of
nations in deciding whether a defendant who was a resident of Maryland could obtain
a discharge under the insolvent law in the state of Maryland from a plaintiff who was
a resident of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff argued that
according to the strict idea of a municipal law, it was limited in its operation
to the jurisdiction of the state that made it[;] . . . and to a free people
particularly, it must appear, unreasonable that there should be legislation where
there is no representation .... There are, however, he [Justinian] acknowledged, cases in which an indirect effect is given to foreign statutes, in order
to accomplish the rules of justice[;] ... the foreign statutes, as such, have no
coercive authority extra territorium, but are received only by consent, so far
as they are necessary to justice.
Id. at 239-40.
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Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim equal
consideration for their rights, whatever may be their relative dimensions or
strength, or however greatly they may differ in government, religion, or
manners. This perfect equality, and entire independence of all distinct states,
is a fundamental principle of public law. It is a necessary consequence of this
equality, that each nation has a right to govern itself as it may think proper, and
no one nation is entitled to dictate a form of government, or religion, or a
course of internal policy, to another. 70

However, as sovereigns, states could enter into compacts or treaties that
were binding among themselves. The states, or the peoples thereof,
were parties to the Constitution of the United States, having consented
to be bound by it. Therefore, the states could agree to be bound by
certain principles that went beyond mere voluntary comity,71 to protect
the privileges and immunities of citizens of foreign states while in their
own jurisdictions. Article IV, Section 2 represents such an agreement
on the part of the states to recognize citizens of foreign states as citizens
of their own states and to respect the privileges and immunities of
citizens of foreign states while under their jurisdiction in order to further
the peace among the states and to strengthen the Union. 72

70. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *21 (O.W. Holmes Jr.,
ed., 12th ed. 1873).
71. This does not mean that the states ceased to recognize voluntary principles of
comity. For example, in Bank of Augusta, Justice Taney described the nature of the
union among the people of the United States and urged voluntary application of the
principles of international comity in cases where courts were not constrained by the
Constitution to apply these principles. Justice Taney reasoned as follows:
The intimate union of these states, as members of the same great political
family; the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together;
should lead us, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater
degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness towards one another, than we
should be authorized to presume between foreign nations. And when (as
without doubt must occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any state
requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will, and the legal
presumption is at once at an end. But until this is done, upon what grounds
could this Court refuse to administer the law of international comity between
these states? They are sovereign states; and the history of the past, and the
events which are daily occurring, furnish the strongest evidence that they have
adopted towards each other the laws of comity in their fullest extent.
Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 590. Thus, the principles of the law of nations were
recognized as legal default rules, which could be trumped by positive law enacted by the
legislature.
72. Elsewhere in the Constitution, the states are prohibited from further compacting
among themselves without the approval of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This was
probably an attempt to ensure that there were no special privileges accorded between
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Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article rv, Section 2
made binding through the consent of the states the voluntary principles
of international comity found in the well-developed body of law termed
the "law of nations."73 In addition, the Clause served to preserve the
equality of the states by guaranteeing that the citizens of foreign states
would enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens on an equal
footing with resident citizens in all of the other states comprising the
Union. 74 In an often-cited passage from The Federalist Papers Number

states within the federal system, but that the privileges and immunities of citizenship
would be available to all on an equal footing within the Union.
73. In Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855), Justice Wayne presented
the opinion of the Court concerning the relation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
to the sovereignty of the states. Citing Vattel, Justice Wayne reasoned:
In such a union, the States are bound by all of those principles of justice
which bind individuals to their contracts. They are bound by their mutual
acquiescence in the powers of the constitution, that neither of them should be
the judge, or should be allowed to be the final judge of the powers of the
constitution, or of the interpretation of the laws of congress. This is not so,
because th~ir sovereignty is impaired; but the exercise of it is diminished in
quantity, because they have, in certain respects, put restraints upon that
exercise, in virtue of voluntary engagements.
Id. at 351 (citing EMMERICH VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS ch. 1, § 10). One of these
"voluntary engagements" was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2, which forced the states to recognize foreign citizens as citizens of their own
states, entitled to all of the privileges and immunities attaching to that status.
74. The Justices in the Dred Scott decision recognized the importance of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 as not only embodying
principles of international comity, but also as guaranteeing the equality of the states in
the Union. For example, Justice Nelson in his concurring opinion in Dred Scott
discussed the principles of international comity in relation to the privileges and
immunities of citizens, citing Justice Story as an authority on the subject. Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 460 (1856) (Justice Nelson appealed to Justice
Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws as well as works by Huberus and Kent).
Justice Nelson applied the principles of international comity concerning the status of
persons in foreign states to determine the status of Dred Scott. Id. at 466-67.
Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, Justice Catron
discussed the privileges and immunities of citizens in relation to the territories controlled
by Congress and the Clause's maintenance of the equality among the states. According
to Justice Catron:
The Constitution having provided that "The citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States," the
right to enjoy the territory as equals was reserved to the States, and to the
citizens of the States, respectively. The cited clause is not that citizens of the
United States shall have equal privileges in the Territories, but the citizen of
each State shall come there in right of his State, and enjoy the common
property. He secures his equality through the equality of his State, by virtue
of that great fundamental condition of the Union-the equality of the States.
Id. at 527. Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 may
be seen as not only guaranteeing to citizens the privileges and immunities inherent in the
concept of citizenship, but also as ensuring the sovereignty of the states as equals within
the federal system. The Privileges and Immunities Clause was therefore designed to be
as much a federalism provision governing relations among the states as it was to be an
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Eighty, Alexander Hamilton discussed the effect of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, noting that the Clause
formed "the basis of the union" and established an "equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union [would] be
entitled."75 The people of the United States were to be recognized as
citizens, members of each of the states' political communities, founded
upon a social compact. In this respect, the people of the United States
could be said to form one people, since each person was automatically
made part of the political community of each state. Each citizen would
be entitled to be placed upon an equal footing with every other citizen
no matter where they might find themselves. One of the most important
functions of the new federal judiciary would be to enforce this equality.16

However, the privileges and immunities of citizens were not defined
in the Constitution and were not comprehensively enumerated by the
courts. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly declined the task of
exhaustively enumerating the privileges and immunities of citizens under
the Clause.77 Notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to comprehensive-

individual rights provision, guaranteeing that the citizens of the individual states would
be recognized as citizens within foreign jurisdictions. See Bogen, supra note 14, at 84445; Gonzales, supra note 14, at 499-50.
The Dred Scott Court struck down the Missouri Compromise as a violation of this
equality of the states. According to the Court, "the act of 1820, known as the Missouri
compromise, violates the most leading feature of the Constitution-a feature on which
the Union depends, and which secures to the respective States and their citizens an entire
EQUALITY of rights, privileges, and immunities." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 528-29. The
Missouri Compromise violated this equality among the states by depriving the rights of
property of the citizens of the slaveholding states. The right of these citizens to hold a
certain species of property, namely slave property, was not respected within the territory,
while the rights of property of citizens in the nonslaveholding states were respected.
This was a violation of the sovereignty of the slaveholding states because it was a
refusal to respect the rights of property that had been vested under the jurisdiction of
these states. The sovereign power of the nonslaveholding states to vest property in the
citizenry was respected, while that of the slaveholding states was not.
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961 ). Chester Antieau has argued that this passage indicates that Hamilton understood
the Clause as guaranteeing certain fundamental rights of"citizens of the several States."
Antieau, supra note 14, at 8.
76. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
77. Thomas M. Cooley, one of the most prominent nineteenth century constitutional scholars, discussed the ill-defined nature of the privileges and immunities protected
under the Clause in his comments on Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States. Citing Conner v. Elliot, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1856), Cooley
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ly define the privileges and immunities of citizens, certain of these
privileges and immunities were enumerated in the many cases arising
under the Clause prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts generally made a distinction between special privileges, which
were not guaranteed under the Clause, and fundamental privileges, which
were the privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Article
IV, Section 2.78 Furthermore, courts frequently acknowledged that the
states retained the power to regulate the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Clause.79
Besides the question of what types of rights were the "privileges" and
"immunities" of citizens under Article IV, Section 2, courts also
addressed the question of what kind of protection these privileges and
immunities were guaranteed, whether antidiscrimination80 or substantive

stated, "[t]he Supreme Court will not describe and define these privileges and immunities
in a general classification, preferring to deal with each case as it may come up." 2
JOSEPH S. STORY, CO:tvfMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 560
n.4 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1873).
78. See infra Part III.D discussing the distinction between special and fundamental
privileges under the Clause. As one commentator concluded:
[T]here was a widespread belief in certain "fundamental" rights, to be enjoyed
by the members of any body politic of necessity, because demanded by the
"law of nature." . . . These rights, being conceived of as inherent in the idea
of citizenship, were, as a matter of course, those which were commonly
regarded as guaranteed by the Comity Clause; but any others, not being
inherently possessed by the citizens of every political society, were to be
considered as for the individual States to grant to or withhold from whomsoever they pleased.
HOWELL, supra note 4, at 63.
79. See infra Part III.E discussing the states' power of regulation. See also
HOWELL, supra note 4, at 80 ("It has never been questioned to any considerable extent
. . . that a State may adopt proper quarantine and other police regulations with a view
to the safeguarding of the health and welfare of its own citizens, although such
regulations very evidently operate as restrictions upon the eajoyment of the privilege
above named.").
80. Thomas M. Cooley accepted the antidiscrimination interpretation of the Clause
as granting the same privileges and immunities to nonresident citizens as were available
to resident citizens. See 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 559-64 n.4. Distinguishing special
privileges from the privileges and immunities of citizens, Cooley made it clear that, in
his opinion, the privileges and immunities secured by the Clause were those that were
afforded under a given state's laws and constitutions. According to Cooley:
[T]he privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several
States by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which
are common to the citizens in the latter State, under their constitution and
laws, by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens
in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was
not intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation
in other States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, .
express or implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer
must, therefore, be enjoyed at home unless the assent of other States to their
enjoyment herein be given.
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protection. The Clause may have guaranteed certain fundamental rights
uniformly throughout the several states, or it may merely have guaranteed equal civil rights in each state. Finally, there was the question of
the Clause's relationship to the regulation of commerce. 81 Although the
Clause may have been motivated in part by concerns with interstate
commerce, the Clause had a broader purpose, to form a single union of
all of the people of the United States. This Part explores that governing
purpose by examining the history, text, structural context, and case law
arising under the Clause.

A.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
of the Articles of Confederation

It is widely recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution was derived from a corresponding clause in the Articles of Confederation. 82 The Constitution,
Id. at 560 n.4. Cooley also stated that the Clause served to remove the disabilities of
alienage in the several states, indicating that perhaps there were certain rights envisioned
as being afforded substantive protection under the Clause. Furthermore, it must be noted
that this interpretation of the Clause is the same as that given by Justice Field in Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) who subsequently interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment as affording substantive protection to certain privileges and immunities of
citizenship in the Slaughter-House Cases.
81. Thomas M. Cooley discussed the relationship between the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the congressional power over regulation of commerce, which was
explored in Ward v. State, indicating that both clauses were designed to facilitate
commerce among the states. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 559-64 n.4 (citing Ward v.
State, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1872) (Clifford, J.)). According to Cooley, the Court in
Ward stated:
[I]t will be sufficient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakably secures
and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of
the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business,
without molestation, to acquire personal property, to take and hold real estate,
to maintain actions in the courts of the State, and to be exempt from any
higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the State upon its own citizens.
Id. at 563 n.4 (citations omitted). However, the court in Ward did not indicate that this
was the only purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
Id. at 559-64 n.4.
82. See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 14; Bogen, supra note 14; Gonzales, supra note
14. Charles Pinckney, the probable draftsman of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
stated in a 1787 letter that "[t]he 4th article, respecting the extending [ofJ the rights of
the Citizens of each State, throughout the United States . . . is formed exactly upon the
principles of the 4th article of the present Confederation." 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 112. This provision was adopted with
almost no debate. See id. at 437.

839

however, contained an improved mechanism for enforcement of its
Privileges and Immunities Clause: a national judiciary that would
preside over conflicts among citizens of different states. 83 An understanding of the original meaning of the corresponding clause in the
Articles of Confederation conveys some idea of the intention of the
Framers in including the similarly-worded clause in the Constitution.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles reads as follows:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these
states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the

The Supreme Court addressed the relation between the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Articles and that of the Constitution in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.
(18 Pet.) 519 (1839). The argument before the Court was that the constitutional rights
of citizens who form corporations might be violated if corporations were not also
afforded protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 547. The
question was whether a Georgia corporation could sue in the courts of the United States
claiming a violation under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2. Id. at 519. Although it was recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2, like its predecessor in the Articles of Confederation, created a
"community of rights" among the citizens in the United States, placing them upon the
same footing as resident citizens in each of the several states, the Court did not extend
this protection to corporations. In argument before the Court, Mr. Webster discussed the
state of the Union under both the Articles of Confederation and the present Constitution.
[L]et us see what was the relation between the citizens of the different states
by the articles of confederation. The government had become a confederation.
But it was something more-much more. It was not merely an alliance
between distinct governments for the common defence and general welfare, but
it recognised and confirmed a community of interest, of character, and of
privileges, between the citizens of the several states. . . . [Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation] placed the inhabitants of each state on equal ground
as to the rights and privileges which they might exercise in every other state.
So things stood at the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The
article of the present Constitution, in fewer words and more general and
comprehensive terms, confirms this community of rights and privileges . . . .
Id. at 552.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Alexander Hamilton commented on the provision of
a national judiciary in the Constitution and its relation to enforcement of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in The Federalist No. 80, stating:
[I]f it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of
executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will follow, that in order
to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to
which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to
preside in all cases in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another
state or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision
against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should
be committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be
likely to be impartial between the different states and their citizens, and which,
owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias
inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 75, at 537-38.
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people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject
to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof
respectively . . . .84

The precursors of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of
the Articles of Confederation are found in the following proposed
Articles VI and VII, drafted largely by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania
and reported on July 12, 1776:
Art. VI. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always have the
same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages, in the other
Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now have, in all Cases whatever, except
in those provided for by the next following Article.
Art. VII. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all the Rights,
Liberties, Privileges, Immunities, and Advantages, in Trade, Navigation, and
Commerce, in any other Colony, and in going to and from the same and to any
Part of the World, which the Natives of such Colony enjoy. 85

Some commentators have argued that the first of these proposed
Articles was intended to provide substantive protection for certain
uniform fundamental rights, while the second of these Articles was
designed to provide antidiscrimination protection and is based on
principles of interstate comity. 86 Under this interpretation, Article IV
of the Articles of Confederation contains language that reflects the
meaning of both of these proposed Articles, 87 but Article IV, Section
2 of the Constitution dropped the interstate comity language, while
retaining the language guaranteeing basic, fundamental, natural rights. 88
However, it is not· at all clear from the language of the first of these
proposed Articles that it was intended to provide substantive protection
for fundamental rights that were to be uniform among the states. The
proposed Article VII may merely have protected the rights of foreign
citizens as measured by those rights accorded to native citizens, and the
proposed Article VI may have been abandoned because it would freeze
the noncommercial law of the states. 89 Article IV of the Articles of

84. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 6th ed.
1963); 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 908-09 (1906).
85. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 547 (1906).
86. See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 14, at 3.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 6.
89. Bogen, supra note 14, at 818 (arguing that "Article VII ... used the colonial
charter technique of measuring intercolonial rights by the rights of natives of the colony"
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Confederation may be read as providing antidiscrimination protection for
whatever basket of fundamental rights each state chose to adopt. This
is the interpretation that Justice Story seems to have adopted in his
Commentaries. According to Justice Story, "[t]he intention of this clause
was to confer on them, [the citizens of each state,] if one may so say, a
general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State would be entitled to under the
like circumstances."90 Thus, the clause found in the Articles of
Confederation corresponding to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 provides strong historical support for both the
substantive and antidiscrimination readings of the Clause.

B.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause: Forming
"The Basis of the Union"

As Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist Papers Number
Eighty, the Privileges and Immunities Clause formed the "basis of the
Union."91 The Framers of the Constitution expressed time and again
the notion that the former colonies were to exist independently of
England as a unified body. For example, James Wilson, after reading
the Declaration of Independence to the Constitutional Convention,
observed "that the United Colonies were declared to be free & independent States; and inferring that they were independent, not Individually,
but Unitedly . ..."92 The union was, thereby, strengthened, as compared to the states outside the federal system. The new Constitution
wrought this fundamental innovation. 93
Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a number of courts
had an opportunity to construe the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 in a variety of contexts. 94 These cases provide a
wealth of information concerning the nineteenth century understanding
of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in the Clause. A
common theme in these cases was that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause established a "community of rights" among the citizens of the
United States.
and that Article VI "prevented any alteration of noncommercial state law affecting
residents of other states, even if nondiscriminatory against nonresidents.").
90. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 559 (footnotes omitted).
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 75, at 518-19.
92. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 324 (M. Farrand
ed. 1966).
.
93. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles
of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 (1997) (comparing
the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation).
94. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Campbell v. Morris, 95 a case later cited by members
of Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment,96 the
Maryland Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in Article IV, Section 2. The defendant
argued that the terms "privileges and immunities" meant the "right of
holding property by the citizens of any state, and having the protection
of their property and persons in the same manner as the citizens of this
state."97 According to defense counsel, the Framers left the word
"rights" out of Article IV, Section 2 "in order to prevent the right of
voting, and holding offices, by the citizens of one state in another
state. " 98 In other words, the term "rights" was left out to avoid a
construction that would provide a constitutional guarantee of political,
not merely civil, rights under Article rv, Section 2. 99 The defendant
argued that unequal regulation of the property of foreign citizens violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 100 Defense counsel described
the privileges of citizenship the Clause guaranteed as follows:
A citizen of another state may hold real property in any state of the union,
subject to the laws and regulations of that state, and his property and his person
are entitled to the protection of the laws in the same manner as the citizens of
the state. When a citizen of another state comes into this state, he is entitled
to all the benefits of our judiciary, and he is also subject to the process of the
same in the same manner as the citizens of this state. Another privilege secured

95. 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797). See also HOWELL, supra note 4, at 16
(describing Campbell as "[t]he first reported case bearing upon the clause"); Maltz, supra
note 4, at 336-37 (discussing Campbell).
96. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 121.
97. Campbell, 3 H. & McH. at 537 .
. 98. Id. at 538.
99. It was long recognized that political rights such as the right to vote and to hold
public office were not intended to be guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 62 ("From the earliest times in the judicial
interpretation of the Comity Clause it has always been affirmed that there are certain
kinds of public or political rights which do not come within its operation."); id. at 63-64
("In view of the fact that the so-called 'natural rights' theory was at the time accepted
practically without question, it is not to be wondered at that the judges in the early cases
were so positive in their statements as to the exclusion of political privileges from the
list of rights to be shared equally by the citizens of all the States ....").
100. As defense counsel argued, the act of assembly at issue in the case put "the
foreign citizen in a worse situation, and he may be deprived of his property in a different
manner from that by which a citizen of this state is deprived of his property." Campbell,
3 H. & McH. at 538.
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to the citizen by this clause is, that he may go into a different state without
being under the necessity of talcing an oath of allegiance. 101

Thus, the defendant interpreted the Clause to accord substantive
protection in all of the States to certain fundamental rights. However,
defense counsel also recognized that the state's power of regulation
controlled the exercise of these rights. Although the state had the power
to regulate the rights guaranteed under the Clause, it could not discriminate against foreign citizens. According to defense counsel, "[i]f the
laws of this state put the citizens of another state in a worse situation
than the citizens of this state, it is a violation of the social compact." 102
Thus, unequal regulation violated not only the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, but also the "social compact" among citizens of the United
States.
In contrast, plaintiff's counsel argued that Article IV, Section 2 did not
give "foreign citizens all the advantages of the citizens of any particular
state." 103 Instead, citizens were merely guaranteed the "right of
citizenship in every state." 104 The plaintiff contended that the act of
assembly at issue in the case did not violate the "rights of citizenship,"
but merely proscribed a "particular mode of recovering debts, and a
citizen of another state is not in a worse situation than the citizens of our
own state." 105 Thus, the plaintiff argued that this mode of regulation
did not violate the rights of citizenship under the Clause.
Justice Samuel Chase delivered the opinion of the court. In addressing
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Chase
stated that "[p]rivilege and immunity are synonymous, or nearly so.
Privilege signifies a peculiar advantage, exemption, immunity; immunity
signifies exemption, privilege." 106 Justice Chase elaborated:
[A] particular and limited operation is to be given to these words, [privileges
and immunities] and not a full and comprehensive one . . . . The court are of
the opinion it means ... the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real
as well as personal property, and that such property shall be protected and

101. Id. at 548.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 542.
104. Id.
105. Id. See also HOWELL, supra note 4, at 57 ("It is the protection of substantive
rights which is guaranteed to the citizens of the several States; and the procedural forms
adopted for enforcing such rights may validly differ in respect to non-residents, provided
only the difference is not such as to defeat their enjoyment of some substantive right
accorded by a State to its own citizens.").
106. Campbell, 3 H. & McH. at 553.
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secured by the laws of the state, in the same manner as the property of the
citizens of the state is protected. 107

Justice Chase's citation of certain specific privileges and immunities may
indicate that, in his view, the Clause guaranteed certain fundamental
privileges and immunities of citizens uniformly among all of the states,
in addition to ensuring that foreign citizens could exercise these rights
in the "same manner" as native citizens. 108 At the same time, he
recognized the requirement of equality in regulations concerning the
mode in which the privileges and immunities of citizens could be
exercised--that the privileges and immunities of citizens had to be
protected in the "same manner" for non-resident citizens as they were for
resident citizens. However, as previously noted, this was not the only
interpretation found in case law dealing with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
An interpretation of the Clause as providing only antidiscrimination
protection was also prevalent. Justice Story in his Commentaries, 109
as well as Abbot v. Bayley, 110 another case cited by members of
Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, 111
advanced the notion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause merely
placed citizens of one state upon an "equal footing" with citizens of
every other state. In Abbot, the Massachusetts court stated:
The privileges and immunities secured to the people of each State in every
other State, can be applied only in case of removal from one State into another.
By such removal they become citizens of the adopted State without naturalization, and have a right to sue and be sued as citizens; and yet this privilege is
qualified and not absolute, for they cannot enjoy the right of suffrage or of
eligibility to office, without such term of residence as shall be prescribed by the
constitution and laws of the State into which they shall remove. They shall
have the privileges and immunities of citizens, that is, they shall not be deemed
aliens, but may take and hold real estate, and may, according to the laws of

107. Id. at 554. This part of the opinion was cited by Senator Trumbull, who read
the remarks of Justice Chase in discussing the Civil Rights Bill. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 121.
108. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 19 ("The most casual examination of the
reasoning in [Campbel[J shows that it is based almost entirely upon the prevalent
political theory of natural rights.").
109. 2 STORY, supra note 77; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
110. 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89 (1827).
111. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 121
(remarks of Senator Trumbull).
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such State, eventuallil enjoy the full rights of citizenship without the necessity
of being naturalized. 12

However, even in the Abbot opinion, there is evidence of a substantive
reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Abbot court
mentioned a specific privilege or immunity of citizenship, that of taking
and holding real estate, indicating that even under its antidiscrimination
interpretation, certain privileges and immunities of citizens may have
been understood to exist in all of the states even if they were not
mandated by the federal Constitution. The relevant question becomes
whether the prevailing view held that the Clause mandated such
uniformity.
The proper interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
disputed until the Civil War. A significant case, Lemmon v. People, 113
decided in 1860, involved the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 and the slaveholder's right of property in his slave
when traveling in foreign jurisdictions. 114 The question was whether
New York could free a citizen's slave if that individual came within its
jurisdiction accompanied by his slave. More specifically, the issue was
whether the right of property in slaves was protected under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.11 5 The slaveowner argued that there were
certain general privileges and immunities inherent in the status of citizen
of the United States that the Clause guaranteed in all of the states,
including the right of property in a slave.
[T]he object of this section [Article IV, Section 2] is to secure to the citizen,
when within a State in which he is not domiciled, the general privileges and
immunities which, in the very nature of citizenship, as recognized and
established by the Federal Constitution, belonged to that status; so that by no
partial and adverse legislation of a State into which he might go as a stranger
or a sojourner can he be deprived of them. 116

Thus, the argument stated that the Clause afforded both substantive as
well as antidiscrimination protection for foreign citizens visiting other
states. Plaintiff's counsel also pointed to the principles of international
comity that he claimed were "converted by the Constitution into an

112. Abbott, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 92.
113. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). See Maltz, supra note 4, at 345-46 (discussing Lemmon).
114. The conflict over the right of a slaveowner to maintain a property interest in
his slave when traveling in a free state also invoked the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article
IV. See infra Part 111.C.1.
115. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 580.
116. Id. at 580-81. Plaintiffs counsel again reiterated his point: "By the section
quoted [Article IV, Section 2] the citizen of each State is secured in all the general
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States whilst temporarily and
necessarily within a State other than that of his domicil." Id. at 581.
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absolute right of the citizen." 117 Citing Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution, plaintiff's counsel explained that "[c]omity, like municipal
law, has its foundation in compact, express or implied. The social or
international compact between the States, as such, was fixed by the
Federal Constitution." 118 The "duty of a State toward the citizens of
another State" was a duty that was imposed "not by comity, as a rule of
action, but by the Federal Constitution." 119
Counsel for the defendant, the· State of New York, argued that the
"state of slavery is contrary to natural right," 120 citing in particular
Justinian's Institutes. As a result, the "peculiar system of laws" arising
in states that recognized slavery was "irreconcilable with the jurisprudence of States where it does not exist." 121 Citing among other
sources the Roman authorities, defendant's counsel urged that the "law
of slavery is local, and does not operate beyond the territory of the State
where it is established."122 As a result, New York could free the
plaintiff's slave without violating the plaintiff's rights under Article rv,
Section 2 of the Constitution. 123 Finally, counsel made a telling
argument in stating that if slaves were property, there would be no need

117. Id.
118. Id. at 582.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 584.
121. Id. at 585.
122. Id. In order to support his contention that slavery was a mere local institution
created by positive regulations, having no effect outside the jurisdiction, defendant's
counsel cited the 1820 decision by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Rankin v. Lydia,
9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467,470 (1820). In that case, defendant's counsel noted that the
Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
"[I]n deciding this question, we disclaim the influence of the general principles
of liberty which we all admire, and conceive it ought to be decided by the law
as it is, and not as it ought to be. Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of this
State, and the right to hold them under our municipal regulations, is
unquestionable. But we view this as a right existing by positive law of a
municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the unwritten
and common law."
Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 587 (quoting Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470
(1820)).
123. Citing a variety of authorities, counsel for the defendant reasoned that "[w]hen
the slave is carried, or escapes beyond its jurisdiction, he becomes free, and the State to
which he resorts is under no obligation to restore him, except by virtue of express
stipulation." Id. at 585.
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for the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 124 Arguably,
slave property would then be afforded the same protection as other forms
of property under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2.
Citing Vattel and Montesquieu, defendant's counsel argued that comity
involved the protection of only natural rights. "The laws of nations are,
in their origin, only natural rights of men applied to nations." 125
Slavery was not a "natural relation, but contrary to nature, and at every
moment it subsists, it is an ever new and active violation of the law of
nature." 126 Therefore, any protection of slave property in New York
could only exist because of the voluntary action of that state. However,
the New York statute explicitly freed such individuals. Therefore, the
state legislature had not chosen to accord voluntary comity with respect
to property in slaves within its jurisdiction. 127
The court sided with counsel for the State of New York. The court
assented to the proposition that a state's municipal regulations concerning the status of individuals could have no binding extraterritorial effect,
but maintained that courts should presume that the legislature desires that
they be respected out of principles of voluntary comity. 128 Furthermore, the court agreed with the widely accepted view that slavery was
contrary to principles of natural right and, therefore, could have no

124. Id. at 589. For a more thorough discussion of the Fugitive Slave Clause, see
infra Part 111.C. l.
125. Id. at 592.
126. Id. at 597. Defense counsel William M. Evarts stated: "The law of nations,
built upon the law of nature, has adopted this same view of the status of slavery, as
resting on force against right, and finding no support outside of the jurisdiction of the
municipal law which establishes it." Id. He further elaborated on this point:
The rule of the law of nations which permits the transit of strangers and
their property through a friendly State does not require our laws to uphold the
relation of slave owner and slave between strangers.
By the law of nations, men are not the subject of property.
By the law of nations, the municipal law which makes men the subject of
property, is limited with the power to enforce itself, that is by its territorial
jurisdiction.
By the law of nations, then, the strangers stand upon our soil in their natural
relations as men, their artificial relation being absolutely terminated.
Id. at 598 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120, 121 (1825)).
127. Citing, among others, Justice Story and the Dred Scott Court, defense counsel
recognized that
[t]he comity, it is to be observed, under inquiry, is ... of the State and not of
the Court, which latter has no authority to exercise comity in behalf of the
State, but only a judicial power of determining whether the main policy and
actual legislation of the State exhibit the comity inquired of . . . .
Id. at 596.
128. Id. at 602.
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binding extraterritorial effect outside of slaveholding states. 129 Note,
however, that in this case, the State of New York explicitly declared by
statute that it did not accord voluntary comity to the status of slavery.
Thus, this positive regulation overrode any principles of international
comity that might have applied in the case. 130
The court also addressed the effect of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2. According to the court, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
secured a "community of intercourse" among the states. 131 Although
the Constitution made the states into "a single nation" for "all external
purposes and for certain enumerated domestic objects," the court
acknowledged that the states remained sovereign under the Constitution
with respect to certain other subjects outside the sphere of the enumerat-

129. Id. at 605. The court cited the well known English case, Sommersetv. Stewart,
for the proposition that "a state of slavery could not exist except by force of positive
law." Id. According to the court, this rule of law in England was transported to
America with the colonists.
The laws of England respecting personal rights were in general the laws of the
Colonies, and they continued the same system after the Revolution by
provisions in their Constitutions, adopting the common law subject to
alterations by their own statutes. The literature of the Colonies was that of the
mother country.
Id. The court also stated, citing Montesquieu, that "slavery is repugnant to natural
justice and right, has no support in any principle of international law, and is antagonistic
to the genius and spirit of republican government." Id. at 617. The court cited Justice
Story's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania to the same effect. Id. at 622-23. For a more
thorough discussion of Prigg, see infra notes 183-208 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 602-03. According to the court:
[I]t follows that where the Legislature of the State, in which a right or
privilege is claimed on the ground of comity, has by its laws spoken upon the
subject of the alleged right, the tribunals are not at liberty to search for the
rule of decision among the doctrines of international comity, but are bound to
adopt the directions laid down by the political government of their own State.
Id. As a result, the court looked only to the law of New York on the question of
whether a slave became free upon setting foot upon the soil of New York. The court
also stated:
Comity . . . never can be exercised in violation of our own laws; and in
deciding whether comity requires any act, we look to our own laws for
authority. There can be no application of the principles of comity, when the
State absolutely refuses to recognize or give effect to the foreign law, or the
relation it establishes, as being inconsistent with her own laws, and contrary
to her policy.
Id. at 629.
131. Id. at 607.
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ed powers delegated to the national govemment. 132 The Privileges and
Immunities Clause merely guaranteed that foreign citizens would have
the same rights as native citizens, except for those rights that depended
on the domicil of the individual. 133 In this case, citizens of New York
were also barred from bringing slaves within the state, and therefore,
under this interpretation, there was no violation of the prohibitions of the
Clause. 134
Judge Clerke authored a lengthy dissent in the case. He based his
argument on a "principle of the unwritten law of nations" that citizens
have a right of passage through foreign territories without having those
territories acquire a right over their person or property. 135 Judge
Clerke argued that this principle applied as well to property in slaves
under the Constitution of the United States because that document
recognized such property. 136 Because the constitutional compact
recognized property in slaves, this principle of the law of nations was
even more applicable to the states. 137

132. Id. at 608. Among the powers that were retained by the states, according to
the court, was the power to regulate "[t]he social status of the people, and their personal
and relative rights as respects each other, [and] the definition and arrangements of
property ...." Id.
133. Id. According to the court, the Clause was "intended to guard against a State
discriminating in favor of its own citizens." Id. at 627.
134. Id. at 610.
135. Id. at 636.
136. Id. at 637. Judge Clerke queried:
[C]an any one State insist, under the federal compact, in reference to the rights
of the citizens of any other State, that there is no such thing as the right of
such citizens, in their own States, to the service and labor of any person. This
is property; and whether the person is held to service and labor for a limited
period, or for life, it matters not; it is still property--recognized as an existing
institution by the people who framed the present Constitution, and binding
upon their posterity forever, unless that Constitution should be modified or
dissolved by common consent.
Id. Judge Clerke also cited the Dred Scott case and the opinion of Chief Justice Taney
for the proposition that the Constitution recognized property in slaves. Id. at 640.
137. Id. at 641. According to Judge Clerke, "the relations of the different States of
this Union towards each other are of a much closer and more positive nature than those
between foreign nations towards each other." Id. at 642. Judge Clerke's summation of
his argument is particularly instructive in understanding the way in which principles of
the law of nations became binding as conventional obligations under the Constitution:
The right to the labor and service of persons held in slavery, is incontestably
recognized as property in the Constitution of the United States. The right
yielded by what is termed comity under the law of nations, ripens, in necessary
accordance with the declared purpose and tenor of the Constitution of the
United States, into a conventional obligation, essential to its contemplated and
thorough operation as an instrument of federative and national government.
Id. at 643.
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Thus, both the majority and dissent in Lemmon interpreted the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 as protecting
certain natural law rights of citizenship throughout the United States.
The two sides disputed only whether the right of property in a slave was
such a natural law right of the citizen, or whether it was merely a
municipal regulation-a special privilege or immunity-having no
binding extraterritorial effect.
The court in another important antebellum case dealing with the status
of free blacks, Crandall v. State, 138 similarly focused its attention on
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Crandall involved
a Connecticut statute that forbid the teaching of "coloured persons not
inhabitants" of the state without the approval of the legislature. 139 In
rendering its decision, the court evaluated whether this act violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Although the
case was reversed on a technicality, 140 the arguments of counsel in the
case provide insight concerning the meaning attributed to the Clause in
antebellum America.
First, the court determined whether such "coloured persons" were
citizens for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Citing,
among others, Chancellor Kent's Commentaries as authority, the attorney
for the State of Connecticut argued that free blacks were not citizens
because they were under certain disabilities in various states. 141
Furthermore, admitting that education might be a fundamental privilege
guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2, he argued that even if they were
citizens under the Clause, the State of Connecticut was still free to
regulate the schools for the public good. 142 Thus, counsel urged the

138. 10 Conn. 339 (1834); see Maltz, supra note 4, at 339-40 (discussing Crandall).
139. Crandall, 10 Conn. at 339.
140. Id. at 370-71. The Connecticut act in question prohibited unlicensed schools
that taught "coloured persons." However, the information did not allege that the school
in question was unlicensed. Id.
· · 141. Id. at 339-47, 359. Counsel also noted that the first naturalization act passed
by Congress in 1790 reserved naturalization for "free white" persons, indicating that
blacks were not citizens. Id. at 358.
142. Id. at 347. According to counsel:
The legislature may regulate schools. I am free to say, that education is a
fundamental privilege; but this law does not prohibit schools. It places them
under the care of the civil authority and select-men; and why is not this a very
suitable regulation? I am not sure but the legislature might make a law like
this, extending to the white inhabitants of other states who- are unquestionably
citizens, placing all schools for them under suitable boards of examination, for
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court to find that the state of Connecticut passed the act within the
proper scope of its regulatory power with respect to the fundamental
privilege of education.
On the other side, plaintiff's counsel argued first that free blacks were
citizens and that the common law made no distinction in status based
upon color alone. 143 Furthermore, counsel contended that education
was a fundamental privilege and, consequently, that free blacks had the
right to come into the State of Connecticut and be educated (although
not necessarily at taxpayer expense). 144 Plaintiff's counsel then urged
that the Connecticut act was not a permissible regulation of the privilege
of educating oneself because the power exercised by the legislature was
one of "exclusion on the ground of alienage." 145 In other words, the
Connecticut act was not a "general and equal law," according to
counsel. 146 Thus, in Crandall, the court dealt with the familiar
question of the nature of the protection afforded under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause--substantive or antidiscrimination protection.

the public good; and I can see no objection to the board created by this act.
Id. (emphasis in original). Counsel also cited Judge Washington's decision in Corjield
v. Coryell, stating that the fundamental privileges and immunities could be regulated
under Article IV, Section 2 by the states for the "general good of the whole." Id. at 364.
There was later much dispute in Congress over whether the right to attend common
schools was a fundamental privilege or immunity of citizens. See McConnell, supra
note 15, at 1023-29. However, although the case is strong that the right to educate
oneself was a fundamental privilege or immunity, the case for recognizing the right to
attend common schools is weaker. One could perhaps argue that if such schools are
supported through taxation that one has a right to attend the school.
143. Crandall, 10 Conn. at 348. Counsel argued:
Here, the free man of colour may take his position, and upon the immutable
principles of justice and truth demand his political rights from that government
which he is bound to aid and to defend: he is not a citizen to obey, and an
alien to demand protection. Nor is he of an intermediate class. His relations
to society are the same as others; his absolute and relative rights, his rights of
person and to things, his acquisitions of property by contract and by
inheritance,-and even the soil, which no alien inherits-are the same. So
every requisition of the law, in its civil and criminal provisions, reaches him.
His legal capabilities and his legal obligations are the same. Every favour or
right conferred on the citizens, by general legislation, reaches him; every
requisition demands his obedience.
Id. at 349-50 (emphasis in original). Counsel also argued that the fact that free blacks
did not possess the right to vote did not mean that they were not citizens because there
was no "necessary connexion" between voting and citizenship. Id. at 351. Political
rights such as the right to vote and to hold office were not thought to be inherent rights
of citizenship in nineteenth century America. For a more comprehensive discussion of
the status of "citizen" in antebellum America and the fundamental privileges and
immunities accompanying that status, see Smith, supra note 12.
144. Crandall, 10 Conn. at 350-51.
145. Id. at 352.
146. Id. at 353.
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Furthermore, the court also addressed the question of the proper scope
of state regulation under the Clause.
The Supreme Court interpreted the Clause several times prior to
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the arguments
before the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden noted the relation
between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
and commerce. 147 In that case, involving the congressional power to
regulate commerce, it was argued that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as well as the Commerce Clause reflected the notion of comity
among the states. 148 In discussing the commercial barriers among the
states under the Articles of Confederation, it was argued that the
Constitution remedied problems arising among the states under the
Articles. The Constitution remedied
these evils . . . [b]y express prohibitions on the states, in those particulars in
which the evils had been most sensibly felt, preventing them from levying any
impost or duty of tonnage without the consent of Congress . . . . [and by]
vesting Congress with a general power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the states. 149

Furthermore, it was argued that the "law of nations" provided the
source of at least the right of intercourse with a state, as explicitly
mentioned in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of
Confederation:
The constitution does not profess to give, in terms, the right of ingress and
egress for commercial and any other purposes, or the right of transporting
articles for trade from one state to another. It only protects the personal rights
of the citizens of one state, when within the jurisdiction of another, by securing
to them "all the privileges and immunities of a citizen" of that other, which
they hold subject to the laws of the state as its own citizens; and it protects
their property against any duty to be imposed on its introduction. The right,
then, of intercourse with a state, by the subjects of a foreign power, or by the
citizens of another state, still rests on the original right, as derived from the law
of nations. 150

Therefore, because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 embodied principles originally expressed in the law of nations,
the right of engaging in commerce was seen as flowing not only from

147.
148.
149.
150.

See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
Id.
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the principles of the law of nations, but also from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. This indicated that the purpose of the Clause was
to effect greater commercial union among the citizens of all of the states,
besides protecting the rights of citizens in foreign states and the equality
of the states. 151 Furthermore, by referring to the "personal rights of
citizens," it seems that counsel had in mind a certain set of rights,
encompassing personal rights other than commercial privileges, which
all of the states would be obligated to recognize. 152 Thus, the Clause
afforded protection broader in scope than merely a guarantee of
commercial privileges and immunities.
In Thurlow ,~ Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 153 the Court again
addressed the relationship between commerce and the privileges and

151. This Clause was designed to carry out, among other things, the "commercial
purposes" of the Union. As Mr. Ogden argued before the Supreme Court in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle:
The great object of the Constitution was to erect a government for commercial
purposes, for mutual intercourse, and mutual dealing. The prosperity of every
State could alone be promoted and secured by establishing these on principles
of reciprocity; and on the security and protection of the citizens of each State,
in all the States united by the government.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 526 (1839).
152. Other provisions of the Constitution dealing with commercial issues were also
thought to be designed to ensure greater unity among the states. For example, the
prohibition against emitting bills of credit was a further attempt to unify the United
States commercially. In Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, it was
argued before the Court that
[t]he separation of all these powers of coining, issuing bills, making legal
tenders, fixing standards, and the bestowal of them on the Union, to the total
exclusion of the States, was indispensably necessary to accomplish the great
ends for which the Constitution was formed. Its leading object was to make
the people one people, for many purposes, and especially as to the currency.
One, as far as the high immunities and privileges of free citizens are
concerned. One, in the rights of holding, purchasing, and transferring
property. One, in the privilege of changing domicil and residence at pleasure.
One, in the modes and means of transacting business and commerce.
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 289-90 (1837). In fact, a uniform currency was argued to be
essential to assuring that the citizens of each state were accorded all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states:
Such a currency was altogether proper and indispensable under a system
which, for the first time in the history of free governments, established it as
a fundamental principle that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." It was impossible
to carry out this principle without it.
Id. at 291. The understanding of the Union formed under the Constitution given in this
argument may entail certain rights of citizens that were relatively uniform among the
states and which were guaranteed to all citizens under Article IV, Section 2. Through
construction of a single political community, or body politic, from the people of the
several states, certain privileges and immunities of these individuals as members of this
political community were guaranteed.
153. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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immunities of citizens. The case involved a tax upon items entering a
state, which was not applied to those items already in the state. It was
urged before the Court that "the subjection of the productions of one
State, when introduced for the purpose of sale and consumption within
the territories of another to the internal laws and regulations of the latter
State, finds an analogy in the case of the citizens of one State going into
the jurisdiction of another." 154 Therefore, the provisions of Article IV,
Section 2 with respect to the privileges and immunities of citizens could
be applied to invalidate the discriminatory tax. 155 Chief Justice Taney
delivered the opinion of the Court and in dicta argued as he subsequently
would in Dred Scott v. Sandford that the states could not exercise a
power that would have extraterritorial force and "compel other States to
acknowledge as citizens those whom it might not be willing to
receive. " 156
The Taney majority in Dred Scott accepted this view in arguing that
freed blacks could not have been considered citizens at the time of
ratification of the Constitution because they would have been entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizenship under Article IV, Section 2.
Such a result, Chief Justice Taney argued, neither reflected the reality in
the United States before the Civil War nor the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney reasoned:

154. Id. at 570.
155. Id. at 570-71. Mr. Burke argued for the state that:
The constitution provides, that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States." Citizens of one
State, going into the jurisdiction of another State, can claim no exemption from its
laws under this clause .... If they remain in the State, they become subject to the
taxing power, and all the burdens and restraints which its laws impose upon its own
citizens.
Id.
156. Id. at 585. Chief Justice Taney based his argument on the fact that Congress
had been given the exclusive power of naturalization. He analogized this power of
naturalization to the commerce power, reasoning that the states could not be allowed to
exercise any power having extraterritorial effect through the Privileges and Immunities
Clause where there was a corresponding congressional power over the subject matter.
Taney concluded:
[I]t would seem to be hardly consistent with this provision to allow any one
State, after the adoption of the Constitution, to exercise a power, which, if it
operated at all, must operate beyond the territory of the State, and compel
other States to acknowledge as citizens thos~ whom it might not be willing to
receive.
Id.
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It cannot be supposed that they [State sovereignties] intended to secure to them
[blacks] rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout
the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own
dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding
States regarded them as included in the word "citizens," or would have
consented to a constitution which might compel them to receive them in that
character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the
privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation
of the special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be
necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who
were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter
every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass
or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased,
to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation,
unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be
punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in
private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold
public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever
they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the
same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and
insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the
State. 157

Thus, Chief Justice Taney enumerated certain rights under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause to which free blacks would be entitled were they
considered citizens of the United States. His analysis indicates that it
may have been the· general understanding that certain rights would be
respected by all free governments and, therefore, that certain rights
would be civil rights of the citizen in any state in which he might find
himself. 158
The nature of the rights enumerated by Chief Justice Taney is also
noteworthy. Taney stated that free blacks would possess not only the
right to enter any state and remain without molestation, but also the right
to "full liberty of speech in public and in private," the right to "hold
public meetings," and the right to "keep and carry arms" wherever they
went. Therefore, Chief Justice Taney did not limit the privileges and
immunities protected under the Clause to certain rights of "trade and
commerce," such as those at issue in Gibbons v. Ogden and Thurlow v.
Commonwealth ofMassachusetts, but enumerated certain other personal
rights that would be protected under the Clause, some of which were
analogous to provisions in the Bill of Rights. 159

157. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1856).
158. For an argument supporting this interpretation of the Clause, see infra Part
IV.D.
159. See U.S. CONST. amends. I (guaranteeing "freedom of speech" and "the right
of the people peaceably to assemble") and II (guaranteeing "the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms'l
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The foregoing discussion of antebellum case law demonstrates that
courts examining the Privileges and Immunities Clause clearly noted that
it formed the "basis of the union" and made the United States "one
nation" by both entitling citizens to certain national rights in every state,
as well as placing them upon an equal footing with resident citizens in
the state in which they found themselves with respect to rights traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments. The rights
conferred under the Clause were limited to civil rights and did not
include political rights. 160
However, the Clause clearly encompassed a broader set of rights than
those relating only to trade and commerce. Further, the Taney opinion
in Dred Scott indicates that there may have been certain rights thought
to be afforded citizens in all free governments, which would therefore
be the privileges and immunities of citizens in all of the states. The
question remained, though, concerning the nature of the protection the
Clause extended--whether it guaranteed substantive protection, or
merely antidiscrimination protection, and whether the privileges and
immunities of citizens were intended to be guaranteed uniformly among
the states under the Clause. 161

160. Mr. Webster argued before the Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), that the Clause did not extend political rights to citizens
of each state in the several states and that the Clause acted "independently" of any
voluntary comity-in other words, the fact that this Clause was placed in the
Constitution made the protection mandatory rather than voluntary among the states. Id.
at 552. Webster explained:
[T]his article in the Constitution does not confer on the citizens of each
State political rights in every other State, is admitted. A citizen of Pennsylvania cannot go into Virginia and vote at an election in that State; though, when
he has acquired a residence in Virginia, and is otherwise qualified as required
by her constitution, he becomes, without formal adoption as a citizen of
Virginia, a citizen of that State politically. But for the purposes of trade,
commerce, buying and selling, it is evidently not in the power of any State to
impose any hinderance or embarrassment, or lay any excise, toll, duty, or
exclusion, upon citizens of other States, to place them, coming there, upon a
different footing from her own citizens.
Id. Furthermore, Webster noted: "This is American, constitutional law, independent of
all comity whatever." Id. at 553.
161. See infra Part IV, which addresses this interpretational problem in greater
detail.
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C.

A Structural Analysis of Article IV: The Fugitive Slave Clause
and Full Faith and Credit Clause

Other provisions of Article IV, in addition to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, were intended to extend principles of international
comity among the states. Principles of comity formed the basis of both
the Fugitive Slave Clause 162 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 163
as well. The Full Faith and Credit Clause ensured that the judgments of
state courts would be respected in foreign states. The Fugitive Slave
Clause ensured the recognition of the property of citizens in slaves
outside slaveholding states.

1.

Cases Arising Under the Fugitive Slave Clause

Neither reason nor natural law provided the foundation for property in
slaves. Rather, property in slaves was considered merely conventional.164 Thus, if it weren't for the presence of the Fugitive Slave Clause

162. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
163. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
164. For example, Justice McClean, dissenting in the Dred Scott decision, compiled
an extensive list of authorities stating that slavery was contrary to the principles of
natural law and as such could only be a local institution founded upon mere municipal
regulations.
As to the locality of slavery. The civil law throughout the Continent of
Europe, it is believed, without an exception, is, that slavery can exist only
within the territory where it is established; and that, if a slave escapes, or is
carried beyond such territory, his master cannot reclaim him, unless by virtue
of some express stipulations.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 534 (1856) (citations omitted). Justice
McClean concluded:
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which
preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself, from
whence it was created, is erased from the memory; it is of a nature that
nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law.
Id. at 535 (citation omitted). Justice McClean concluded not only that slavery was
contrary to principles of natural law, but also that it had no foundation in the common
law. Justice McClean noted, quoting Rankin v. Lydia:
"Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of [the] State, and the right to hold slaves
under our municipay [sic] regulations is unquestionable. But we view this as
a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation
in the law of nature, or the unwritten and common law."
Id. at 536 (quoting Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 470 (1820)). See also JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL LAW§ 667 (1864) ("Slavery, in
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in the Constitution, the slaveholders' rights of property in their slaves
might not be respected when they ventured outside their home states into
states that did not recognize property in human beings. 165 Indeed, this
was the case before ratification of the Constitution. 166 An analogy
might be drawn between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
Iv, Section 2 and the Fugitive Slave Clause in that, under at least one
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, both clauses
protect the rights of citizens to hold property in foreign states. 167 The
compact among the states embodied in Article IV required that the rights
of property that had vested in a citizen's home state be respected in all
of the foreign states.
In general, protection of property in slaves in the free states was not
consistent with principles of the law of nations. 168 However, laws

the United States is entirely a local institution of those States in which it is established,
and rests alone on positive legislation.").
165. As was argued before the Court in The Amistad:
[I]t was deemed necessary in the Constitution to insert an express stipulation
in regard to fugitives from service. The law of comity would have obliged
each State to protect and restore property belonging to a citizen of another,
without such stipulation; but it would not have required the restoration of
fugitive slaves from a sister State, unless they had been expressly mentioned.
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 559 (1841).
166. This dilemma was pointed out by defendant's counsel before the Supreme
Court in the case of Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
During the confederation, the southern States had sustained great inconveniences and loss by the change that had been effected by the abolition laws of the
northern States. The conventional or customary law, was no longer observed.
There was no provision upon the subject in the articles of confederation. In
many of the northern States no aid whatsoever would be allowed to the owners
of fugitives slaves, and sometimes, indeed, they met with open resistance.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 564 (1842). Similarly, Justice Wayne discussed this problem in
his opinion in Prigg:
Experience had shown that under the confederacy the reclamation of fugitive
slaves was embarrassed and uncertain, and that they were yielded to by the
States only from comity. It was intended that it should be no longer so ...
. It was foreseen, that unless the delivery of fugitive slaves was made a part
of the Constitution, and the right of the States to discharge them from service
was taken away, that some of the States would become the refuge of runaways
Id. at 645. For a more thorough discussion of the Court's decision in Prigg, see infra
notes 183-208 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 113-37 discussing Lemmon.
168. For example, in People v. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), Judge Paine reasoned
that besides there being no constitutional right to transit with slaves, there also was no
right based upon the principles of the law of nations. According to Judge Paine:
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regulating one's status in ways other than slave versus free were to be
respected in foreign jurisdictions. Justice Story stated in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws:
All laws, which have for their principal object the regulation of the capacity,
state, and condition of persons, have been treated by foreign jurists generally
as personal laws . . . . [T]hey are for the most part held by foreign jurists to be
of absolute obligation everywhere, when they have once attached upon the
person by the law of his domicile. 169

Therefore, normally one's status would remain the same outside the
jurisdiction of the state in which the status attached, even when "the law
of the domicile and that of the situation (situs) are in conflict with each
other." 170 However, slavery was different, according to Justice Story:
There is a uniformity of opinion among foreign jurists and foreign tribunals in
giving no effect to the state of slavery of a party, whatever it might have been
in the country of his birth or of that in which he had been previously domiciled,
unless it is also recognized by the laws of the country of his actual domicile,
and where he is found, and it is sought to be enforced. 171

Therefore, the Fugitive Slave Clause was designed to trump the
common law of the free states to ensure that slaveholders retained
property in their slaves outside their state of domicile. The consensus

Writers of the highest authority on the law of nations agree that strangers have
a right to pass with their property through the territories of a nation . . . . And
this right, which exists by nature between States wholly foreign to each other,
undoubtedly exists, at least as a natural right, between the States which
compose our Union. But we are to look further than this, and to see what the
law of nations is when the property which a stranger wishes to take with him
is a slave.
Id. at 133 n.3 (citations omitted). Judge Paine argued that there could be no property
in slaves, and therefore that under the law of nations, there could be no right to take
slaves through foreign states and retain property in those slaves.
·
[T]hey [writers on the law of nations] all agree that by the law of nature alone
no one can have a property in slaves. And they also hold that, even where
slavery is established by the local law, a man cannot have that full and
absolute property in a person which he may have in an inanimate thing ....
It can scarcely, therefore, be said, that when writers on the law of nations
maintain that strangers have a right to pass through a country with their
merchandise or property, they thereby maintain their right to pass with their
slaves.
STORY, supra note 61, at 134 n.3 (citation omitted). For a more comprehensive
discussion of Lemmon, see supra notes 113-37 and accompanying text.
169. STORY, supra note 61, at 49. However, there were writers who took exception
to this general rule. "John Voet ... is one of the few jurists who insist that personal
statutes of all sorts respecting capacity or incapacity, majority or minority, legitimacy
or illegitimacy, have no extra-territorial operation, either directly or consequentially." Id.
at 56-57.
170. Id. at 54-55.
171. Id. at 118-19.
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was that slavery's status as a creature of mere municipal regulation
warranted no extraterritorial effect. 172 The protection of slave property
in the free states necessitated some form of positive law, overriding the
principles of private international law. According to Justice Story:
Independent of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, for the
protection of the rights of masters in regard to domestic fugitive slaves, there
is no doubt that the same principle pervades the common law of the nonslaveholding States in America; that is to sav, foreign slaves would no longer
be deemed such after their removal thither. m ·

The rights of masters over their slave property in free states was a matter
of great dispute prior to the Civil War. This controversy concerning the
meaning of the Fugitive Slave Clause sheds light on the antebellum
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Cases arising under the Fugitive Slave Clause in the courts of the
United States between ratification of the Constitution and ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment exhibit a reliance upon the philosophy of
international comity underlying Article IV. 174 A number of cases dealt

172. According to Justice Story, this conclusion was dictated by three principles of
the law of nations laid down by Huberus and adopted by Story in his Commentaries on
the Conflict of Laws. Id. at 27. Similarly, Justice Marshall concluded:
That . . . [slavery] is contrary to the law of nature, will scarcely be denied.
That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally
admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits,
and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this
admission.
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 118-20 (1825).
Members of Congress also noted the local nature of slavery. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 332, 335 (1858) (Rep. Walton); id. at App. 79 (Sens.
Fessenden and Mason); id. at 87-90 (Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess.
App. 938-39 (1856) (Rep. Brenton); id. at 201 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1164 (Rep.
Cragin).
173. STORY, supra note 61, at 119.
174. The connection between the notion of comity and the Fugitive Slave Clause
is evident in Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583)
wherein the Ohio circuit court stated:
The surrender of fugitive slaves was a matter deeply interesting to the slave
states. Under the confederation there was no provision for their surrender. On
the principles of comity amongst the states the fugitives were delivered up; at
other times they were protected and defended. This state of things produced
uneasiness and discontent in the slave states. A remedy of this evil, as it was
called, was provided in the constitution.
Id. at 337. This remedy in the Constitution, to which the court refers, was the Fugitive
Slave Clause, which was needed to ensure that the rights of property in slaves would be
protected in non-slaveholding states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
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with the problem of property in slaves outside of slave states under the
Constitution. 175 For example, in Johnson v. Tompkins, 176 the court
upheld the right of a master to property in a slave's custody and services
and recognized the security given to the right to reclaim fugitive slaves
under the Constitution. 177 The court observed that although this right
of property was contrary to principles of natural law, it was embodied
in the fundamental law of the United States and, thus, was legally
binding. According to the court, "the law of the land recognises the
right of one man to hold another in bondage, and that right must be
protected from violation, although its existence is abhorrent to all our

Articles of Confederation might not have afforded this protection because there was
some dispute concerning whether slaves remained property upon entering a free state.
Property in slaves was generally recognized as being contrary to the law of nature, and
it had been argued that, as a result, once slaves left the jurisdiction having positive laws
that were contrary to the laws of nature, the property in slaves need not be protected as
a privilege or immunity of citizens. Id. at 338. The court in Miller v. McQuerry
recognized the analogy between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and went so far as to declare that Congress
possessed the power to enforce the provisions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
through appropriate legislation. According to the court:
The constitution provides, "that full faith shall be given to public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings," of one state in every other. If an individual claims
this provision as a right, and a state court shall deny it, on a writ of error to
the supreme court of the Union, such judgment would be reversed. And the
provision is that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of ci~izens in the several states." Congress unquestionably
may provide in what manner a right claimed under this clause, and denied by
a state, may be enforced. And if a case can be raised under it, without any
further statutory provisions, so as to present the point to the supreme court, the
decision of a state court, denying the right, would be reversed.
Id.
175. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Prigg v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Groves v. Slaughter, 40
U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); Miller v. McQuerry,
17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820).
Paul Finkelman has noted the importance of these cases in the development of the
contemporary understanding concerning principles of international comity as applied to
the states prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Finkelman:
The question of comity for slavery helped define the issues and problems that
ultimately led to the Civil War. These issues also helped define the goals of
the war and shaped its consequences. Much of the wording of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears to be a direct response to the issues raised by the cases
involving comity and interstate relations before the war. Perhaps the most
important legacy of Aves, Dred Scott, Lemmon, and the other antebellum
comity cases is this amendment.
FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 342.
176. 13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416).
177. Id. at 840. The court reasoned that "[t]he ownership of ... [the slave] being
thus clearly made out, he must be deemed to be the property of Mr. Johnson, over which
he has the same control as over his land or his goods." Id. at 843.
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ideas of natural right and justice."178 Many of the antebellum cases
addressing this issue reiterated this principle.
In Rankin v. Lydia, 179 the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the
conflict over the status of slaves brought into the Northwest Territory
after the Ordinance of 1787 outlawed slavery. Judge Mills recognized
that the right to property in slaves was "a right existing by positive law
of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the
unwritten and common law." 18° Citing Vattel, Judge Mills distinguished between property of an individual in transit and that of an
individual domiciled in a state and, therefore, a resident of the state.
Mills argued that the property of an individual in transit was not subject
to municipal regulation, as opposed to the property of a resident. 181
Therefore, the law of the domicile, which did not recognize slavery,
governed, and freed the slave. 182
Although a number of state cases addressed the right to property in
slaves under the Fugitive Slave Clause, the Supreme Court did not
conclusively deal with the meaning of the Clause until 1842. The
Supreme Court finally addressed the proper interpretation of the Fugitive
178. Id. The court stressed the inviolability of property as protected under the
Constitution and the dangers of disregarding the protection afforded property by the
Constitution: "If this spirit pervades the country; if public opinion is suffered to prostrate
the laws which protect one species of property, those who lead the crusade against
slavery may, at no distant day, find a new one directed against their lands, their stores
and their debts ...." Id. at 844. Thus, the court recognized a substantive right to
property, which it enforced against abridgement by the state governments. What
provision of the Constitution the court appealed to in rendering its decision is unclear.
However, it would seem that the court was reaching beyond the Fugitive Slave Clause
in order to guarantee a substantive right of property in slaves against state abridgement.
179. 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820).
180. Id. at 470.
181. A similar argument was subsequently made by Justice Baldwin in Groves v.
Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841). Justice Baldwin appealed to the congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce to argue that regulation of slave property was
outside the power of the state governments. According to Justice Baldwin, "transit of
property, whether of slaves or bales of goods, is lawful commerce among the several
states, which none can prohibit or regulate, which the constitution protects, and Congress
may, and ought to preserve from violation." Id. at 516.
182. This analysis was rejected in Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 193 (1833) wherein a
Missouri court appealed to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2 as guaranteeing a substantive right to transit with one's property in the several states.
According to the court, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it was "the
undoubted right of every citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other
State with his property of every description, including negro slaves, without being in any
way subject to forfeit his property." Id. at 194.
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Slave Clause in Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 183 An
examination of the arguments made on both sides in Prigg, as well as
the decision of the Court, is useful in grasping the prevalent antebellum
understanding of the Fugitive Slave Clause and its relation to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 184 In Prigg, a citizen of the state
of Maryland was indicted for kidnapping a black woman under a
Pennsylvania law that made it a crime to forcibly "carry away or seduce,
any negro or mulatto" present in the state of Pennsylvania with the
intention of making them a slave. 185 In argument before the Court,
counsel for the State of Pennsylvania made an analogy between the
Fugitive Slave Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. Counsel for the defendant argued that one of the
defendant's privileges and immunities as a citizen was to exercise the
rights of property in his slaves in all of the states. The state's counsel
admitted that
[a]mong the people of this free country, there is nothing which should be
guarded with more watchful jealousy, than the charter of their liberties; which
being the fundamental law of the land, in its judicial construction, every one is
immediately interested, from the highest dignitary to the meanest subject of the
commonwealth. Any irreverential touch given to this ark of public safety
should be rebuked, and every violence chastised; its sanctity should be no less
than that of the domestic altar; its guardians should be Argus-eyed; and as the
price of its purchase was blood, its privileges and immunities should be
maintained, even if this price must be paid again. 186

In this excerpt, counsel expressed to the Court the idea of the state as
founded upon a charter or compact conferring certain "fundamental"
privileges and immunities of citizenship. 187
However, the state's counsel argued that the Fugitive Slave Clause did
not remove the states' general power to regulate the subject of fugitive
slaves nor vest an exclusive power of regulation in the national

183. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see Maltz, supra note 11, at 253-54 (noting the
similarity between Justice Taney's approach to the Fugitive Slave Clause in Prigg and
congressional Republicans' interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article N, Section 2 prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment); Maltz, supra
note 4, at 312-13 (discussing the Prigg decision).
184. Prigg is particularly relevant since Republicans such as James R. Wilson,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, relied on the case for the proposition that
Congress possessed the power to enforce all of the provisions of Article IV, including
the Privileges and Immunities Clause as well as the Fugitive Slave Clause. See Aynes,
supra note 15, at 650-51 (noting Wilson's citation of Prigg and the importance of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a precursor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
185. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 550.
186. Id. at 571-72.
187. For a discussion of the relation between social compact theory and the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, see Smith, supra note 12.
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government. According to counsel, the Clause merely obligated the state
to offer up fugitive slaves. As such, it only infringed upon the state's
power to regulate the subject of fugitive slaves in one particular. 188
Therefore, it was argued that under the Fugitive Slave Clause, if not
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Iv, Section 2, the
states retained the power to regulate the slave trade. Furthermore, the
state's counsel argued that Congress had no power under the Clause to
pass legislation compelling state action. This was consistent with the
prevailing view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause-that Congress
had no power to compel the states through federal legislation to obey
their obligations under the Clause.
Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court, acknowledging that
the purpose of the Fugitive Slave Clause was to protect the rights of
property of slaveholders in their slaves throughout the Union. 189 Such
explicit recognition was necessary because property in human beings was
widely considered to be merely conventional and not founded in natural

188. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 592-93. According to counsel, the Fugitive Slave
Clause
certainly gives no authority to the general government, in terms; none, even
by implication. It simply enjoins a duty on the states, and prohibits them from
passing laws or regulations liberating fugitive slav~s. It recognises the general
right to legislate on this subject, for it restricts its exercise in a particular
manner ....
Id. This argument is extremely interesting, for it presages Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which gave to Congress the power to compel the state governments through
legislation to refrain from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States. Like some members of Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment, counsel argued that such a congressional power to compel the states to do
or refrain from doing something would annihilate the sovereignty of the states. See id.
189. Id. at 611. According to Justice Story:
Historically, it is well known, that the object of this clause was to secure to
the citizens of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership
in their slaves, as property, in every state in the Union into which they might
escape from the state where they were held in servitude. The full recognition
of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of
property in all the slaveholding states; and, indeed, was so vital to the
preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be
doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which
the Union could not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against
the doctrines and principles prevalent in the non-slaveholding states, by
preventing them from intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the
rights of the owners of slaves.
Id.

865

law. 190 This view was expressed by Chancellor Kent, who stated in
his Commentaries on American Law that,
Sir William Blackstone ... examines ... [the] causes of slavery by the civil
law, and shows them all to rest on unsound foundations; and he insists that a
state of slavery is repugnant to reason and the principles of natural law. The
civil law. . . admitted it to be contrary to natural right, though it was
conformable to the usage of nations. 191

Therefore, under the law of nations, founded upon principles of natural
law, 192 states were not obligated to recognize aliens' property in slaves.
According to Kent, as soon as a slave set foot within the jurisdiction
where the municipal laws did not recognize property in slaves, that slave
became free. 193
Justice Story recognized this argument in his opinion. However, he
concluded that the Fugitive Slave Clause trumped the principles of the
law of nations, being a positive law by which all the states were bound.
Justice Story reasoned:
By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of
slavery, as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it is in
opposition to its own policy and institutions, in favour of the subjects of other
nations where slavery is recognised. If it does it, it is as a matter of comity,
and not as a matter of international right. The state of slavery is deemed to be
a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the
territorial laws. This was fully recognised in Somerset's Case, ... which was
decided before the American revolution. It is manifest from this consideration,
that if the Constitution had not contained this clause, every non-slave-holding

190. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. As Justice Curtis later stated
in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford:
Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law.
This is not only plain in itself, and agreed by all writers on the subject, but is
inferable from the Constitution, and has been explicitly declared by this court
[referring to Prigg v. Pennsylvania]. The Constitution refers to slaves as
"persons held to service in one State, under the laws thereof." Nothing can
more clearly describe a status created by municipal law.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 624 (1856).
191. 2 KENT, supra note 70, at *248 (footnotes omitted).
192. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the relationship between natural law and
the law of nations in nineteenth century legal thought).
193. 2 KENT, supra note 70, at *248-49. According to Kent:
The instant the slave touches the soil, he becomes free, so as to be entitled to
be protected in the enjoyment of his person and property, though he may still
continue bound to service as a servant. ... [B]y the common law, it was said,
one man could not have a property in another, for men were not the subject
of property. In the case of Somerset, in 1772, who was a negro slave, carried
by his master from America to England, and there confined, in order to be sent
to the West Indies, he was discharged by the K. B. upon habeas corpus, after
a very elaborate discussion, and upon the ground that slavery did not and
could not exist in England, under the English law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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state in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway
slaves coming within its limits, and to have given them entire immunity and
protection against the claims of their masters; a course which would have
created the most bitter animosities, and engendered perpetual strife between the
different states. 194

Hence, slavery in America was viewed as being in conflict with
principles of natural law and founded solely upon positive law. Were
it not for the Fugitive Slave Clause, the institution of slavery would have
been analogous to the charters of incorporation considered in cases such
as Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 195 which had no extraterritorial effect
except by the voluntary recognition of foreign states.
The Fugitive Slave Clause put the subject of property in slaves beyond
the reach of the state governments. The right to property in slaves is
therefore analogous to the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States. 196 Although the states were free to
regulate the exercise of the right, they could not withhold or "control the
incidents" of the right. Justice Story saw the distinction between
regulation and abridgement not as a degree along a continuum, but as a
bright line discernible by the courts. 197
Elsewhere, Justice Story reiterated his opinion that the Constitution
made recognition of property in slaves obligatory upon the state

194. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611-12 (citation omitted).
195. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); See infra notes Part III.D.1 and accompanying
text, discussing corporations and special privileges under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
196. See infra Part III.D.2 and accompanying text, discussing the nature of the
fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Article IV, Section
2.
197. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 612-13. According to Justice Story:
The [fugitive slave] clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive,
unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or
regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. The slave is
not to be discharged from service or labour, in consequence of any state law
or regulation. Now, certainly, without indulging in any nicety of criticism
upon words, it may fairly and reasonably be said, that any state law or state
regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the right of the owner
to the immediate possession of the slave, and the immediate command of his
service and labour, operates, pro tanto, a discharge of the slave therefrom.
The question can never be, how much the slave is discharged from; but
whether he is discharged from any, by the natural or necessary operation of
state laws or state regulations. The question is not one of quantity or degree,
but of withholding, or controlling the incidents of a positive and absolute right.
Id.
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governments, which had consented to be bound by Article IV. The
Constitution in this respect went beyond mere voluntary principles of
comity:
Before the adoption of the Constitution, no state had any power whatsoever
over the subject, except within its own territorial limits, and could not bind the
sovereignty or the legislation of other states. Whenever the right was
acknowledged or the duty enforced in any state, it was as a matter of comity
and favour, and not as a matter of strict moral, political or international
obligation or duty. Under the Constitution it is recognised as an absolute,
positive, right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme
force, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by state sovereignty or state legislation.
It is, therefore, in a just sense a new and positive right, independent of comity,
confined to no territorial limits, and bounded by no state institutions or policy. 19s

From this, Story reasoned that the regulation of fugitive slaves should be
subject to national legislation. 199 This new positive right was not
created by the courts, but arguably could only exist through the act of
consent of all the people in ratifying the Constitution.
Furthermore, Justice Story maintained that this right of property in
slaves was a positive right not founded upon principles of natural law.
Such a right is therefore, perhaps, distinguishable from the privileges and
immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2. Justice
Story's argument regarding the Fugitive Slave Clause allows by analogy
an argument that the national government was to have power to enforce
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 against the
states to protect a uniform set of privileges and immunities inherent in
citizens of the United States.200 However, it remained within the
power and sovereign capacity of a state to regulate the fundamental
privileges and immunities of the citizens within the state's jurisdiction.
The fundamental privileges and immunities were the rights of citizens
under the civil law and encompassed the citizens' rights in their persons
and property. The Constitut~on left jurisdiction over the persons and

Id. at 623.
Id. Accordingly, Story concluded:
It would be a strange anomaly, and forced construction, to suppose, that the
national government meant to rely for the due fulfillment of its own proper
duties and the rights, which it intended to secure, upon state legislation, and
not upon that of the Union. A fortiori, it would be more objectionable to
suppose that a power, which was to be the same throughout the Union, should
be confided to state sovereignty, which could not rightfully act beyond its own
territorial limits.
Id.; see also Maltz, supra note 4, at 331 (noting Justice Story's conclusion that the
federal government had the exclusive power to regulate the recapture of fugitive slaves).
200. This was a question that produced controversy among congressional
republicans responsible for drafting the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra Part II.D.
198.
199.
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property of citizens to the individual states to regulate in that the
Constitution conferred powers upon the general government that were
national in character, while the states retained their powers of "police"
over the persons and property within their jurisdictions.
Chief Justice Taney's concurring opinion similarly illustrates the
strong analogy between the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 201 In affirming the states'
retained right to regulate citizens' rights of property within their
respective jurisdictions, Chief Justice Taney stated:
Again. The Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of
each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states. And although these privileges and immunities, for greater safety,
are placed under the guardianship of the general government; still the states
may by their laws and in their tribunals protect and enforce them. They have
not only the power, but it is a duty enjoined upon them by this provision in the
Constitution.
The individual right now in question [the right to reclaim fugitive slaves],
stands on the same grounds, and is given by similar words, and ought to be
governed by the same principles. The obligation to protect rights of this
description is imposed upon the several states as a duty which they are bound
to perform; and the prohibition extends to those laws only which violate the
right intended to be secured.
I cannot understand the rule of construction by which a positive and express
stipulation for the security of certain individual rights of property in the several
states, is held to imply a prohibition to the states to pass any laws to guard and
protect them. 202
•

Justice Taney's argument thus makes a strong analogy between the
nationalized right of property in slaves and the privileges and immunities
of citizenship. States may still pass regulatory laws governing the
exercise of these rights, but they may not pass laws intended to destroy
these rights. The general government was charged under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause, in Taney's
opinion, to protect the rights guaranteed against state action. The right
of property in slaves is an absolute right guaranteed under the United
States Constitution by the federal government similar to the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.
Justice Thompson clarified the distinction between guaranteeing a right
and the regulation of the right in his concurring opinion. According to
Justice Thompson, regulation of the "mode and manner in which" a right
201.
202.

Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
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is to be "asserted and carried into execution" is probably better left to
the Congress, in the case of the Fugitive Slave Clause, in order to assure
· uniformity. 203 However, Justice Thompson saw nothing in the Clause
that would preclude state regulation.204 He argued for a concurrent
power of Congress and the states to regulate the manner in which
fugitive slaves were to be delivered back into the custody of their
masters. 205
Chief Justice Wayne's concurring opinion reiterated the themes of the
other Justices' opinions. According to Chief Justice Wayne, the power
of regulating the manner in which fugitive slaves were delivered up
should lie with Congress, since only some of the states recognized
property in slaves, and it would be to the prejudice of the slaveholding
states to allow the states to individually regulate in this area. 206 Justice

203. Id. at 634.
204. Id. Justice Thompson distinguished between a guarantee of a right and the
mode of regulating a right in interpreting the Fugitive Slave Clause. According to
Justice Thompson:
.
This provision naturally divides itself into two distinct considerations. First,
the right affirmed; and secondly, the mode and manner in which that right is
to be asserted and carried into execution.
The right is secured by the Constitution, and requires no law to fortify or
strengthen it. It affirms, in the most unequivocal manner, the right of the
master to the service of his slave, according to the laws of the state under
which he is so held. And it prohibits the states from discharging the slave
from such service by any law or regulation therein.
The second branch of the provision, in my judgment, requires legislative
regulations pointing out the mode and manner in which the right is to be
asserted. It contemplates the delivery of the person of the slave to the owner;
and does not leave the owner to his ordinary remedy at law, to recover
damages on a refusal to deliver up the property of the owner.
Id. A similar division may be made under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article N, Section 2. The first inquiry concerns the nature of the privileges and
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Clause. The second concerns the mode or
manner in which these rights could be asserted. It is likely that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause guaranteed a uniform result among the states with respect to the first
inquiry, but allowed for a diversity of approaches under the second. See infra Part IV.D.
205. Justice Daniel, in his concurrence, also argued that the power was concurrent
and not exclusive in the federal government. According to Justice Daniel:
[T]he majority of my brethren proceeding beyond these positions, assume the
ground that the clause of the Constitution above quoted, as an affirmative
power granted by the Constitution, is essentially an exclusive power in the
federal government; and consequently that any and every exercise of authority
by the states at any time, though undeniably in aid of the guarantee thereby
given, is absolutely null and void. I am prepared to affirm, that even in
instances wherein Congress may have legislated, legislation by a state which
is strictly ancillary, would not be unconstitutional or improper.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 651-52.
206. Id. at 641 ("To permit some of the states to say to the others, how the property
included in the provision was to be secured by legislation, without the assent of the
latter, would certainly be, to destroy the equality and force of the guarantee, and the
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Wayne's opmton illustrates the concept of a community of rights
embodied under Article IV of the Constitution. These rights include the
privilege of holding property. Thus, protecting property in slaves merely
upholds one such privilege of citizenship in express terms. However, as
previously noted, because property in slaves was seen as contrary to
natural right and as merely based on conventional or positive law-a
mere municipal regulation-non-slaveholding states would be free to
make their own regulations on the subject and free slaves without
abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens.
According to Justice Wayne, the Fugitive Slave Clause was designed
to protect the equality of states that chose to maintain the system of
slavery as an institution, in addition to protecting individual rights.207
This argument is analogous to that made by the Dred Scott majority with

equality of the states by which it was made.").
207. Id. at 644-45 (emphasis added). In Justice Wayne's opinion:
[T]he provision was not intended only to secure the property of individuals,
but that through their rights, that the institutions of the states should be
preserved, so long as any one of the states chose to continue slavery as a part
of its policy.
The subject has usually been argued as if the rights of individuals only were
intended to be secured, and as if the legislation by the states would only act
upon such rights.
The framers of the Constitution did not act upon such narrow grounds.
They were engaged in forming a government for all of the states; by
concessions of sovereign rights from all, without impairing the actual
sovereignty of any one, except within the sphere of what was conceded. One
great object was, that all kinds of property, as well that which was common
in all of the states, as that which was peculiar to any of them, should be
protected in all of the states, as well from any interference with it by the
United States, as by the states .... The ... [free states] were bound, when
forming a general government with the other states, under which there was to
be a community of rights and privileges for all citizens in the several states,
to protect that property of their citizens which was essential to the preservation
of their state constitutions. If this had not been done, all of the property of the
citizens would have been protected in every state, except that which was the
most valuable in a number of them. In such a case, the states would have
become members of the Union upon unequal terms. Besides, the property of
an individual is not the less his, because it is in another state than that in
which he lives. It continues to be his, and forms a part of the wealth of his
state. The provision, then, in respect to fugitive slaves, only comprehended
within the general rule a species ofproperty not within it before.
Id. (emphasis added). This excerpt also indicates the analogy to be made between the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause. Both clauses were
intended to protect fundamental property rights of citizens in all the states.
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respect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 208 The design of the
Fugitive Slave Clause mandated that the ability to hold property in
slaves came within the heading of "privileges and immunities of
citizens." Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause may be seen
not only as creating a community of rights among the people of the
United States, but also, in certain instances, as contributing to the
establishment of the federal structure and protecting the equality of the
several states, by extraterritorially enforcing the rights of property vested
by the states individually.
2.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause

Like the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, notions of international comity formed the basis of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1. Justice Story discussed the
Clause in his Commentaries as going beyond the "general comity of
nations."209 According to Justice Story, "[t]he framers of both instruments must be presumed to have known, that by the general comity of
nations, and the long-established rules of the common law, both in
England and America, foreign judgments were prima facie evidence of
their own correctness."210 However, Story concluded that
[a] motive of a higher kind must naturally have directed them to the provision.
It must have been, "to form a more perfect union," and to give to each State a
higher security and confidence in the others, by attributing a superior sanctity
and conclusiveness to the public acts and judicial proceedings of all. 211

Therefore, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as well as the other clauses
in Article IV, were designed to move beyond principles of international
comity in order to construct "a more perfect Union" and to make what
once were voluntary principles founded upon natural reason binding
upon the states as sovereign entities.

208. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
209. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 183-84. Story also mentioned the Clause in his
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, stressing the equality-based nature of the
protection afforded under the Clause. Story states therein:
By the Constitution of the United States it is declared that full faith and credit
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And Congress, in pursuance of the power given
them by the Constitution in a succeeding clause, have declared that the
judgments of State courts shall have the same faith and credit in other States
as they have in the State where they are rendered .... They are therefore put
upon the same footing as domestic judgments.
STORY, supra note 61, at 754.
210. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 183.
211. Id. at 184.
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D.

The Distinction Between Fundamental and Special Privileges

An important distinction arose in the jurisprudence under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 prior to
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment-the distinction between
fundamental privileges and immunities, which were guaranteed under the
Clause to all citizens, and special privileges and immunities, which were
not. By the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, it was well-established that "citizens of one
State do not carry with them into other States any special privileges or
immunities, conferred by the laws of their own States...." 212 Elsewhere,213 I have argued, based on an analysis of social compact
theories influential in nineteenth century American legal thought, that the
fundamental privileges and immunities protected under Article IV,
Section 2 were those powers of citizens existing anterior to the
establishment of government and that special privileges and immunities
could exist only after formation of the government. This Part traces this
distinction between fundamental and special privileges in the context of
the case law arising under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The distinction is an important one in terms of delineating the rights
guaranteed under the Amendment as well as the scope of permissible
state regulation under Section 1.
First examined is the nature of the "special privileges" not guaranteed
under the Clause. These privileges were local or municipal regulations
that could have no extraterritorial force. In particular, the privileges and
immunities granted to corporations were among the special privileges
and immunities not guaranteed under the Clause.214 Corporations were

212. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 100 (1873).
213. See Smith, supra note 12.
.
214. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839); Ducat v. City of
Chicago, 48 Ill. 172, 174 (1868), aff'd, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1871) (stating that
"corporations are not citizens within the meaning of section 2 of article 4, of the
Constitution of the United States"). People v. Imlay held:
An incorporated company is not a citizen, within the meaning . . . [of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause]. Such a company is a creation of the state
which incorporates it, which has no power to legislate for other states, or to
give to the artificial bodies which it creates powers to act in other states. Such
companies act in other states than those which incorporate them, only by the
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tion under Article III. Thus, much like the right to property in
slaves,217 the privileges and immunities granted under corporate
charters were viewed as merely special privileges and immunities-municipal regulations that had no binding extraterritorial effect.
This Part also addresses the nature of the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Clause. These were the
privileges and immunities of citizens thought to be inherent in the
concept of citizenship in all free governments. In particular, Justice
Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,218 cited by Senator
Trumbull during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment,219 partially enumerated some of these fundamental privileges and
immunities guaranteed under Article Iv, Section 2.

pretended that such permission or residence clothed them with the character
or with a single right pertaining to a British subject.
Id. at 342. Justice Daniel therefore analogized the status of corporations as artificial
persons to that of aliens. Any privileges and immunities that were enjoyed by aliens
were enjoyed at the discretion of the government, since aliens were not parties to the
social compact and could claim no legal right to the privileges and immunities of
citizenship. Similarly, corporations, because they could exist only after the creation of
the government, were not considered parties to the social compact and therefore had no
legal right to enjoyment of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Id. at 343.
Justice Campbell, also dissenting, reasoned as follows:
A corporation is not a citizen. It may be an artificial person, a moral person,
a juridical person, a legal entity, a faculty, an intangible, invisible being; but
Chief Justice Marshall employed no ·metaphysical refinement, nor subtlety, nor
sophism, but spoke the common sense, "the universal understanding," as he
calls it, of the people, when he declared the unanimous judgment of this court,
"that it certainly is not a citizen."
Nor were corporations within the contemplation of the framers of the
Constitution when they delegated a jurisdiction over controversies between the
citizens of different States . . . . [T]o administer the rights and privileges of
citizens of the different States, held under a constitutional guaranty, when
brought into collision or controversy-rights and immunities derived from the
constitutional compact, and forming one of its fundamental conditions, was the
object of this jurisdiction [under Article III].
Id. at 351.
217. See supra Part III. C.1.
218. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
219. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122
(remarks of Senator Trumbull).
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1.

Corporations and Special Privileges

The Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle stated that corporations did not qualify as "citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 220 Justice Story in his Commentaries
also stated that a corporation could not possess the status of "citizen" for
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2. 221 However, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under Article III,
a corporation was considered to be analogous to a citizen. In Bank of
the United States vs. Deveaux, the Supreme Court reached this re-

220. 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839). Chief Justice Taney gave the opinion of the Court,
stating the arguments on both sides. He reaffirmed the Court's previous decision
concerning jurisdiction under Article III. The identity of individuals composing a
corporation could be used in determining jurisdiction, but not for purposes of conferring
privileges and immunities under Article IV, Section 2.
It is true, that . . . this Court decided that in a question of jurisdiction they
might look to the character of the persons composing a corporation; and if it
appeared that they were citizens of another state, and the fact was set forth by
proper averments, the corporation might sue in its corporate name in the
Courts of the United States. But in that case the Court confined its decision,
in express terms, to a question of jurisdiction; to a right to sue; and evidently
went even so far with some hesitation. We fully assent to the propriety of that
decision ....
Id. The Court further reasoned that although the privileges and immunities of
corporations need not be recognized by the states under Article IV, Section 2, the states
could voluntarily recognize these privileges and immunities, consistent with principles
of voluntary international comity.
The comity ... extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty.
It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered; and is inadmissible
when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes
so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly
intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong; that Courts of
justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of
nations.
Id. at 589. Therefore, if the principles of comity are voluntary the courts are constrained
and must look to the legislature for guidance as to which foreign rights or laws are to
be respected in the courts. However, under Article IV, Section 2, the states must
recognize as residents citizens of the several states. With respect to corporations, which
do not possess the status of citizens, the principles of comity are merely voluntary.
221. After Bank ofAugusta v. Earle, a number of state courts had also come to the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68
(1868) (states may tax out-of-state corporations); Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429, 446
(Sup. Ct. 1852); People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68, 79 (S.C.N.Y. 1855) (act did not prevent
corporations from doing business in the state); Fire Dep't v. Noble, 3 E.D. Smith 440,
452 (N.Y.C.C.P. 1854); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767, 773 (1856)
(states may require licensing of out-of-state corporations); but see Magill v. Brown, 16
F. Cas. 408 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8,952) (stating that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause guaranteed out-of-state corporations the same right to hold property as in-state
corporations).
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sult.222 According to Justice Story, the Court held that "[a] corporation, as such, is not a citizen of a State in the sense of the Constitution.
But if all the members of the corporation are citizens, their character will
confer jurisdiction, for then it is substantially a suit by citizens suing in
their corporate name. " 223 Thus, both courts and commentators agreed
that corporate charters were special privileges, not guaranteed under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
During the debates in Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment, one
case in particular, Paul v. Virginia, 224 indicated the nature of the
privileges and immunities to be guaranteed under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that
a law compelling insurance companies not incorporated within a state to
be licensed did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. The Court held that the privileges and immunities
secured to citizens under the Constitution were those privileges and
immunities common to citizens of the several states and did not include
special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own states. Thus, both the
special privileges and immunities accorded to corporations, which were
creatures of state law, as well as other special privileges and immunities
of citizens, had no extraterritorial effect under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Under the Clause, foreign citizens were merely
placed upon the same footing as resident citizens with respect to the
privileges and immunities of citizens. In Paul, counsel argued:
A corporation created by the laws of one of the States, and composed of
citizens of that State, is a citizen of that State within the meaning of the
Constitution.
Legislation imposing special and discriminating restrictions
upon the carrying on of lawful business in one State by citizens of other States
was expressly forbidden by an article of the Confederation . . . .225

However, consistent with prior case law, on the other side counsel
contended that a corporation was not a "citizen" within the meaning of
the term as used in the Constitution:
[N]o one, we presume, ever supposed that the artificial being created by an act
of incorporation could be a citizen of a State in the sense in which that word

222. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
223. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 479 (footnotes omitted).
224. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). For a discussion of Paul, see HOWELL, supra
note 4, at 9-10, 98-100.
225. Paul, 75 U.S. at 170.
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is used in the Constitution of the United States, and the averment was rejected
because the matter averred was simply impossible .... This court has several
times decided that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the
Constitution. 226

Refusing to stray from well-established legal principles, the Court
adopted the latter argument that corporations were not afforded the rights
otherwise guaranteed under the Clause because, existing only after the
institution of society and establishment of government, corporations
could not be parties to the social compact from which the privileges and
immunities of citizenship were derived.227 Distinguishing on these
grounds between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 and diversity jurisdiction under Article III, Justice Field
delivered the opinion of the Court declaring that "[t]he term citizens as
there used [in the Privileges and Immunities Clause] applies only to
natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to the
State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing
only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed."228 Justice

226. Id. at 175. Furthermore, counsel made the analogy of special privileges and
immunities to political rights, which also were not conferred under the Clause. These
rights of participation in government might also be said to be rights that could exist only
after the institution of the government, similar to the special privileges and immunities
afforded to both corporations and citizens. They are not the "common rights" that are
inherent in individuals or which are naturally deduced from the social compact.
If the assumption that a corporation was a citizen in the contemplation of the
Constitution of the United States were correct, yet it would not follow, that a
citizen of a State residing in one State, would be entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of each of the other States. Politically, it is very certain
he would not, and it is not seen very clearly how he could in all other things.
There is no question, that a citizen of any particular State, who removes into
any other State of the Union and resides there long enough to become a
citizen, is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the latter State,
without being required to be naturalized. He would become a citizen by the
mere operation of the Constitution of the United States. By such removal he
might lose some of his privileges, wilst he gained others; after he became a
citizen of a State he could not sue a citizen of the same State in the courts of
the United States. To illustrate,-a citizen of New York may sue a citizen of
Virginia in the United States courts.
Id. at 176.
227. Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the relation between social compact theories
and special privileges and immunities).
228. Paul, 75 U.S. at 177. Justice Field continued, citing Bank ofAugusta v. Earle
for the proposition that corporations could not be considered citizens for purposes of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. He concluded that
in no case which has come under our observation, either in the State or
Federal courts, has a corporation been considered a citizen within the meaning
of that provision of the Constitution, which declares that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States.
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Field continued his opinion by discussing the effect of the Clause as
placing "the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens
of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in
those States are concemed."229
However, Justice Field also mentioned certain substantive rights that
the Clause guaranteed including "the acquisition and enjoyment of
property," "pursuit of happiness," and "equal protection" of the laws.
Citing Lemmon,23° Field concluded:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens
of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the
advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves
them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating
legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress
into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the
same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and
enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them
in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no
provision in the Constitution tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the
United States one people as this. 231

The Privileges and Immunities Clause served to confer those privileges
and immunities of citizenship guaranteed in the state in which an
individual found himself, and not any special privileges and immunities
that were conferred in his home state. Such a provision was necessary
to remove the disabilities of alienage--0therwise, "the Republic would
have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have
constituted the Union which now exists."232 Field explained that
the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several
States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which
are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws
by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their
own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not

Id. at 178. Field observed that the decision of the Court that corporations were citizens
for purposes of Article III "was confined in express terms to a question of jurisdiction
[and] that the principle had never been carried further, and that it had never been
supposed to extend to contracts made by a corporation, especially in another sovereignty
from that of its creation ...." Id. at 179.
229. Id. at 180.
230. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). For a more comprehensive discussion of Lemmon and the
court's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in that case, see supra
notes 113-37 and accompanying text.
231. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
232. Id.
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intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other
States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, express or
implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer must,
therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent of other States to their
enjoyment therein be given.233

If the Clause were interpreted to protect special privileges and immunities, such as the grant of a corporate charter, the states would possess the
power to extend the effect of their laws extraterritorially to the other
states in the Union. According to Justice Field, this would be "destructive of the independence and the harmony of the States."234 As a
result, "[t]he principal business of every State would, in fact, be
controlled by corporations created by other States."235 Thus, Justice
Field adhered to the principle of the law of nations that a state's laws
could have no extraterritorial effect, at least with respect to special
privileges and immunities granted to citizens.236
However, notice that Justice Field only mentioned "special" privileges
in declaring that they were not available to citizens outside their home
states. This leaves open the possibility that fundamental privileges could
be guaranteed extraterritorially under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Another possibility is that all of the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizenship were recognized in every state, and, therefore,
the issue of whether they were guaranteed substantive protection under
the Clause would never arise. 237
Thus, the Court in Paul v. Virginia noted the distinction between
special privileges, which were mere local laws or positive regulations not
binding outside the jurisdiction of the state, and fundamental privileges
and immunities of citizenship, which were the privileges and immunities

233. Id. at 180-81. Among the special privileges conferred by the states, Justice
Field included the "grant of corporate existence," reasoning that
a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privileges to the corporators,
enabling them to act for certain designated purposes as a single individual, arid
exempting them (unless otherwise specially provided) from individual liability.
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal
existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created .... [As a result,
the] recognition of its existence even by other States, and the enforcement of
its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States-a
comity which is never extended where the existence of the corporation or the
exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests or repugnant to their
policy.
Id. at 181.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 182.
236. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the principles of the law of nations
underlying Article IV).
·
237. See infra Part IV.D for a more thorough discussion of this interpretation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
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to which Article IV, Section 2 referred-privileges and immunities of
citizens. One such special privilege, granted by a mere positive law
having no extraterritorial effect under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, was the privilege conferred by a
corporate charter to carry on business using the corporate form. Because
the charter was a mere positive local regulation, it had no binding effect
outside the jurisdiction of the state granting the charter, and, therefore,
might only be respected voluntarily by foreign states following principles
of comity. The rights guaranteed under charters of incorporation were,
thus, analogous to the property right a master had in his slave--a right
not founded in natural law and, therefore, not binding extraterritorially
absent some expression in positive law to the contrary.
2.

Fundamental Privileges

The antebellum cases addressing the Privileges and Immunities Clause
made it abundantly clear that the rights guaranteed under the Clause did
not include special privileges. A long line of cases, the most frequentlycited of which was Car.field v. Coryell,238 held that the Clause guaranteed only those privileges and immunities of citizenship that were
fundamental. However, even prior to this decision, courts in the United
States recognized that the Clause protected certain fundamental rights of
citizenship.239 Car.field is an appropriate starting point for determining

238. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Among these fundamental
rights of citizens were the right to contract, to hold property, to sue, to testify in court,
and perhaps several rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights such as the right to bear
arms and the right to free speech. For example, a number of courts acknowledged that
the right to sue was one of the fundamental privileges and immunities guaranteed under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g., id.; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
239. For example, the Supreme Court stated that the privileges and immunities of
citizens were "natural, inherent and unalienable rights of man." VanHome's Lessee v.
Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). Judge Chase stated that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause "secures and protects personal rights," Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. &
McH. 535, 554 (1797), and entitles "the citizens of each State ... to all the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several states," id. at 553 (emphasis added), including
the right "to acquire and hold real property in any of the states." Id. at 554. Judge
Cabell of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that under the Clause, "although
a citizen of one state may hold land in another, yet he cannot interfere in those rights,
which, from the very nature of society and of government, belong exclusively to citizens
of that state. Such are the rights of election and of representation ...." Murray v.
M'Carty, 2 Munf. 393,398 (1811). Chancellor Ridgely of the Delaware Chancery Court
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what rights the Privileges and Immunities Clause was understood to
guarantee considering that Justice Washington's interpretation of the
Clause was widely recognized as being definitive, and given that
Republicans in Congress,240 as well as both the majority and dissenters
in the Slaughter-House Cases,241 cited Corfield as authority in interpreting the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in the Constitution.
Corfield v. Coryell involved a forfeiture of property under a New
Jersey act that prohibited "any person who is not at the time an actual
inhabitant and resident in this state . . . [from gathering] clams, oysters,
or shells, in any of the rivers, bays, or waters in this state . . . ."242
The plaintiff in the case whose property was seized argued that the right
of fishing in the bed of public waters of a state is common to all the
citizens of the state and, alternatively, that the oyster beds were common
property between Delaware and New Jersey and that New Jersey could
not assert an exclusive right to them.243
In contrast, the defendants argued that New Jersey as a sovereign state
was entitled to the rights and prerogatives of a sovereign, and that the
com:p:1.on property of citizens of a state may be regulated and controlled
for the "common benefit. "244 The defense made the distinction
between "privileges and immunities," which were private proprietary
rights and capacities, and rights to the common property of the state,
contending that "[a]s to the second section of the fourth article of the

stated that "the words 'privileges and immunities' comprehend all rights, and all the
methods of protecting those rights, which belong to a person in a state of civil society
... and the general good require." Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 469 (1821).
In the same case, Chief Justice Johns stated that "[t]he privileges and immunities to be
secured to all citizens of the United States ... which includes the whole United States,
and must be understood to mean, such privileges as should be common, or the same in
every State ...." Id. at 476-77. This statement of Justice Johns reflects the notion of
a jus gentium as distinguished from the jus civile of each state. The jus gentium
represents that part of the civil law that is common among nations, or the law of nations.
See Smith, supra note 12. If these privileges and immunities were found in each state,
even if the Clause were intended to afford antidiscrimination protection, it would be the
case that citizens would be able to exercise these rights within all of the states on an
equal footing with resident citizens.
240. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122
(remarks of Senator Trumbull).
241. Justice Miller termed Corfield"[t]he first and the leading case" on the meaning
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75-76. Similarly, Justices Field, id. at 97, and Bradley, id.
at 116-17 (noting that Corfield 's "often-quoted" language was "very instructive"), cited
Corfield as being authoritative in their dissents.
242. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 546.
243. Id. at 548.
244. Id. at 549.
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constitution, it applies only to the privileges and immunities of
citizenship, not to rights in the common property of the state."245
In deciding whether the New Jersey act was constitutional, the court
made a detailed examination of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. In an often-cited passage, Justice Bushrod
Washington described the nature of_ the privileges and immunities of
citizens referenced in Article IV, Section 2 as being fundamental:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to
enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen
of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts
of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and
an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other
citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description
of privileges deemed fundamental: to which may be added, the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state
in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be
mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment
of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly
calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding
provision in the old articles of confederation) "the better to secure and
perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse· among the people of the different
states of the Union."246

The court's enumeration of"particular privileges"encompassed instances
of capacities with respect to property recognized by the majority of the

245. Id.
246. Id. at 551-52. Senator Trumbull later quoted Justice Washington in order to
indicate the nature of the privileges and immunities guaranteed in the Civil Rights Bill,
a precursor of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122. However, Trumbull argued that the Civil
Rights Bill did not cover the elective franchise. Id.
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state governments.247 Property, here, must be understood in the
Lockean sense of the term. One may have property in one's life, labor,
or goods. Thus, the court listed the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the freedom to travel in foreign states as among those
privileges and immunities deemed fundamental. These fundamental
privileges and immunities belong to "citizens of all free governments."
This is an expression of the concept of the jus gentium applied to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Those
privileges and immunities that are fundamental are civil capacities that
have been recognized as :flowing from principles of natural reason by a
majority of the governments characterized as "free."248
However, not every right that citizens might be able to exercise under
the government of a particular state necessarily falls within the phrase
"privileges and immunities of citizens." Only those privileges and
immunities deemed fundamental, or inherent in citizenship as such, are
encompassed in the guarantee of Article IV, Section 2.249 The power
of regulation remains with the state governments. Through the consent
of the governed, the state governments have been given a power of
regulation over the property of citizens, which they must exercise only
for the "common benefit." Exercise of this power is therefore not
inconsistent with the inviolability of the privileges and immunities of
citizens because this power has been given through the consent of the
citizens via the compact (or law) establishing the government.250 In
the case of the regulation of common property of the state in which the
citizens have been vested as tenants in common, the state governments
owe no duties whatsoever to citizens of foreign states. Citizens of
foreign states have no more right to participate in the common property

247. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 33 ("In both Corfield v. Coryell and Ward v.
Maryland there are dicta to the effect that the right to acquire and possess property of
every description is one secured to the citizens of the several States by virtue of the
Comity Clause.") (citations omitted).
248. See.Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the deductive and inductive methods for
determining the principles of the law of nature).
249. According to the court:
[W]e cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel,
that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states
are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the
citizens of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they are
enjoyed by those citizens; much less, that in regulating the use of the common
property of the citizens of such state, the legislature is bound to extend to the
citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own
citizens.,
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
250. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing social compact theory and the background
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of the state than they do to participate in any citizen's private property
in the state.
In particular, the court found that the right to fish the river bed at
issue in the case was the property of the citizens of New Jersey as
tenants in common, subject to the regulation of the state government for
the common good, and not a privilege or immunity of citizenship.251
Because the citizens of the state of New Jersey held the river beds as
private property and as tenants in common, others had no right to use
and enjoy this property. Just as a foreign citizen from another state of
the Union would have no right under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to the property of John Smith living in
New Jersey, so this individual had no right to the property the citizens
of New Jersey held as tenants in common. However, this individual
would have a right to exercise the capacities with respect to property,
privileges and immunities, that are recognized by all free governments
and to hold, for example, his own property without its removal either by
the state of New Jersey or by individuals within the jurisdiction and
sovereign power of the state.

E.

Regulation of the Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens Under Article IV, Section 2

Although the states were obligated to confer all of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship enjoyed by resident citizens to non-resident
citizens, they retained the power to regulate these rights of citizenship
as long as they did so in a nondiscriminatory manner. As Justice
Washington stated in his opinion in Car.field, the privileges and
immunities of citizens were "subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
251. Co,jield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. According to the court:
A several fishery . . . is the property of all; to be enjoyed by them in
subordination to the laws which regulate its use. They may be considered as
tenants in common of this property; and they are so exclusively entitled to the
use of it, that it cannot be enjoyed by others without the tacit consent, or the
express permission of the sovereign who has the power to regulate its use.
Id. See also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391,396 (1876) (noting that the right to fish
in waters that were the common property of Virginia was "not a privilege or immunity
of general but of special citizenship"); HOWELL, supra note 4, at 69 ("Besides what have
been termed by the courts political privileges, it has been settled that the citizens of the
several States are not entitled by virtue of the Comity Clause to enjoy upon equal terms
with the citizens of any State the use of property in which that State is vested with a
proprietary interest and which it holds for the general benefit of its own citizens.").
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government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole."252
The privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states,
retained by the citizens, may have been more or less uniform throughout
the United States.253 However, the manner in which these rights were
regulated by the state governments certainly was not. The state
governments could pass positive regulations or municipal laws prescribing the mode or manner in which one could exercise the rights of
citizenship.254 These regulations were merely local laws with no

252. Co,jield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
253. This may have been the motivation behind the Clause-to ensure that certain
important rights of the citizen would be uniform among the several states. As the court
stated in Ducat v. Chicago:
[The individual citizen] has rights which are so important, as to make it
desirable that they should be uniform throughout this broad and expanded
Union, which, in order to promote mutual friendship and free social, or
business intercourse among the people of the several States, were placed, by
this clause of article 4, under the protection of the federal government.
48 Ill. 172, 180 (1868). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Towles the court stated that the
privileges and immunities of a naturalized citizen of the United States and a citizen of
any of the states were identical, implying that there was a uniform set of privileges and
immunities of citizens as such, which was to be guaranteed under the Clause.
It is obvious, that the privileges and immunities of the naturalized citizen and
of the citizen of each state, are exactly the same, under the constitution of the
U. S. art. 4, § 2, and the naturalized citizen, and the native citizen of North
Carolina, would be both equally entitled to them, whatever they are, in the
state of Virginia.
32 Va. (5 Leigh) 743, 749 (1835).
254. The case of Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266)
illustrates the potentially limited nature of the rights of free men, citizens, and the role
of the government in regulating these rights. The case involved an act that regulated the
terms and conditions "upon which free negroes and mulattoes may reside in the city of
Washington, and for other purposes." Id. at 612. Free blacks were required to appear
before the mayor and
,
subscribe a statement of their trades, or means of subsistence, and of their
family . . . to produce a satisfactory certificate from three respectable white
inhabitants ... as to his living peaceably, his means of subsistence, and his
character[,] . . . "to enter into bond with one good respectable white citizen,
assurety in the penalty of twenty dollars, conditioned for the good, sober, and
orderly conduct of such person or persons of color, and his or her family ..

"
Id. In Costin, counsel argued:
It is said that the constitution gives equal rights to all the citizens of the
United States, in the several states. But that clause of the constitution does not
prohibit any state from denying to some of its citizens some of the political
rights enjoyed by others. In all the states certain qualifications are necessary
to the right of suffrage; the right to serve on juries, and the right to hold
certain offices; and in most of the states the absence of the African color is
among those qualifications. Every state has the right to pass laws to preserve
the peace and the morals of society . . . .
Id. at 613. Counsel therefore urged that the state could still regulate the life, liberty, and
property of citizens for the public welfare.
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extraterritorial effect that need not be respected outside the jurisdiction
of the state, but which could be voluntarily respected by foreign states
based purely upon voluntary principles of international comity.
Case law prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment made it
abundantly clear that state governments were to retain their power of
regulation under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as long as they
exercised it for the "common benefit." In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief
Justice Taney argued that if free blacks were considered citizens for
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, they would be entitled
to certain fundamental rights of citizenship and would be exempt from
all police regulations except those that applied to all citizens alike. 255
Therefore, it would seem that under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, discriminatory regulation was prohibited. Justice Field's
assessment of the operation of the Clause may have been the most
accurate, however. Justice Field asserted in the Slaughter-House Cases
that the Clause prohibited discriminatory regulation against foreign
citizens when venturing into states in which they were not resident
citizens. He argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed, in part, to apply this principle to
all citizens and to prevent discriminatory regulation within every state
with respect to resident citizens as well.256
Courts during the antebellum period recognized that although state
governments were not free to abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2, they could regulate the

Judge Cranch agreed with this argument, acknowledging that although citizens were
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states under Article
IV, Section 2, the states still maintained the power to make regulations for the public
good. According to Judge Cranch:
A citizen of one state, coming into another state, can claim only those
privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the latter state, in like
circumstances. But the present case is like that of a state legislating in regard
to its own citizens, and I can see no reason why it may not require security for
good behavior from free persons of color, as well as from vagrants, and
persons of ill-fame.
.
Id. at 613-14. Therefore, Judge Cranch seemed to indicate that the state governments
were free to regulate the privileges and immunities of citizenship, even in a discriminatory manner, as long as they did so pursuant to the public welfare.
255. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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manner in which they were exercised. 257 Attorneys arguing before the
Supreme Court also recognized this power of regulation that remained
with the state govemments.258 Under Article IV, Section 2, these
principles of comity were no longer voluntary among the several states
but were made binding by compact. The state governments, however,
maintained the power to regulate the manner in which these privileges
and immunities of citizenship were exercised. For example, in Conner
v. Elliott,259 the Supreme Court held that the states had a right to
regulate marriage contracts and that a right to community of acquets or
gains between married persons, where the marriage was contracted
within the state, was not one of the personal rights of citizens under
Article IV, Section 2. The Court decided to determine if certain rights
were "privileges and immunities" of citizens on a case by case basis

257. For example, in Hutchinson v. Thompson, the court held that the clause in the
ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwestern Territory that declared that
the navigable rivers in the territory should be "common highways ... without any tax,
impost, or duty ...." and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2 did not prohibit the states formed in the territory from legislating concerning the rivers,
but that any regulations must apply equally to their own citizens and citizens of other
states. 9 Ohio 52, 62 (1839). The states were thereby prohibited from imposing
discriminating restrictions, duties, and imposts upon citizens of other states. The court
reasoned that such interference on the part of the federal government would invade the
jurisdiction of state governments, which were free to regulate such affairs with respect
to their own citizens. Id. at 63-64. According to the court:
It was the intention of the ordinance, first, to restrain a state from obstructing
the navigation of a river to the injury of the inhabitants of another state, into
or from which it passed; and in the second place, to prohibit all discriminating
duties on citizens of other states, on any river, whether it run through several
states, or was contained in the limits of the single state which attempted to
impose such duties. This was effecting precisely what was effected by the
constitution of the United states, which was in agitation at that very time, and
was adopted two years afterwards. That gives to the citizens of each state, all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, and in addition,
clothes Congress with the power of regulating the commerce among the states.
The principles of the new constitution, (as it was uncertain whether it would
be adopted,) were carried into the ordinance. But to suppose that it was
intended to restrain the state from passing laws affecting the navigation of
rivers, which lay exclusively within its own limits, by authorizing the building
of bridges, dams, or aqueducts, can not be admitted, because it would, to say
the least, be a palpable departure from those principles.
Id. at 65.
258. For example, in Bank ofAugusta v. Earle Mr. Webster argued before the Court
that:
The right of a foreigner to sue in the Courts of any country may be regulated
by particular laws or ordinances of that country . . . . But if, under pretence
of such regulation, any nation shall impose unreasonable restrictions or
penalties on the citizens of any other nation, the power of judging that matter
for itself lies with that other nation.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 557 (1839).
259. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855).
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rather than setting out a general classification.260 However, the Court
stated that the Clause conferred privileges that "belong to citizenship."261 The Court recognized a fundamental distinction between
rights that were essential to the concept of citizenship and the incidents
of these essential rights. The incidents of the rights, or the regulations
governing the exercise of these rights, could be prescribed by the state
governments according to the Court. However, the state governments
were obligated to respect the essential rights of citizens-the rights
inherent in the concept of citizenship.262 Thus, regulations prescribing

260. Id. at 593. The Supreme Court stated that it would be "safer, and more in
accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal" to examine which rights were guaranteed
under the Clause on a case by case basis and that this was "especially" true when the
Court was dealing with so broad a provision.
261. The Court reasoned:
[A]ccording to the express words and clear meaning of this clause, no
privileges are secured by it, except those which belong to citizenship. Rights,
attached by the law to contracts, by reason of the place where such contracts
are made or executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to
those contracts, cannot be deemed "privileges of a citizen," within the meaning
of the constitution . . . . They are incidents, ingrafted by the law of the State
on the contract of marriage.
Id.
262. This distinction between the fundamental rights of the citizen and the
regulation of those rights arose in the case of Crandall v. State, IO Conn. 339, 349-53
(1834). In that case, William Ellsworth made the following argument before the court:
The law under consideration forbids a citizen of another state from coming
here, to pursue education, as all others may do, because he has not a legal
settlement in the state . . . . This power of regulating because of alienage is
virtually a power of exclusion, and in this case is, in effect, and was designed
so to be ... the legislature may superintend and regulate private schools ...
, [as it might superintend and regulate] all the pursuits of its citizens, but . .
. this must be done by a general and equal law. Mere birth in another state
cannot be seized upon, as a ground of distinction, discrimination and
deprivation . . . . The law must be alike and general, or there is an end of
equal privileges and immunities.
If 4th art. sec. 2, means anything, [it secures] to a citizen of New York, a
right to come here, and remain here, if he offends against no general law; he
cannot be whipped out, nor carried out of the state because he has no legal
settlement: he may present the shield of the constitution, and as Paul claimed
the immunity of a Roman citizen, he may claim the immunity of an American
citizen .... Neither present nor future poverty can strike out of the constitution the word "citizen," and a "citizen" has a universal right, title, and
immunity, to a residence, and other fundamental rights.
REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL, PLFF.
IN ERROR, VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, BEFORE THE SUPRE:ME COURT OF ERRORS, AT
THEIR SESSION AT BROOK.LYNN, JULY TERM, 1834, at 14 (1834), reprinted in GRAHAM,
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the mode or manner in which fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens could be exercised had no binding extraterritorial effect, much
like the rights granted under charters of incorporation or the
slaveholder's right of property in his slave, discussed previously.
Regulations were analogous to special privileges and immunities of
citizens, which were not guaranteed under the Clause.

IV.

ANTIDISCRIMINATION OR SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION?

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there are at least two
possible interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. The first is that the Clause guarantees that
nonresident citizens will have merely the same privileges and immunitfos
that are guaranteed to resident citizens. The privileges and immunities
of citizenship are the fundamental rights of person and property that
exist anterior to the formation of the government and that, perhaps, are
embodied in the positive law of the states' constitutions. However,
under this reading of the Clause, the privileges and immunities
guaranteed in every state might be different. As the Supreme Court in
United States v. Cruikshank noted in construing Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "the rights of citizenship under one of these
governments will be different from those that he will have under the
other."263 Under this interpretation, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause merely ensures that citizens changing their residence or traveling
to foreign states will have the same rights of person and property as
resident citizens.
The second view concerning the meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause is that it guarantees a uniform set of substantive
privileges and immunities to citizens of the United States no matter what
rights a particular state constitution might contain. 264 Chester James
Antieau advanced this view, arguing that the purpose of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause was to secure a uniform set of fundamental rights

supra note 11. For a more thorough discussion of Crandall, see supra notes 138-46 and
accompanying text.
263. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875) (citation omitted).
264. Senator Poland of Vermont seems to have made this argument, equating the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. According to Poland:
The clause of the first proposed amendment, that "no State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States," secures nothing beyond what was intended by the
original provision in the Constitution, that "the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866).
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to citizens of the United States.265 In addition, Michael Kent Curtis
has argued that this was the view of the Republicans in Congress
responsible for framing the Fourteenth Amendment. 266 This view is,
perhaps, more consistent with the protection of slaves as property in
states where slavery was outlawed. Although property in human beings
seemed to be recognized under the Fugitive Slave Clause, appeal was
also made to the Privileges and Immunities Clause as guaranteeing a
substantive right to property of all kinds. 267 Some of the state constitutions expressly prohibited slavery, and yet the courts upheld
slaveholders' rights of property in their slaves when traveling to foreign
states. Further, under this interpretation of the Clause, equality in
regulation of these rights might also have been one of the substantive
rights afforded protection as a common right of citizens. Therefore, this
interpretation might afford substantive protection for certain fundamental
rights, as well as antidiscrimination protection in the regulation of those
fundamental rights.
Case law arising under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
rv, Section 2 as well as in other areas, the opinions of legal commentators, and statements by members of Congress during the Reconstruction
debates, all offer clues concerning the nature of the protection thought
to be afforded under the Clause. Both interpretations may be historically
accurate to a certain extent and may be accommodated by keeping in

265. Antieau, supra note 14, at 5. Antieau asserts that Article IV was intended to
be enforceable by Congress when read together with the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Id. at 1-2. However, the Necessary and Proper Clause states that "Congress shall have
the Power ... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. The Privileges and Immunities Clause makes no mention of any
congressional enforcement power. Therefore, it would seem that the Necessary and
Proper Clause cannot authorize Congress to enforce the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. However, the United States is given the power to "guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government ...." Id. art. IV, § 4. Therefore, it may
be the case that Congress was intended to possess a power to enforce the guarantee of
certain fundamental rights under the Guarantee Clause. Michael Conant has similarly
asserted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was originally intended to secure
certain privileges and immunities of Englishmen, inherited by the colonists. See Conant,
supra note 36.
266. See CURTIS, supra note 10, at 114. See also KETTNER, supra note 14, at 258
(supporting the substantive reading of the Clause); Kaczorowski, supra note 11 (same).
267. See supra Part III. C.1, discussing the nineteenth century interpretation of the
Fugitive Slave Clause.
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mind the conceptual framework developed during the nineteenth century
addressing the rights guaranteed under the Clause.

A.

Case Law

It is particularly noteworthy that antebellum cases discussing the
"privileges and immunities" of citizens outside the context of Article IV,
Section 2 seem to indicate that there was a well-defined understanding
of what constituted the set of privileges and immunities to which citizens
of all free governments were entitled.268 For example, in Sheridan v.
Furber,269 a case involving an alleged assault and battery of a master
of a ship and the first mate against the carpenter of the ship, the court

268. As previously noted, cases addressing the Privileges and Immunities Clause
itself also give clues to its meaning. The case of The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102 (D.
Mass. 1844) (No. 3,529), addressed the rights of free men of color under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Under a statute of Louisiana, "colored
seamen" belonging to vessels of the United States were prohibited from being brought
into the ports of Louisiana. Id. at 1102. Although the statute was held to be
inconsistent with federal regulations of commerce under the Commerce Clause, the case
is interesting for the court's discussion in dicta of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2. The court stated that had the free man been a citizen of the
states, the statute would have been unconstitutional in its application, abridging the
citizen's right to privileges and immunities under the United States Constitution.
Another case that arose under the Louisiana statute was Commonwealth v. Aves, 35
Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). See CASE OF THE SLAVE-CHILD MED: A REPORT OF THE
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL AND OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT IN THE CASE OF
COMMONWEALTH vs. AVES 5 (Boston: Isaac Knapp ed., 1836). It was argued before the
court in this case by Ellis Gray Loring that under the statute "colored citizens of the
North, seamen or others, are forbidden by law from entering many of the Southern ports
in this Union, on peril of being 'confined in jail"' and that the statute was "in direct
violation" of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 14-15.
Loring argued that slavery was not founded upon principles of natural law, but rather
was merely conventional. He reasoned that slavery "is contrary to good morals;-a
violation of the law of nature, and of the revealed will of God. · It therefore falls within
the first exception to the exercise of national comity." Id. at 20; see also FINKELMAN,
supra n0te 14, at 109 n.28 (discussing other ways in which the privileges and immunities
of free black citizens were denied by Southern states); Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero
of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law of Slavery, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 2007 (1996) (discussing the Negro Seamen's Acts in the
Southern states); id. at 1998-2000 (discussing Justice Curtis's opinion in Aves); Maltz,
supra note 4, at 340-41 (discussing the Negro Seamen's Acts). The court in Aves found
this reasoning persuasive, and Justice Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, declared
that slavery was "contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, humanity and
sound policy." Aves, 18 Pick. at 215. Shaw reasoned that if the right to personal
property in slaves were based upon the natural law then "if slavery exists anywhere, and
if by the laws of any place a property can be acquired in slaves," then "the law of
slavery must extend to every place where such slaves may be carried." Id. at 216.
Shaw rejected this argument with respect to slavery, stating that comity could "apply
only to those commodities which are everywhere, and by all nations, treated and deemed
subject of property." Id.
269. 21 F. Cas. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (No. 12,761).
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expressed a notion of the "privileges and immunities" of citizens that
involved certain fundamental rights that were guaranteed under all free
governments. Even though the alleged assault occurred on a ship
outside the territory of the United States, the court used the phrase
"privileges and immunities of citizens" to describe the rights that citizens
possessed even though they might relinquish some of them in the
disciplined environment of a ship at sea.
[W]ith regard to a ship-master, the persons over whom his authority is to be
exerted are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all respects
other than in their qualified subjection to the discipline on ship-board; and every
provision of law which sanctions the deprivation of their rights as freemen,
evinces, at the same time, a jealous solicitude in their behalf, by imposing on
the master a heavy responsibility in the employment of his power. 27

Similarly, Polydore v. Prince271 involved an alleged assault and
battery on the high seas. The question in this case was whether a
foreign slave who suffered the alleged assault could sue in the courts of
the United States or whether "this personal incapacity upon the received
principles of the jus gentium, or at least on the principles of national
comity, follows him into whatever country he may voluntarily go or be
carried by his master."272 The defendants in the case argued that,
although slavery was contrary to "natural right," it was "an institution
admitted and acknowledged by the law of nations" and therefore the
incapacity of slavery followed the slave "as the shadow follows the
body" while traveling abroad in the United States. As a result, defense
counsel argued that the slave could not sue in the courts of the United
States for the alleged assault.273 The defendants pointed to the "Code
Napolean" as authority for the proposition that one's status followed one
outside the jurisdiction under which it attached. The defendants also
described the caste systems erected in Europe and the distinctions in the
"privileges and immunities" separating the different levels.
Among these personal statutes, for which this ubiquity is claimed, are those
which formerly over the whole of Europe, and still over a large part of it,
divide the people into different castes, as nobles and plebeians, clergy and laity.

270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1268.
19 F. Cas. 950 (D. Maine 1837) (No. 11,257).
Id. at 951.
Id.
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The favored classes were entitled to many personal ~rivileges and immunities
particularly beneficial and honorable to themselves. 2 4

However, the court did not adopt the defendants' arguments, stating
that "the peculiar personal status, as to his capacities or incapacities,
which an individual derives from the law of his domicil, and which are
imparted only by that law, is suspended when he gets beyond the sphere
in which that law is in force." 275 The status of slave could only be
conferred through positive municipal regulation, and it did not flow from
principles of natural right. Thus, this status need not be recognized
outside the jurisdiction in which it was conferred. As a result, the slave
in this case was automatically entitled to certain "rights and capacities
of a free man" upon entering the jurisdiction of the United States.276
The substantive rights of citizens were also discussed by certain
members of the Supreme Court deciding the Dred Scott case.277 For
example, in arguing that the Framers of the Constitution did not
understand the term "citizen" to include free blacks, Chief Justice Taney
made the following pragmatic argument:

274. Id. at 951-52.
275. Id. at 953. The court distinguished between natural relations of foreigners and
those established through "mere positive institution":
Natural relations of foreigners, and such as are established by our own
domestic institutions, we recognize in foreigners who are temporarily resident
among us; but the rights and obligations which flow from them must, as a
general rule at least, be determined by our own law, and be enforced by such
means only as the local law allows. But those merely artificial distinctions,
those capacities and disqualifications of mere positive institution, established
by different communities among their members, which are not founded in
nature but which relate to their own domestic economy, their municipal
institutions, and their peculiar social organization, cannot be admitted to follow
them into other nations in whose laws such distinctions are unknown, without
disturbing the whole order of society, and introducing into communities
privileged castes of persons, each governed to a considerable extent by
different laws and affected by personal privileges peculiar to themselves, and
totally at variance with the habits, social order, and the laws of the community
among whom they reside.
Id.
276. 19 F. Cas. 950 (D. Maine 1837) (No. 11,257). According to the court:
The law which declares a slave free on his introduction into this country, by
necessary consequences, if it be not an identical proposition, declares him to
be possessed of the civil qualities of a freeman, and confers on him the faculty
of vindicating his rights, and claiming redress for wrongs in the ordinary
course of justice . . . .
Id. For a more detailed discussion of the "civil qualities of a freeman," see Smith, supra
note 12.
277. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the Dred Scott case and the understanding
of both the majority and dissenting members of the Court concerning the rights of
citizens).
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[I]f persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and of the United States,
they would be entitled to all of these privileges and immunities in every State,
and the States could not restrict them; for they would hold these privileges and
immunities under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its
courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution and the
laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the States could limit
or restrict them, or place the party in an inferior grade, this clause of the
Constitution would be unmeaning, and could have no operation; and would give
no rights to the citizens when in another State. He would have none but what
the State itself chose to allow him. This is evidently not the construction or
meaning of the clause in question . . . . And these rights are of a character that
would lead to consequences which make it absolutely certain that the African
race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were not in
contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when these privileges and
immunities were provided for the protection of the citizen in other States. 278

This passage might be read as stating that the citizens of one state
were merely placed on the same footing with the citizens of every state
insofar as they were entitled to the fundamental privileges and immunities of any state in which they found themselves. Each state might have
a different set of fundamental privileges and immunities based, perhaps,
on provisions in the state constitutions. However, Chief Justice Taney
explicitly enumerated certain of the privileges and immunities free blacks
would be entitled to enjoy were they citizens.279 This would seem to
indicate that there was a uniform set of core fundamental privileges and
immunities to which citizens were entitled in every state.
Furthermore, Justice Curtis also discussed the privileges and immunities of what he called "general citizenship" under Article IV, Section 2.
Curtis's statements indicate that there might have been a uniform set of
privileges and immunities that he thought were guaranteed under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause: .
Nowhere else in the Constitution is there anything concerning a general
citizenship; but here, privileges and immunities to be enjoyed throughout the
United States, under and by force of the national compact, are granted and
secured. In selecting those who are to enjoy these national rights of citizenship,
how are they described? As citizens of each State. It is to them these national
rights are secured. The qualification for them is not to be looked for in any
provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States. They are to be
citizens of the several States, and, as such, the privileges and immunities of

278.
279.

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,423 (1856).

See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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general citizenshi~, derived and guarantied [sic] by the Constitution, are to be
enjoyed by them. 80

Based on antebellum case law, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
probably guaranteed substantive protection for certain "national" rights
of citizenship, such as the privilege of suing in the courts of the United
States. The qµestion is whether it also guaranteed substantive protection
for privileges and immunities traditionally within the regulatory control
of the state governments, such as the right to contract and the right to
testify. The tentative answer to this question based on an examination
of antebellum case law is that the Clause did provide a substantive
guarantee of such rights.
B.

Commentators

The view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed
substantive protection to a core set of fundamental rights was held by
certain commentators prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For example, William Rawle, in The Constitution of the United States
of America, stated that "[t]here [were] certain incidents to the character
of a citizen of the United States, with which the separate states cannot
interfere."281 Similarly, Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, stated
that in C01field v. Coryell it was declared that "the privileges and
immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United States to citizens
of the several States were to be confined to those which were, in their
nature, fundamental, and belonged of right to the citizens of all free
Governments."282 Therefore, nineteenth century commentators tended
to follow the results reached by courts, indicating that the privileges and
immunities of citizens were intended to be uniform among the states and
to be afforded substantive protection under the Clause. In particular,
Justice Washington's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as guaranteeing certain fundamental rights, which he attempted
to enumerate, was often cited as authoritative. These rights were those
common-law rights of citizens, many of which were traditionally under
the regulatory control of the state governments such as the right to
contract and to sue.283

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 580.
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 81 (1st ed. 1825).
282. 2 KENT, supra note 70, at *71-72.
283. See supra note 246 and accompanying text, quoting Justice Washington's
enumeration of rights guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause; see also
HOWELL, supra note 4, at 48 ("That the citizens of every State are entitled by virtue of
the Comity Clause to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
280.
281.
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C.

Congressional Republicans

This view of the Clause as having substantive content was also held
by many of the Republicans in Congress who were responsible for
framing the Fourteenth Amendment. 284 For example, James Wilson of
Iowa, co-author of the Thirteenth Amendment, manager of the Civil
Rights Bill in the House and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of
the House, stated that slavery "denies to the citizens of each State the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"285 and that
[f]reedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the right of
assemblage for the purpose of petition belong to every American citizen, high
or low, rich or poor, wherever he may be within the jurisdiction of the United
States. With these rights no State may interfere without breach of the bond
which holds the Union together. 286

several States has been declared from the very beginning by the decisions discussing the
general scope and operation of the clause.").
284. This conclusion was reached by Michael Kent Curtis in his historical study of
the Fourteenth Amendment. CURTIS, supra note 10, at 114 ("The debates show ... that
Bingham and others who framed the Fourteenth Amendment relied on a reading of the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 by which it protected a body
of national privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, including those in
the Bill of Rights.").
285. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864).
286. Id. Representative John A. Kasson stated:
You cannot go into a State of the North in which you do not find refugees
from southern States who have been driven from the States in the south where
they had a right to live as citizens, because of the tyranny which this
institution exercised over public feeling . . . and even over the laws of those
States.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1864). According to Kasson, slavery "denies
the constitutional rights of our citizens in the South, suppresses freedom of speech and
of the press, throws types into the rivers when they do not print its will, and violates
more clauses of the Constitution than were violated even by the rebels when they commenced this war ...." Id. Senator John Sherman of Ohio stated:
There never was any doubt about the construction of this clause [the privileges
and immunities clause] of the Constitution-that is, that a man who was
recognized as a citizen of one state had a right to go anywhere within the
United States, at and exercise the immunities of a citizen of the United States.
TENBROEK, supra note 11, at 185 n.14. Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania
stated that the rights guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV included "[t]he right of speech, the right of transit, the right of domicil, the right to
sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the right of petition." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1263 (1866). Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania stated that the
Civil Rights Bill was necessary to guarantee "these fundamental rights and immunities
which are common to the humblest citizen of every free State . . . ." Id. at 1151.
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Wilson reasoned that "[b]efore our Constitution was formed, the great
fundamental rights ... belonged to every person who became a member
of our great national family. No one surrendered a jot or tittle of these
rights by consenting to the formation of the Govemment."287
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the principal draftsman of the
Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act and the Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate, stated that individuals going into
other states were "entitled to the great fundamental rights of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness, and the right to travel, to go where [they
please]."288 After President Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Bill,
Trumbull stated:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights .... They are
those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in
all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them
in all the States of the Union. The right of American citizenship means
something. 289

Similarly, Representative William Lawrence of Ohio stated that there
were "some inherent and inalienable rights, pertaining to every citizen
which cannot be abolished or abridged by state constitutions or laws."
According to Lawrence:
Every citizen . . . has the absolute right to live, the right to personal security,
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are rights
of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are others,
as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy
property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and
property. 290

Therefore, although members of Congress thought it necessary to clarify
the effect of the Constitution in guaranteeing the privileges and
immunities of citizenship by passing the Fourteenth Amendment,' it
seems they may have thought the correct interpretation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 encompassed substantive
protection for the privileges and immunities of citizens.

D.

Resolution

The difference between these competing views of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause might practically be minimal. All of the state

287.
288.
289.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115-19 (1866).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 1757. Trumbull referred to these rights of citizenship as "natural rights."

290.

Id. at 1833.

Id.
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governments guaranteed the fundamental rights of property and person
in their state constitutions.291
Furthermore, these privileges and
immunities were embodied in the English common law and adopted by
the colonists in America. The Framers of the Constitution and the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that these rights flowed
from the principles of natural law and that therefore they would be
embodied in the fundamental law of all "free governments." All free
governments would respect these rights of citizens. Furthermore, these
fundamental rights, embodied in the positive law of the states as well as
documents such as the Declaration of Rights of 1774, which had been
consented to by all of the people, may have received substantive
protection through the guarantee of a "Republican Form of Government"
in Article rv, Section 4.292 The Privileges and Immunities Clause may
have been designed to forbid discrimination in whatever rights were
granted, and the rights that happened to be granted were practically
identical in the several states because of the common heritage of the
states.
The most accurate interpretation of the Clause encompasses both of
these views to a certain extent. Citizens of the United States were
guaranteed certain fundamental rights corresponding to the natural law
rights of person and property that were recognized as belonging of right
to citizens in all free governments. Although elsewhere I have tried to
construct a model to accurately characterize tht:, nature of these powers
or capacities,293 the "privileges" and "immunities" of citizens, the
courts·ofthe day declined this task and stated that they would determine
whether a given right was a privilege or immunity of citizenship on a

291. One contemporary commentator argued that because of this fact, Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not present any great innovation:
All else in this section [Section 1] has already been guaranteed in the second
and fourth section of the fourth article; and in the thirteen amendments. The
new feature declared is that the general principles which had been construed
to apply only to the national government, are thus imposed upon the States.
Most of the States, in general terms, had adopted the same bill of rights in
their own state constitutions.
GEORGE w. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 290 (1876). See also
JOBN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 151 (1868) (noting that the Amendment would not "interfere with any of the
rights, privileges, and functions which properly belong to the individual states"). ·
292. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the role the Guarantee Clause may have
played in protecting a uniform set of substantive rights throughout the several states).
293. Id.
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case by case basis. 294 By looking to that body of law that all nations
that could be called "free" had adopted as their own municipal law,
judges could endeavor to determine what were the privileges and
immunities of citizenship that were founded upon principles of natural
law. By relying on the wisdom of the nations of the world as well as
past generations, judges could discover moral principles founded in
reason and determine what rights were to be classified as privileges and
immunities of citizenship.
The privileges and immunities of citizenship were the fundamental
rights of citizenship that flowed from the social compact existing anterior
to the establishment of the government, and, therefore, no government
possessed the power to abridge these rights. They were founded upon
principles of natural law, but were expressed in the positive law of
custom, the common law inherited from England and expressly adopted
under state constitutions and the Declaration of Rights of 1774, the
organic law of the United States, and most importantly, the state
constitutions. As Justice Field stated in his Slaughter-House dissent, the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
do not derive their existence from its [a State's] legislation, and cannot be
destroyed by its power. The [fourteenth] amendment does not attempt to confer
any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those
already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities
which belong of right to citizens as such, and o~dains that they shall not be
abridged bY: State legislation. 295
.
·

Thus, it is likely that the rights guaranteed under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause were intended to be accorded substantive protection.
The terms "privileges" and "immunities" were terms of art encompassing
certain powers or capacities that were founded upon the social compact
theories of the natural law theorists. 296
Although the antidiscrimination aspect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is commonly accepted,297 and, although the guarantee under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause may not have extended to the

294. See, e.g., Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1856).
295. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95-96 (1873). Justice Field
also stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to give practical effect to the
declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which
the law does not confer, but only recognizes." Id. at 105.
296. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
297. This reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was prevalent by the
beginning of the twentieth century. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 105 ("[T]here exists
only one privilege or immunity of which it can be said that it may be demanded as of
right by the citizens of every State in the Union. That one is equality of treatment,
freedom from discriminating legislation."); but see id. (stating that this interpretation of
the Clause was "far from being clearly recognized or stated by the courts").
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rights of a citizen against his own government, the weight of the
evidence indicates that the privileges and immunities to be guaranteed
were substantive rights out of reach of the state governments as well as
the federal government. The only way in which these rights could be
altered was through the consent of the people. However, this consent
would not be forthcoming as long as the people acted rationally because
these rights were founded upon principles of natural reason-no one
would enter into the social compact without some assurance that these
rights would be guaranteed. Under the original Constitution and Article
IV as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment, states retained their
sovereignty and, therefore, their power to regulate the rights of person
and property of individuals within their jurisdiction. Thus, they could
govern the exercise of the privileges and immunities of citizenship as
long as they did not impair the value of these privileges and immunities
to the citizens, unless they did so pursuant to their regulatory power,
exercised for the common good. Consequently, through differences in
regulation, there might be differences from state to state in the mode or
manner by which citizens exercised their privileges and immunities, but
in all states citizens would have a constitutional guarantee of certain
fundamental privileges and immunities. The state governments could not
abridge these rights through improper regulations.
The view presented in this Article is that both the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article Iv, Section 2 and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment were
designed to afford substantive protection to a well-defined closed set of
capacities of citizens and that antidiscrimination protection was merely
derivative in nature. Each citizen is entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizenship; therefore, no inequality may result. Just as all
persons are entitled to freedom of speech under the First Amendment
and there can be no inequalities in free speech rights because each
individual shares in. the same substantive guarantee, so individuals
guaranteed substantive protection of privileges and immunities also
receive antidiscrimination protection. One of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship was the immunity from unequal regulation of
the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens unless such
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regulations were passed pursuant to the common good.298 Not only
was each individual entitled to bring suits, for example, but each
individual must be subject to the same statute of limitations unless the
public good necessitated otherwise. As we have seen, there may have
been a mandate of "limited absolute equality"299 with respect to a
citizen's entitlement to the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizenship, but inequalities in regulation were permissible as long as
these inequalities constituted a legitimate exercise of the state
government's police power. With respect to special privileges and
immunities, there was no substantive or antidiscrimination guarantee,
since these were not privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed
under Article IV, Section 2.
V.

THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

An analysis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause leads to an
explanation of the distinction made between civil and political rights by
congressional Republicans debating Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the belief on the part of congressional Republicans that the states would remain free to regulate the privileges and
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Amendment. The fact that
special privileges---local or municipal regulations---were not guaranteed
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause in foreign states explains
many of the beliefs on the part of Republicans concerning the meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 30 First, it was understood that political rights would not

°

298. This was the interpretation of the Clause given by Justice Bradley in his dissent
in the Slaughter-House Cases. Bradley argued that equality was "one of the privileges
and immunities of every citizen" under Article IV of the Constitution. The SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
299. Earl Maltz has been the foremost proponent of this theory. See, e.g., EARL M.
MALTZ, CML RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 68 (1990);
Maltz, supra note 11.
·
.
300. The notion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment only guaranteed certain "fundamental" privileges and immunities
of citizenship is not a new idea and is widely supported by statements made by members
of Congress during the debates over the Amendment. For example, during the debates
over the Civil Rights Act Senator Trumbull stated:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; and what are
they? They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free
citizens or free men in all countries, s,.ich as the rights enumerated in this bill,
and they belong to them in all the States of the Union.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). However, this Article has attempted
to offer an explanation of what the term "fundamental" meant in the context of the
jurisprudence of Article IV, Section 2. By developing a definition of this term and
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be guaranteed µnder the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 301 These were rights of participation in the
government such as voting and serving on juries. Such rights could not
be fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens because they could
exist only after establishment of the government. 302 The same is true
in general of all such special privileges. Second, it was thought that the
states remained free to regulate the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens even after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, for
example, by passing laws regulating criminal and civil conduct, without
investing in Congress the power to prescribe uniform criminal or civil
codes for all of the states. 303 The sovereignty of the states was to

distinguishing fundamental from special privileges and immunities, one may determine
what exactly the Privileges or Immunities Clause was designed to protect instead of
merely looking for particular exemplars of what were deemed "fundamental" privileges
and immunities of citizenship at the time of ratification of the Amendment.
301. See Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 142, 145 (1984); see
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (According to Michigan Senator
Jacob Howard, "[t]he right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities
... secured by the Constitution.").
302. Several members of Congress equated fundamental privileges and immunities
protected under Article IV, Section 2 with the rights of citizenship. For example,
Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania, in discussing the Civil Rights Bill, stated:
"The sole purpose of the bill is to secure to [blacks] the fundamental rights of
citizenship; those rights which constitute the essence of freedom, and which are common
to the citizens of all civilized States; those rights which secure life, liberty, and property,
and which make all men equal before the law ...." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1152 (1866). Similarly, Lyman Trumbull stated with respect to the Bill that it
[provides that blacks are to be considered citizens and that] they will be
entitled to the rights of citizens. And what are they? The great fundamental
rights set forth in this bill: the right to acquire property, the right to go and
come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts,
and to inherit and dispose of property. These are the very rights that are set
forth in this bill as appertaining to every freeman.
Id. at 475.
303. For example, Senator Bingham objected to the original version of the Civil
Rights Bill because of its guarantee of equal "civil rights," protesting that "'[C]ivil
[R]ights' ... embrace every right that pertains to the citizen ... [it would] strike down
... every State constitution which makes a discrimination on account of race or color
in any of the civil rights of the citizen ...." THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS'
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 186 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291
(1866)). The distinction between the phrases "civil rights" and "privileges and
immunities" is therefore evident. As Raoul Berger has noted, these phrases were not
synonymous or used interchangeably. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill ofRights:
Akhil Amar's Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 27 (1993). An explanation for the
distinction may be found in the theory presented in this Article. The phrase "civil
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remain intact under the Amendment. 304 This belief can be explained
by noting that the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens
differ from special privileges or municipal regulations. The latter were
not guaranteed under either the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 or under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, antidiscrimination protection under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may have
been at the level of regulation of the privileges and immunities of
citizens. The Clause may have guaranteed substantive as well as
antidiscrimination protection in terms of the fundamental privileges and
immunities that citizens were entitled to enjoy in all of the states, as well
as the privilege or immunity of being subject only to equal regulation of
these fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens. Thus, one of
the privileges and immunities of citizens was enjoyment of equal civil

rights" could be construed as referring to the positive regulations or modes in which the
privileges and immunities of citizenship were exercised. Mandating an equality of civil
rights would indeed reform the civil and criminal codes of the states and call for a
uniformity in legislation among the states. However, the phrase "privileges and
immunities" could be construed as referring only to those capacities of citizenship
existing anterior to the establishment of the government that are regulated through
municipal regulations passed by legislatures. Thus, the theory presented in this Article
accounts for the distinction in terminology made by members of Congress.
304. Several statements by members of Congress indicate their concern that the
sovereignty of the state governments not be impaired by the new Amendment. For
example, Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated
"the proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any class of
persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the principle of
existing local sovereignty." THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note
2, at 111 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866)). Similarly,
Columbus Delano stated, "there are certain rights of citizenship that are exclusively
within the control of the States ...." Id. at 178 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 157 (1866)). Senator Trumbull remarked that the Civil Rights Bill "in no
manner interferes with the municipal regulations of any State which protects all alike in
their rights of person and property. It could have no operation in Massachusetts, New
York, Illinois, or most of the States of the Union." Id. at 200 (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1761 (1866)). Finally, Robert Hale declared that "all powers
having reference to the relation of the individual to the municipal government, the
powers of local jurisdiction and legislation, are in general reserved to the states . . . ."
Id. at 153 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866)). See also FLACK,
supra note 10, at 68 (concluding that, "Radical leaders were as aware as any one of the
attachment of the great majority of the people to the doctrine of States Rights ... the
right of the states to regulate their own internal affairs . . . ."); Alfred H. Kelly,
Comments on Harold M Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 55 (Harold Hyman ed., 1966) (concluding that the "commitment to
traditional state-federal relations meant that the radical Negro reform program could be
only a very limited one"). Later, Justice Bradley, one of the Slaughter-House dissenters,
emphasized in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment "does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law
for the regulation of private rights."
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rights. This interpretation of Section 1 as protecting only fundamental
privileges and immunities of citizens is not only consistent with the
original meaning of Section 1, but also was the interpretation adopted by
the Supreme Court dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases, 305 who
were defeated by a narrow margin.

A.

The Distinction Between Civil and Political Rights

It is well established that Republicans intended to guarantee basic civic
rights, but not political rights, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 306 The text itself guarantees privileges and immunities

305. The Slaughter-House dissenters referred to the Lockean triumvirate of life,
liberty, and property as embodied in the Declaration of Independence as referring to the
fundamental rights of citizens "of every free government." For example, Justice Bradley
stated in his dissent in referring to the Declaration:
Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of freemen,
asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty ... and property. These
are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of
law, and which can only be ... modified, by lawful regulations necessary or
proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the
citizens of every free government.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872). Thus, Justice Bradley
reiterated Justice Washington's belief that the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens were those to which citizens of all free governments were entitled and that these
were the privileges and immunities referred to in Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Field made similar remarks. According to Justice Field, "[t]he
privileges and immunities designated [in Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment] are
those which of right belong to the citizens of al/free governments." Id. at 97. Thus, the
"privileges or immunities of citizens" referred to in Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as those derived from Article IV, Section 2 were those privileges
and immunities that were fundamental---that existed anterior to the formation of
government, whether belonging equally to all men or flowing from the social compact
among the members of society, its citizens.
This was the conclusion of the first court to hear a case arising under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Hall, the
federal court queried, "[w]hat are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States here referred to? They are undoubtedly those which may be denominated
fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens . . . of the several states which
compose this union from the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign."
26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
306. See CURTIS, supra note 10, at 29. The distinction between political and civil
rights was well established in nineteenth century legal thought. For example, Chief
Justice Taney made such a distinction in his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, where
he stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the
community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political
power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices." 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
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of citizens and not political rights, such as the right to vote or hold
office.307 Many Republicans had stated during the debates over the
proposed Civil Rights Bill, a precursor of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that political rights would not be guaranteed under the
Bill. 308 After reading the passage from Car.field v. Coryell, which

422 (1856). Justice Curtis made the same distinction in his dissent. Id. at 581.
However, complicating the analysis concerning rights addressed under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was the fact that the phrase "political rights" was sometimes
used as a synonym for "civil rights." The original version of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment secured "to all citizens ... the same political rights and privileges." See
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 51-52 (1988) (suggesting that the "political rights" language was
dropped because it might be construed as guaranteeing to free blacks political rights such
as the right to vote and hold office, the right to serve on juries, and the right to serve
in the militia); Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 965
(1984).
307. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. In United States v. Hall, the court stressed this
point:
What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States here
referred to? They are undoubtedly those which may be denominated
fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free states, and which
have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which
compose this Union from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign.
26 F. Cas. at 81.
308. For example, Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania stated that "no
lawyer who is acquainted with the use of terms and the rules which regulate the
construction of laws" could interpret the Bill to extend the suffrage laws. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866). Representative Thayer analyzed the language of the
Bill:
In the first place, the words themselves are "civil rights and immunities," not
political privileges; and nobody can successfully contend that a bill guarantying [sic] simply civil rights and immunities is a bill under which you could
extend the right of suffrage, which is a political privilege and not a civil right.
Then, again, the matter is put beyond all doubt by the subsequent particular
definition of the general language which has been just used; and when those
civil rights which are first referred to in general terms in the bill are
subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that the
general words which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars
which have been enumerated.
Id. Similarly, Representative James Wilson cited the definition of civil rights in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary as "those [rights] which have no relation to the establishment,
support or management of government." Id. at 1117. See also id. at 1117, 1367
(Wilson), 1263 (Broomall), 1757 (Trumbull). However, there was some confusion in
terminology. Some members of Congress thought that the phrase "civil rights" might
encompass political rights as well. For example, Willard Saulsbury of Delaware was
disturbed that the phrase "civil rights and immunities" in the Bill was a "generic term
which in its most comprehensive signification includes every species of right that man
can enjoy other than" natural rights and that "the right of voting ... [i]s ... a civil right
...." Id. at 477. See also id. at 1157 (Rep. Thornton); id. at 1291 (Rep. Bingham);
id. at 476 (exchange between Sen. Trumbull and Sen. McDougall).
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enumerated the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens under
Article IV, Section 2, Senator Trumbull stated that the Civil Rights Bill
did not provide for the elective franchise. 309 As Congressman Russell
Thayer noted, the words in the Civil Rights Bill were "'civil rights and
immunities', not political privileges."310 The fact that the Fifteenth
Amendment was ratified to extend the vote to free black citizens is
confirmation of this interpretation.311
Furthermore, during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment, several members of Congress indicated that it was not their
intention to confer political rights under Section 1. For example, many
Republicans noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the
right to vote upon free blacks.312 Representative Wilson stated that

309. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122. Several
members of Congress lamented the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights
Act did not confer the elective franchise. For example, Senator Samuel Pomeroy stated
that without suffrage, free blacks would have "no security," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1182 ( 1866), and Senator Sumner stated that if the Amendment "is inadequate
to protect persons in . . . the right to vote, it is inadequate to protect them in anything."
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869).
310. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866).
311. During the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, it was noted that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote. Senator Aaron H. Cragin
recounted:
I remember the struggle that we had here in the passage of the fourteenth
amendment; . . . I remember that it was announced upon this floor by more
than one gentleman, that that amendment did not confer the right of voting
upon anybody . . . . There is no doubt upon the question. It was the
understanding of Congress and of the people of this country that that
amendment did not confer and did not seek to confer any right to vote upon
any citizen of the United States .... [T]hat it conferred the right to vote was
distinctly disclaimed on this floor in the caucus which has been alluded to here
to-night; and, for one, I am not willing to have it go out from this Senate that
we passed that amendment understanding that it conferred any right to vote.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003-04 (1869).
312. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539-40 (1866) (Farnsworth); id. at 2462
(Garfield); id. at 405 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 406-07 (Rep. Eliot). As Senator
Trumbull stated, "the granting of civil rights does not . . . carry with it . . . political
privileges. A man may be a citizen in this country without a right to vote . . . . The
right to vote . . . depends upon the legislation of the various States . . . ." THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 197. Senator Howard
stated:
[T]he first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these
classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the
privileges and immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the
creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of
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suffrage was "a political right which has been left under the control of
the several States, subject to the action of Congress only when it
becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republican form of
government."313 Senator Bingham, upon introducing the Fourteenth
Amendment on the floor of the House, stated that "the exercise of the
elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the
Republic, is exclusively under the control of the states."314 Bingham
also stated that "[i]t is a guarantied [sic] right of every State in this
Union to regulate for itself the elective franchise within its limits, subject
to no condition whatever except that it shall not . . . transform the State
government from one republican in form . . . ." 315 Finally, Senator
Howard stated that Section 1 of the Amendment did "not give to either
of these classes [whites or blacks] the right of voting."316
Members of Congress noted that it was well established under the case
law of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 that
the phrase "Privileges ~nd Immunities of Citizens" did not refer to
political rights, but rather merely extended civil rights to foreign citizens.
For example, William Lawrence stated during the debates that the
privileges referred to under Article IV were "such as are fundamental
civil rights, not political rights, nor those dependent on local law . . .

positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the
basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves,
subject to a despotism.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). See also Maltz, supra note 306, at
942.
.
313. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866).
314. Id. at 2542. This was not the only time that Senator Bingham made a
distinction between political and civil rights. In the debate over admission of Oregon
as a state, Bingham distinguished political rights, which he indicated were conventional,
from natural or inherent rights. According to Bingham, the "distinctive" political rights
of citizens of the United States included:
The great right to choose (under the laws of the States) severally, as I
remarked before, either directly by ballot or indirectly through their dulyconstituted agents, all the officers of the Federal Government, legislative,
executive, and judicial, and through these to make all constitutional laws for
their own government, and to interpret and enforce them; the right, also, to
hold and exercise, upon election thereto, the several offices of honor, of
power, and of trust, under the Constitution and Government of the United
States.
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).· Bingham continued, stating that "[t]his
Government rests upon the absolute equality of natural rights amongst men. There is
not, and cannot be, any equality in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights,
because that is impossible." Id. at 985. Bingham also stated that "[p]olitical rights are
conventional, not natural; limited, not universal; and are, in fact, exercised only by the
majority of qualified electors of any State and by the minority only nominally." Id.
315. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867).
316. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).

908

[VOL. 34: 809, 1997]

Privileges and Immunities Clause
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

317
."

Lawrence's classification of political rights with rights "dependent upon local law" is instructive. Political rights, like municipal
regulations, may exist only after the establishment of government. One
can only participate in government by voting or holding office after a
government is formed. Fundamental civil rights, privileges and
immunities of citizenship, on the other .hand, were thought to exist
anterior to the establishment of government, being comprised of inherent
and inalienable rights of persons as well as those rights :flowing from the
social compact among the members of society, its citizens.318 Therefore, political rights are wholly analogous to municipal regulations
governing the exercise of the fundamental privileges and immunities of
the citizenry. Neither were afforded protection under Article IV, Section
2, and neither were intended to be afforded protection under Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the distinctions between fundamental and special privileges and, concomitantly, between political and
civil rights, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2, were carried over to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In summary, there are two important aspects of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 reflected in statements made
by members of Congress. The first is that the private. proprietary. rights
of citizens in their person and property must be respected when those
citizens venture into the jurisdiction of another state. In this way, the
fundamental rights of citizens to be secure in their person and property
are ensured. The second aspect of the Clau~e is that the citizens of one
state are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens residing in
the jurisdiction in which they find themselves. The rights of person and
property are qualified, as always, by the government's power, which it
has received from the consent of the citizens, to pass regulatory laws for
the public good. These regulations, however, must be designed to secure
the public welfare.

317. Id. at 1836.
318. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing application of social compact theory in
interpreting Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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B.

Regulation of the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens

The notion that the states retained the power to regulate the privileges
and immunities of citizens--those privileges and immunities that were
in their nature fundamental-was expressed time and again during
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. 319 Republicans were concerned that the states retain their power of regulation and that the
Fourteenth Amendment not mandate a uniform civil or criminal code for
the states. 320 As Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section

319. Several commentators have noted the importance of maintenance of the federal
system and state sovereignty in the eyes of the 39th Congress, which passed the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 17, at 50. For example, Raoul
Berger quotes Horace Flack's The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to support his
interpretation of the Amendment under which the states would retain significant power
to regulate the fundamental rights of citizens: "The 'radical leaders,' Horace Flack wrote,
'were as aware as any one of the attachment of a great majority of the people to the
doctrine of States Rights . . . the right of the States to regulate their own internal
affairs."' Id. (quoting FLACK, supra note 10, at 68). In Berger's opinion, "[o]ne of
[Michael Kent] Curtis' major flaws is his refusal to face up to Bingham's repeated
recognition that control. of internal matters was left to the States." Id. at 131. See also
Maltz, supra note 11, at 230 (stating that "[t]he concept of federalism played a critical
role in limiting Republican efforts on behalf of the freedmen").
320. See CURTIS, supra note 10, at 68-69. Curtis notes in particular the objections
of Congressman Robert S. Hale of New York, id. at 69 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2979 (1864)), and Congressman Giles W. Hotchkiss, id. at 71 (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866)). Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky
contended that the Civil Rights Act might "authorize Congress to pass a civil and
criminal code for every State in the Union." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1414
(1866). Willard Saulsbury argued that the act placed limitations on the "police power"
of the states. Id. at 478. Andrew J. Rogers indicated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would "interfere with the internal police and regulations of the States . . .
." Id. at app. 134. Senator Edgar Cowan, playing devil's advocate, had argued that the
mandate for equality in regulation under the Civil Rights Act would confer
upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots, upon lunatics, and upon
everybody native born in all the States, the right to make and enforce
contracts, because there is no qualification in the bill, and the very object of
the bill is to override the qualifications that are upon those rights in the States

Id. at 1782. Congressman Wilson stated during the debate over the Civil Rights Bill that
"[w]e are not making a general criminal code for the States." Id. at 1120. Wilson also
stated that "the rights" of individuals "possesse[d] as a citizen of the United States"
could "only be secured to him by laws which operate within the State in which he
resides." Id. at 2513. Thomas Davies of New York, in debates over the Civil Rights
Act, stated "[t]his government is one of delegated powers, and ... every law ... is
circumscribed by the limitation of the Constitution. The States have reserved all
sovereignty and power which has not been expressly or impliedly granted to the Federal
Government." Id. at 1265-66. Representative Samuel Shellabarger stated that the Civil
Rights Bill's "whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that
whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be
for and upon all citizens alike without distinction based on race or former condition of
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1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated, "[t]he Constitution does not
delegate to the United States the power to punish offenses against the
life, liberty, or property of the citizen in the States . . . but leaves it as
the reserved power of the States, to be by them exercised."321
Bingham also stated:
[T]he care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen, under the
solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Federal Constitution, is in the
States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to effect no change
in that respect in the Constitution of the country. I have advocated here an
amendment which would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to
the oath, and punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but
leaving those officers to discharge the duties enjoined upon them as citizens of
the United States ... by [the] Constitution. 322

slavery." Id. at 1293. Finally, Columbus Delano, a Republican Representative from
Ohio, worried that under the Civil Rights Bill, "Congress has authority to go into the
States and manage and legislate with regard to all the personal rights of the citizen-rights of life, liberty, and property. You render this Government no longer a
Government of limited powers ...." Id. at app. 158. See also HAROLD M. HYMAN,
A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CML WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON
THE CONSTITUTION 438-40 (1973); NELSON, supra note 306, at 114-15; Maltz, supra
note 306, at 936 (stating that "the concept of federalism was one overarching concern");
Maltz, supra note 11, at 230-36.
321. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 186.
Bingham also stated that "the citizens must rely upon the State for their protection. I
admit that such is the rule ... as it now stands." Id. at 159. Bingham cited The
Federalist No. 45 (James Madison): "The powers reserved to the Federal States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State." Id. at 159. Furthermore, Bingham seemed to distinguish
between fundamental rights and their instantiation in municipal law. Bingham stated that
"[t]he rights of life and liberty are theirs whatever States may enact," but also stated:
[W]ho ever heard it intimated that any-body could have property protected in
any State until he owned or acquired property there according to its local law
. . . . I undertake to say no one.
As to real estate, every one knows that its acquisition and transmission under
every interpretation ever given to the word property, as used in the Constitution of the country, are dependent exclusively upon the local law of the States
. . . . But suppose any person has acquired property not contrary to the laws
of the State, but in accordance with its law, are they not to be equally
protected in the enjoyment of it, or are they to be denied all protection?
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). Democratic Congressman Andrew
J. Rogers of New Jersey made a similar distinction between natural rights, a "right which
God gives us," and civil rights, which are "derived from the Government and municipal
law, as laid down in the organism of a State, and to extend to such persons as it may see
fit." Id. at 1122.
322. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866).
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Bingham did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment in any way
infringed upon the powers of the states because it merely forbid that
which the states did not possess the power to do-abridge the privileges
and immunities of the citizen.323
Senator Bingham was not alone in his understanding of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting the states from abridging the
privileges and immunities of citizens, while leaving the states free to
regulate these fundamental capacities of citizenship in different manners.
For example, Representative Shellabarger also indicated that the state
governments could exercise the right to regulate the fundamental
privileges and immunities of citizens without abridging them.
Shellabarger stated:
Now, the inquiry I wish to make is this: suppose that at the time of taking a
statutory apprentice, or at the time of the birth of a child, the age of majority
for the child and the expiration of the apprenticeship is fixed by the law of this
District, or of any of the States, at the age of twenty-one years; and suppose the
State, or the Legislature of the District, in the exercise of municipal legislation,
should change the law so as to terminate the minority and the apprenticeship
at eighteen instead of at twenty-one years, and thus should take from the parent
and from the master three years of service, would that be a depriving the citizen

323. As Bingham stated during the debates:
I repel the suggestion made here in the heat of debate, that the committee or
any of its members who favor this proposition seek in any form to ... take
away from any State any right that belongs to it. . . . The proposition pending
before the House is simply a proposition to arm Congress . . . with the power
to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It "hath that
extent--no more."
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; but they say, "We are opposed to its enforcement by act of Congress
under an amended Constitution, as proposed." That is the sum and substance
of all the argument that we have heard on this subject. Why are gentlemen
opposed to the enforcement of the bill of rights, as proposed? Because they
aver it would interfere with the reserved rights of the States! Who ever before
heard that any State had reserved to itself the right, under the Constitution of
the United States, to withhold from any citizen of the United States within its
limits, under any pretext whatever, any of the privileges of a citizen of the
United States, or to impose upon him, no matter from what State he may have
come, any burden contrary to that provision of the Constitution which declares
that the citizen shall be entitled in the several States to all the immunities of
a citizen of the United States?
Id. at 1088-89; see also id. at 1090 (statement of John Bingham) (noting that "the
adoption of the proposed amendment will take from the States no rights that belong to
the States"); id. at 2542 (statement of John Bingham) (concluding that "this amendment
takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it"); Fairman, supra note 7, at 33;
Gingras, supra note 15, at 44-45 (discussing Bingham's views).
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of property without due process of law within the meaning·ofMagna Charta or
of the Constitution of the United States? Is not the property in these personal
relations within the full control of the municipal legislation of every supreme
legislature? 324

Similarly, Senator Richard Yates of Illinois distinguished between
regulating the rights of citizens and destroying them. According to
Yates:
To define the length of residence necessary to enable a man to vote, to say
what his age shall be, is one thing; and to say that he shall not vote at all
because he is black or white, is an entirely different thing. In the latter case,
color is made the disqualification, just as race would be if Germans were
excluded from the ballot-box. The State may preserve a right; it may fix the
qualifications; it may impose certain restrictions so as to have that right
preserved in the best form to the people; but it is not legitimately in the power
of the State, ... it is not in any earthly power to destroy a man's equal rights
to his property, to his franchise, to his suffrage, or to the right to aspire to
office---I mean according to the true theory of republican government. That is
the one thing, that in this country, the Government cannot do. 325

Although in this passage Yates discussed political rights such as the right
to vote and to hold office, which were not considered to be privileges
and immunities of citizenship, his distinction between the destruction of
a right and its regulation is instructive.
Finally, Senator George F. Edmunds also distinguished between the
regulation of a right and its destruction or abridgment. Edmunds
commented:
Every lawyer, knows ... that it is one thing to have a right which is absolute
and inalienable, and it is another thing for the body of the community to
regulate . . . the exercise of that right.
. . . I may be daily deprived of my liberty under the regulations of the State,
which apply to us all alike. If I am deprived of it, rightfully or wrongfully, I

324. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1636 (1862).
325. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 350 (1868). In his annual message
to the Illinois legislature in January, 1865, Richard Yates, acting as Governor of Illinois,
also stated:
I am for unlimited state sovereignty in the true sense, in the sense that the
State is to control all its municipal and local legislation and I would be the
first to resist all attempts upon the part of the Federal Government to interpose
tyrannical usurpation of power in controlling the legislation. The States are
sovereign in every sense in which it is desirable they should have sovereignty
Maltz, supra note 11, at 233-34 (quoting 1 REPORTS TO
ILLINOIS, 24th Sess. 28 (1865)).
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can only get restored to it by the process of the law under the regulations that
legislation shall provide. My friend admits that one of the privileges of a
citizen of the United States is to hold property. Where is he to hold it? He
must hold it in some State or Territory, must he not? Now, then, is he to
acquire it in spite of the State law by an instrument unwitnessed, unsealed,
unsigned? By no means. He must conform to the regulation of the local law
which declares that his deed must be witnessed by two witnesses, must be
sealed, must be acknowledged, must be delivered. And yet no man here
thought of supposing that a privilege of a citizen was denied, although it is
confessedly by my friend agreed to be a privilege, from the fact that the States
regulate the exercise of it . . . [E]verybodl knows that a right may be perfectly
secure and yet be subject to regulation. 32

Thus, congressional Republicans made a distinction between the
legitimate regulation of a fundamental right and its abridgement or
destruction. In the nineteenth century mind, there was a well-defined
conception of the legitimate sphere of government action in regulating
the fundamental rights of the citizenry. 327 The line between legitimate

326. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869).
327. The Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged this right of regulation in the
states preserved under the Fourteenth Amendment in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876). The Court stated that individuals, upon entering society, conferred upon the
government the power to regulate "the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and
the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes
necessary for the public good." Id. at 125. Justice Field, one of the Slaughter-House
dissenters, recognized this broad police power, acknowledging that the states possessed
the power to "control the use and possession of ... property, so far as may be necessary
for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure them the equal use and enjoyment
of their property." Id. at 145. Field continued, stating:
It is true that the legislation which secures to all protection in their rights,
and the equal use and enjoyment of their property, embraces an almost infinite
variety of subjects. Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals, and health
of the community, comes within its scope . . . . Indeed, there is no end of
regulations with respect to the use of property which may not be legitimately
prescribed, having for their object the peace, good order, safety, and health of
the community, thus securing to all the equal enjoyment of their property ..
Id. at 145-46. Justice Field later expounded upon these views in Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U.S. 27 (1884), in which he stated that the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment
undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of
life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and
security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of
their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to
pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have
like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and
property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of
contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one
except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that
no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the
same calling and condition, and that in the administration of criminal justice
no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as
is prescribed to all for like offences.
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regulation of fundamental rights and their abridgement was not as fuzzy
as it might appear to be to modem legal scholars. 328
·
Although the states remained free to regulate the mode or manner in
which the privileges and immunities of the citizen might be exercised,
they were not free to abridge or destroy these rights--they were inherent
or inalienable rights of the citizen. According to Congressman William
Lawrence of Ohio, matters involving contracting, suing, and property
rights were left to the states "subject only to the limitation that there are
some inherent and inalienable rights, pertaining to every citizen, which
cannot be abolished or abridged by State constitutions or laws."329
However, there were other constraints placed upon the state's power of

Id. at 31. The difference between an arbitrary deprivation of fundamental rights and a
proper exercise of the state's police power is the difference between an abridgement of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and a proper regulation of
the exercise of these rights. Justice Field continued, stating:
[T]he amendment-broad and comprehensive as it is ... was [not] designed
to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power,
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the
very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these
objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such as for draining
marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often necessary for
general benefits-for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts,
cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these
purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but
they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any
one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the
general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character,
they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all
persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but
legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application,
if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly
situated, is not within the amendment.
Id. at 31-32.
328. See, e.g., State v. Medbury, 3 R.I. 138, 141 (1855) (counsel for defendant
stated that "the difference between the regulation and the destruction of a right is too
obvious for argument").
329. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866). Lawrence also stated in
response to concerns of invading the powers of the state governments, "I answer [that]
it is better to invade the judicial power of the State than permit it to invade, strike down,
and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should
be speedily invaded." Id. at 1837.
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regulation. Regulation of the fundamental rights of the citizen had to be
"equal." As Senator Lot M. Morill of Maine stated,
The peculiar character, the genius of republicanism is equality, impartiality
of rights and remedies among all citizens, not that the citizen shall not be
abridged in any of his natural rights. The man yields that right to the nation
when he becomes a citizen. The republican guarantee is that all laws shall bear
upon all alike in what they enjoin and forbid, grant and enforce. This principle
of equality before the law is as old as civilization, but it does not prevent the
State from qualifying the rights of the citizen according to the public
necessities. 330

This equality may have flowed from a fundamental immunity-to be
free from unequal regulation. As Senator Wilson stated concerning the
term "immunities" in the Civil Rights Act, it "merely secure[d] to
citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the law."331
In particular, it was the function of the Civil Rights Act to enforce the
privilege or immunity of citizenship of being subject to equal regulation
of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizenship. The
language of the Act guaranteed "the same" rights of citizenship. For
example, Congressman Shellabarger said of the Civil Rights Bill:
[E]xcept so far as it confers citizenship it neither confers nor defines nor
regulates any right whatever. Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights,
but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are
imposed by State law shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions based on r3:ce or former condition of slavery. 332

Shellabarger also said of Section 1 of the Bill:
[I]f this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate these civil
rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., then
it would . . . be an assumption of the reserved rights of the States and the
people. But, sir, except so far as it confers citizenship, it neither confers nor
defines nor regulates any rights whatever. Its whole effect is not to confer or
regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and
obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike
without distinction based on race or former condition of slavery. 333

In addition, Senator Trumbull stated regarding the Civil Rights Bill that
it "will have no operation . . . where all persons have the same civil
rights without regard to col?r or race. " 334 Thus, the power to regulate

330. CONG. GLOBE,,39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866).
331. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Senator Trumbull stated
that the Act "in no manner interfere[d] with the municipal regulations of any State which
protects all alike in their rights of person· and property. It could have no operation in
Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, or most of the States of the Union." Id. at 1761.
332. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 188.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 122.
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the rights of citizens was left in the hands of the state governments
under both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. As
Senator Bingham stated, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment took
"from no State any right that ever pertained to it."335
Both the Miller majority and the dissenters in the Slaughter-House
Cases recognized this principle. Justice Bradley stated in his dissent that
"[c]itizenship of the United States ought to be, and, according to the
Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in any and
every State in this Union, subject to such regulations as the legislature
may rightfully prescribe."336 According to Justice Miller, "[t]he power
here exercised by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature,
one which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history
of this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may
now be questioned in some of its details. " 337 Justice Miller, quoting
Chancellor Kent,338 gave the test for whether a regulation by a state
pursuant to its police power violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition on abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens:
"Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses,
the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to propel cars, the
building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all," says
Chancellor Kent, "be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of
population, on the general and rational principle, that every person ought so to
use his property as not to injure his neighbors; and that private interests must

335. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
336. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 113 (1872).
337. Id. at 62.
338. Chancellor Kent discussed the general power of the government to regulate
property rights in order to protect the rights of all the citizens when they come into
conflict in his Commentaries:
But though property be thus protected, it is still to be understood that the
lawgiver has a right to prescribe the mode and manner of using it, so far as
may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or annoyance
of others, or of the public. The government may, by general regulations,
interdict such uses of property as would create nuisances, and become
dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens.
Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the
deposit of powder, the application of steampower to propel cars, the building
with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all be interdicted
by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational
principle, that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his
neighbors, and that private interests must be made subservient to the general
interests of the community.
2 KENT, supra note 70, at •340 (citations omitted).
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be made subservient to the general interests of the ~ommunity." This is called
the police power; and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw that it is much easier
to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark its
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise. 339

Justice Miller indicated that the regulation in question in the SlaughterHouse Cases would be permissible since not all such exclusive privileges
were forbidden traditionally. 340 However, Justice Miller did not let his
opinion rest on this argument, because he restricted the privileges and
immunities protected under the Clause to a limited set of "national"
privileges and immunities, which did not include the right to be free
from monopolies.
In contrast to Justice Miller, Justice Field, in his dissent, found that the
state of Louisiana had exceeded the limits of its police power in passing
the regulation because it had "infringed" upon a fundamental right of the
people. According to Justice Field:
All sorts of restrictions and burdens are imposed under it [the police power],
and when these are not in conflict with any constitutional prohibitions, or
fundamental principles, they cannot be successfully assailed in a judicial
tribunal. With this power of the State and its legitimate exercise I shall not
differ from the majority of the court. But under the pretence of prescribing a
police regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon any of the just
rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against
abridgment. 341

Justice Bradley also acknowledged that "[t]he right of a State to regulate
the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive
one, and not to be lightly restricted."342 However, he also stated that
"there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation
cannot infringe."343 Justice Bradley later commented on this power of
regulation in Missouri v. Lewis where he stated that the Amendment
"does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit
of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these
respects may exist in two States separated by an imaginary line . . . .
Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding."344
Thus, the distinction between a permissible regulation of a fundamental privilege or immunity and an impermissible abridgement was carried

339. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62 (footnotes omitted).
340. Justice Miller argued: "Nor can it be truthfully denied, that some of the most
useful and beneficial enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been made
successful by means of these exclusive rights, and could only have been conducted to
success in that way." Id. at 66.
341. Id. at 87.
342. Id. at 114.
343. Id.
344. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).
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over to the congressional understanding of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Section 1 as well as the interpretation of the Clause by the
Slaughter-House dissenters. Just as the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizens could be regulated in different ways through
positive local laws under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
:rv, Section 2, so too could the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States be regulated without abridgement under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
regulations prescribing the mode or manner in which the fundamental
rights of citizens could be exercised were municipal regulations,
analogous to special privileges, prohibited by neither the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, nor the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to illuminate the nineteenth century
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article :rv,
Section 2. Such an inquiry is useful in gaining an accurate understanding of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The "privileges" and "immunities" guaranteed
under Article IV, Section 2 were the same as those later guaranteed
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These were those
capacities of the citizen that existed anterior to the establishment of
government, but which could be regulated pursuant to the common good
by the government that was subsequently established.
Although several commentators have argued that the privileges and
immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Section 1 that were
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments, such
as the right to contract and to hold property, are afforded merely
antidiscrimination protection under Section 1,345 it is likely that ·they

345. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note IO. William E. Nelson has contended that "[b]y
understanding secti~n one as an equality guarantee, the puzzle of how Congress could
simultaneously have power to enforce the Bill of Rights and not have power to impose
a specific provision of the Bill on a state is resolved." NELSON, supra note 306, at 119.
Nelson notes that many of the states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide
for all of the same Bill of Rights protections in their state constitutions and yet did not
oppose ratification or change their constitutions to reflect the federal Bill of Rights after
ratification. Id. at 118.
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were originally intended to be provided substantive protection as well.
There was a widespread belief in nineteenth century America that the
privileges and immunities of citizenship were guaranteed substantive
protection under Article IV, Section 2, or at least there was a presumption that certain privileges and immunities of citizens would exist in all
free governments. The states remained free to regulate the exercise of
these fundamental capacities of citizenship in different ways through
municipal regulation. However, they did not remain free to abridge
them. The difference may appear to be a subtle one from the modem
viewpoint. However, a studious inquiry into the nature of the police
power as understood in nineteenth century America would further
illuminate the distinction.

It is particularly noteworthy that although these commentators agree that the right to
contract and other such privileges and immunities of "state" citizenship receive merely
antidiscrimination protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, they seem to argue that
the provisions of the Bill of Rights receive substantive protection as well. For example,
they would agree that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state government from
passing a generally applicable law outlawing all political speech. Such a law would
apply equally to all and yet would be prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of substantive protection for the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
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